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ABSTRACT 
Water user fees imposed by a state on major water uses is a possible new alternative 
source of state water development funds. 
A fee, similar to an excise tax, might be charged for the use of the water resource per se, 
which in a number of states is declared to be the property of the public or the state. 
States generally have not employed such fees as a source of operating funds for water 
agencies or of development capital. Only in the area of water based recreation-fishing, 
boating, camping, etc.-have states extensively employed user fees. The revenues from these 
fees, however, are used only to defray management and operating expenses associated with 
these activities. 
The implementation of user-fee financing would result in some shifts of financing burden 
connected with water programs from the general taxpayers of the state to specific water users. 
Although this approach has not been utilized by states to a significant extent, the "user pay" 
principle is well established ill economic theory. The theory indicates that user fees would be an 
economically more efficient and equitable source for financing water development than general 
tax revenues. 
In the design of fee structures for major water u~es, several characteristics of fees are 
appropriate to consider. Five which were identified in this study are as follows: equity, 
economic efficiency, allocational effectiveness, administrative simplicity, and revenue 
generating potential. These were used to evaluate different structures for extracting fees from 
the user. These rate design considerations may relate only indirectly to a state system of user 
fees since the state fees envisioned in this study in many cases may be only an add-on or 
surcharge to a basic charge imposed by a local entity, such as a municipality or an irrigation 
district. 
Revenue generating potential, the last of the five characteristics listed, was of primary 
interest in this study. Estimates of revenue potential for four major water uses-irrigation, 
municipal, industrial, and recreation-were made with a formula developed in the study for 
this purpose. Gross estimates of potential from public supply and irrigation uses were made for 
several selected states, and somewhat more detailed estimates were made for the four major 
uses in Utah. The calculations indicated that substantial amounts of funds could be generated 
with only modest increases in current charges. 
A preliminary assessment of legal and administrative implications of implementing water 
user fees in the State of Utah was made in this study. The results indicated that some fee 
alternatives probably could be implemented by administrative action; others would require 
legislative approval. Constitutional issues related to some alternatives would have to be 
resolved by the state supreme court. New uses associated with developing Utah's vast energy 
resources appear to offer a particularly promising prospect for instituting a user fee program 
with minimal legal complications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
In response to rapidly increasing public interest 
in the quality of our environment during recent years, 
government legislation and programs have undergone 
significant changes in scope and emphasis. In the area 
of water resources development and management, 
federal funding for large scale storage projects has 
been diminishing at the same time that funding for 
water pollution control programs has grown tremen-
dously. The emphasis in federal investment in water 
development has shifted in the process from direct 
appropriations to the construction agencies for specific 
projects to a multitude of grant and loan programs 
administered by Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and 
others. 
The effect upon the states has been twofold. 
First, the diminishing availability of federal funds for 
more traditional development projects is causing 
states-some with new statewide water plans-
interested in water development to look elsewhere for 
funds. Although past water development has taken 
many choice reservoir sites, it would be questionable 
to say that little further development will be required. 
Projections of capital investment costs based on 
extrapolation of "needs" in framework studies of the 
U.S. Water Resources Council indicated that the total 
costs for water development (exclusive of water 
quality costs) for the period 1970-1980 will amount to 
$126.2 billion. Of this amount, $74 billion is 
non-federal (National Water Commission, 1973 p. 507) 
A second effect of the recent trends in federal 
policy is that the cost sharing provisions of federal 
grant programs for pollution control make substantial 
demands on state financial resources. These demands 
are likely to become more acute in the future as 
pressure is exerted to pass more costs on to state and 
local governments. One estimate placed the costs of 
constructing municipal sewage treatment systems 
between 1973 and 1980 at $33.8 billion, $12.9 billion of 
whi~h is to be provided by state and local governments 
(Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, 1974). 
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The major sources of capital financing available to 
state and local governments are bond proceeds, tax 
revenues, and federal financial aid (state aid is also a 
major source of local government financing). Long-
term debt (bonds) has financed the largest share of 
state and local capital outlays; however, many states 
have not utilized this source for water development. 
Legal debt limitations and interest rate ceilings loom 
ominously in several states. Furthermore, voters in 
some states hold to a "pay-as-you-go" attitude and are 
reluctant to incur long-term debt to pay for water 
projects. Although some states could make more 
effective use of debt capital, the unprecedented high 
level of taxation, particularly property taxation, 
makes this avenue to capital financing difficult. 
With costs of education and other urgent state 
and local programs spiraling, funds for even the most 
attractive water development projects will be difficult 
to obtain. Even if all of the currently used sources of 
funds are used more effectively, they probably will not 
be sufficient to meet total water development needs. 
Because of great public concern for pollution control, 
large amounts of state and local government funds 
have been contributed in support of this activity. If, as 
the National Water Commission (1973) suggests, the 
federal grant program does eventually terminate, 
state and local governments will have to fill the 
financial gap in improving and operating pollution 
control systems. 
States may have to consider new and innovative 
approaches to raising capital to finance water 
projects. One approach which appears to have merit is 
the collection of state water-user fees. Municipal, 
industrial, and agricultural supply uses; fishing, 
boating, hunting, and other recreational uses; and 
flow uses including hydroelectric power production, 
water transportation, and waste dilution all might be 
charged. In a broad sense, a user fee might be 
considered as any form of a charge imposed upon a 
user for the use of a resource. Sales taxes, severance 
taxes, excise taxes, tolls, entrance fees, licenses, 
water rates, and so forth could all be considered as a 
form of user fee under this broad definition. In the 
case of water uses, fees may be charged on amounts of 
water actually used or on rights to use water 
irrespective of amounts used. They may be set to 
cover the costs incurred in developing and supplying 
the water or to charge the users for the privilege of 
utilizing a public resource, unrelated to development 
costs. For some uses, the charge may be made directly 
on the quantity of water consumed or diverted; for 
others the charges may have to be imposed indirectly 
on products or services related to the water resource. 
The type of user fee examined in this study is 
similar to an excise tax. It is a basic charge or 
surcharge, as the case may be, for the use of a 
resource itself. In effect, it might be considered as 
rent collected by the state for the use of a publicly 
owned resource. 
U ser-fee financing has some desirable features 
not found in other methods of capital financing. People 
pay in proportion to amounts of resources and services 
they receive. The fees would tend to allocate water 
resources in an economically efficient manner and to 
reduce waste. The revenues received would provide 
financing for a state to implement its development 
plans and facilitate cost-sharing arrangements with 
other government entities. 
On the other hand, a state imposed water-user fee 
system constitutes a drastic break with tradition. 
User fees generally have not imposed at the state level 
except for certain recreation uses. A number of 
difficult questions should be answered if a broader 
utilization of such fees is to be considered: How can 
fee structures be designed for each of the major water 
uses? What amounts of funds can be expected from 
different levels of fees applied to different uses? What 
economic effects will result? What legal and institu-
tional problems will be encountered and how will these 
be solved? How will user fees be accepted by various 
water users and other citizens? What administrative 
mechanisms will be required to collect fees and 
administer funds? 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHOD 
The purpose of this research project was to seek 
answers to two of the aforementioned questions, those 
pertaining to the design of user fee alternatives and 
estimates of fund generating potential. The answers 
were intended to develop information that might be 
used by state officials in assessing the feasibility of 
water user fees for water development funding and 
provide a basis for subsequent studies. Subobjectives 
designed to achieve this result were as follows: 
1. Examine the experience of government 
agencies, particularly state agencies, with 
the application of water user fees. 
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2. 
3. 
Review user fee theory and devise state 
water-user fee alternatives for the major 
water uses. 
Determine fund generating potential of 
selected water-user fee alternatives. 
4. Identify problem areas and future research 
needs related to this subject. 
Since user fees have been applied successfully to 
some water uses-for example, effluent charges have 
been utilized in European countries to control waste 
discharges to lakes and streams-a logical starting 
point for this project was an examination of water user 
fee experience. A literature review was supplemented 
by information from agency officials with experience 
in administering user fees obtained through question-
naires and interviews. 
An advisory panel was organized to examine the 
findings of the literature review and make recommen-
dations concerning the direction and emphasis of the 
remaining research. The panel provided expertise in 
economics, engineering, state finance, and state water 
planning. Two members of the panel came from Utah 
state government-one from the executive side and 
one from the legislative side. The panel provided a 
coordinating link between state government officials, 
the potential users of the research results, and the 
researchers. With respect to the scope of the project. 
the panel recommended that fund generating potentj~J 
should be estimated for only four major water 
uses-irrigation, municipal, industrial, and recrea-
tional. The scope of the study was adjusted in 
accordance with this recommendation, although other 
major uses are included in the review of pricing 
policies presented in Chapter III. 
In order to devise fee structures for these major 
water uses, appropriate economic theory was re-
viewed. Criteria based upon political and economic 
equity, economic efficiency, allocational effectiveness, 
administrative simplicity, and revenue generation 
potential were identified and subsequently used for 
evaluating fee structures. 
A case study approach was used to analyze 
water-user fee alternatives in Utah. The case studies 
estimated the funds that might be raised by the 
various alternatives under different fee levels. 
Although conditions vary, many of the problems and 
effects of applying water-user fees in Utah could be 
expected in other states. A formula was developed for 
estimating the fund generating potential of user fees 
(see Chapter V) in other states. 
CHAPTER I 
EXPERIENCE OF STATES AND SELECTED 
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS WITH WATER 
USER FEES 
GENERAL 
Various forms of water user charges have been 
utilized by foreign governments and by U.S. federal 
government agencies, and sewer and water charges 
by local governments are common. States generally 
have not employed water-user fees as a source of 
operating funds for water agencies or of water 
development capital. A 1974 survey of state water 
financing arrangements in connection with this project 
and in cooperation with the Utah Division ~f W a~er 
Resources revealed that few states are Imposmg 
water user charges on uses other than recreation and 
then on only a limited basis (see Table 1). Just two 
states reported a fee for water diversions; two others 
have fees for waste discharges; three reported fees on 
hydropower; only one has storage fees; and one ot~er 
state levies fees on water rights from state lands. Nme 
states sell water from state water projects or from 
purchased storage in federal projects. 
Table 1. State user fee programs. a 
State Water Other
b 
Sales User Fees 
Arkansas Storage 
California x 
Hawaii x Water RightsC 
Indiana x 
Kansas x 
Louisiana x 
Michigan Waste Discharge 
Nevada x Hydropower & Diversion 
New Hampshire x 
New Jersey x Diversion 
New York Hydropower 
Ohio x 
Oregon Hydropower 
Wisconsin Waste Discharge 
aSource: Survey of state water-user fee programs con-
ducted in cooperation with the Utah Division of Water 
Resources,46 states responded. 
bExclusive of one-time permit fees and recreation fees 
and licenses. 
cLeases out water rights from state lands. 
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Although state water sales constitute a different 
form of payment by users than the user fee (excise 
tax) being considered in this study, information on 
water sales is included in Table 1. State experience in 
structuring and administering water sales may have 
application in establishing user fee systems. The brief 
descriptions of various state and foreign government 
systems which follow are divided into two sections: 
one on user fees and one on water sales. 
Several states have established special revolving 
water development funds and some states make 
annual appropriations for state and local water 
projects. Most, if not all, states have license fees and 
access fees for fishing, hunting, and various other 
forms of water recreation. The revenues from these 
fees, however, ordinarily serve to defray management 
and operating expenses of the agencies concerned 
with these activities, and none is made available for 
water development or for administrative expenses of 
water management agencies. 
WATER USER FEES 
Ecuador 
The water user fee similar to an excise tax is rare; 
however, it is being employed in a few places. 
Ecuador, South America, (Daines and Falconi, 1974) 
treats water as a publicly owned commodity and 
charges a concession tax on its use. This tax is not 
related to maintenance, operation, or the value of the 
works from which the user benefits, but is a tax on the 
use of water per se. The amount of the tax varies with 
the amount of use, and different rates are applied to 
different uses. Only culinary use is exempt. The tax is 
based upon metered use or upon the amount awarded 
in the concession. The funds generated by the tax are 
used to finance the operation of the government's 
water agency. See Appendix A for a schedule of 
charges. 
British Columbia 
In British Columbia, Canada, ownership of water 
resources rests with the province, and annual rental 
fees must be paid for storage and diversion rights for a 
wide range of uses (Province of British Columbia, 
1974). Rentals are payable whether the licensee 
exercises his rights or not. Current rental rates are 
presented in Appendix A. 
Except for water used for hydropower, the 
annual rental fees are nominal. Of the approximately 
$11 million of annual revenue produced by these fees, 
in 1976 two-thirds came from hydropower. The main 
purpose of the fees, according to a province water 
official, is not to generate revenue, but to establish 
government ownership of the resources and encour-
age licensees to give up unused rights. The revenues 
are not earmarked for water development or 
administration but revert to the general funds of the 
province. 
Arkansas 
Under provisions of Act 81 of 1957, Arkansas 
requires that no person construct or own a dam to 
impound water exceeding a certain size on any stream 
until he obtains a permit from the Arkansas Soil and 
Water Conservation Commission. The act further 
requires that an annual fee of 2 cents per acre foot be 
charged for the water stored. The money derived from 
these fees goes into the Arkansas Water Development 
Fund which is administered by the Commission. The 
Commission may use the funds to participate in water 
development projects through loans, grants-in-aid, 
and joint ventures. 
Hawaii 
The Department of Land and Natural Resources 
leases out water rights from state lands by public 
auction. The revenues are deposited in the state's 
general fund. 
Michigan 
The Michigan Water Resources Commission 
administers a water quality surveillance fee program. 
Origi~ally authorized by the State Legislature in 1970, 
surveillance fees generate approximately $1 million 
annually. The fees are graduated from $50 to $9,000. 
They are charged to commercial and industrial 
facilities which discharge wastewater to the surface or 
groundwaters of the state. Proceeds are used to 
reimburse the state for costs incurred in monitoring 
the discharges. 
Nevada 
Colorado River water users are charged $0.05 to 
$0.55 per acre foot surcharge on top of $0.50 per acre 
foot paid the Bureau of Reclamation for diverted 
water. These funds are used to cover administrative 
expenses of the Division of Colorado River Resources, 
the agency that has responsibility for administering 
the power resources allocated to Nevada from the 
Colorado River Storage Project. All contracts execu-
ted after 1963 for power generated on the river 
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system provide for a charge of .03 mills per kwh to be 
deposited into the Division's Research and Develop-
ment fund. This income (approximately $5,000 
annually) is available for water development, and is in 
addition to income from a 0.1 mill per kwh 
administrative "surcharge." 
New Jersey 
Surface water diversion fees, which currently 
range from $1.00 to $10.00 per million gallons as flows 
are decreased below minimum levels to zero, were 
established by statute in 1907. In part, the fees were 
to provide economic incentive against streamflow 
depletion; however, the charges are not high enough 
to meet this objective in today's economic environ-
ment. Current annual revenue of approximately 
$250,000 is returned to the state treasury. 
New York 
Four hydropower developments utilizing waters 
in which the state has a propriatory right must pay 
annual license fees into the state general fund. The 
first of these licenses was granted in 1896 for 
perpetuity at a flat rate of $200 per year. The three 
other licenses, granted in the mid 1920s for terms 
ranging from 30 to 50 years, pertain to surplus waters 
of the state canal system. Flat rates charged for these 
three licenses annually amount to $12,000, $18,000, 
and $40,000. 
Sixty applications for hydropower licenses were 
received by the state prior to 1930. Some never came 
to fruition; others expired and were not renewed. No 
new applications have been submitted since 1930. 
Oregon 
The state requires hydroelectric power plants to 
pay annual fees of 20 cents per theoretical horsepower 
per year and obtains approximately one-half million 
dollars per year revenue. The proceeds go into a state 
general fund. 
These annual fees have been in effect for several 
decades, and currently are imposed on 80 private 
companies and municipalities. According to a state 
water official, the fees were initially imposed along 
with limited term licenses on hydropower to constrain 
the development of monopolies. Hydropower was 
considered a profitable enterprise, and many different 
interests were competing to tie up available power 
sites. The fee was viewed strictly as a tax. 
Wisconsin 
The Department of Natural Resources adminis-
ters a monitoring fee on waste discharges. Discharg-
ers of industrial wastes, toxic, and hazardous 
substances are required to pay a $50 annual 
monitoring fee plus an additional fee based upon the 
concentration and quantity of pollutants discharged. 
See Appendix A for fee schedule. 
WATER SALES 
California 
California sells water developed and delivered 
under its large state water project. Water supply 
contracts have been made with 31 local water 
organizations, representing two-thirds of the state's 
population and one-fourth of its land area. These 
organizations have contracted to pay all project costs 
allocated to water supply-about 85 percent of the 
total cost. In 1975 it was estimated (State of 
California, Department of Water Resources, 1975) 
that total project construction expenditures would 
eventually reach $4 billion and that an additional $3.9 
billion would be required for distribution systems to 
convey water from project aqueducts to users; this 
latter amount to be paid exclusively by the local water 
contractors. 
Under the water supply contracts, $71.9 million of 
local funds were advanced to pay construction costs 
for delivery structures and excess capacity required 
locally. Some organizations at the lower end of the 
project delivery system began making payments 
several years in advance of water deliveries. The 
contracts require payments of 1) a Delta water charge 
and 2) a transportation charge. 
The Delta water charge is assessed for each 
acre-foot of water a contractor is entitled to receive. 
The charge is computed so as to return to the state 
during the term of the contract all costs (together with 
interest) attributed to the reservoirs and other 
facilities used to store water and release it down-
stream to the Sacramento River Delta. Costs allocated 
to flood control, recreation, and fish and wildlife 
enhancement are not paid under the water supply 
contracts, but charges for power costs and credits for 
power revenues are included in the determination of 
the Delta water charge. 
The transportation charge is computed so as to 
return to the state during the term of the contract the 
costs of the aqueducts required to deliver the water 
from the Delta to the respective contractors. 
Construction costs and operating costs of each 
aqueduct reach are allocated each year among 
contractors whose deliveries are or will be conveyed 
through that reach. Municipal and industrial users 
repay each year's construction expenditures with 
interest in 50 equal annual installments. Agricultural 
users repay allocated construction costs by a uniiorm 
charge per acre-foot of water entitlement computed to 
return such costs with interest during the term of the 
contract. The publication entitled, Standard Provi-
sions for Water Supply Contracts (State of California 
Department of Water Resources, 1962) describes the 
principles used to define the two charges. Current 
rates are tabulated in Bulletin No. 132-76 (State of 
California, Department of Water Resources, 1976). 
The 31 contractors that purchase water from the 
State Water Project recover their costs through direct 
user charges, property taxes, or a combination of the 
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two. The Metropolitan Water District of Southern 
California (MWD), one of the major contractors, 
supplies water to agricultural, municipal, and indus-
trial users. The water rates and financing structure of 
MWD, though not typical of smaller contractors, 
exemplifies local arrangements for repaying state 
water contract costs. 
The MWD delivers water to six counties in 
Southern California. The Colorado River and the state 
project bringing water from Northern California are 
its two sources of supply. Deliveries may be of raw, 
untreated water, or filtered water. 
The district obtains revenue from water sales, 
property taxes, annexation charges, and interest 
income. Water sales and property taxes account for 
most of the income. In addition to payments for state 
project water, the District must pay debt service on 
bond obligations and operating costs. 
The distribution of costs between taxpayers and 
water users is guided by provisions of Resolution 5821 
which was adopted by MWD in 1960. 
All payments received by the Metropolitan 
Water District of Southern California for annexa-
tion charges shall be applied first to bond 
obligations to which they are or become pledged 
and next to reduce other indebtedness resulting 
from capital expenditures. 
At least one-half of all remaining capital 
charges plus all operation and maintenance costs of 
the Metropolitan Water District of Southern 
California shall be borne by sales of water at 
uniform rates to constituent members irrespective 
of the source of point of delivery of the water, 
except for equitable surcharges to reflect the cost 
of special services. The rate for water shall be at 
least as large as the total of all such costs in the 
three prior fiscal years plus the anticipated cost in 
the next three years divided by the total quantity 
delivered to constituent members in the three 
prior years and that quantity projected for the 
ensuing three years. 
The remainder of all capital charges may be 
met from tax levies on the basis of assessed values 
of property within the Metropolitan . Water 
District of Southern California to the extent 
permitted by law; when the expectancy that this 
tax burden will diminish progressively as the use 
of water approaches the total of the Aqueducts' 
supplies. 
According to the resolution, after annexation 
charges and interest income have been subtracted, the 
remaining capital costs are divided with one-half or 
more being assigned to water users and the remaining 
one-half or less being assigned to taxpayers. The 
resolution also requires that all operating costs be 
repaid by water users. These include 1) fixed costs of 
operating the District systems and the District's 
obligation to the State Water Project and 2) variable 
costs, which are essentially power costs, incurred in 
delivering water through the Colorado River Aque-
duct and the State Water Project. 
The Metropolitan Water District Act (Chapter 
429, Statutes 1927) requires uniform water rates 
throughout the District except for equitable sur-
charges for special services or associated with cost 
differences among the sources from which water is 
obtained. Under this latter provision, MWD has 
established a uniform surcharge for state project 
water above the charge for Colorado River water. 
Current water rates of MWD for given classes of 
service are shown in Appendix A. Water rates for 
agriculture and groundwater replenishment do -not 
cover the full share of capital and fixed operating costs 
incurred in providing service. Resolution 5821 states 
that taxpayers should make up the deficit. 
There has been continuing discussion in the 
District about the division of charges between the 
general taxpayer and the water user. When the 
Colorado River Aqueduct was initially put in 
operation, there were not many users to pay the costs, 
so a large portion (approximately 90 percent) of the 
costs was paid by the taxpayers. As years passed, the 
proportion paid by the water users increased, and a 
50-50 split was adopted in 1960. Although the 
argument has been made each year since that time to 
increase the proportion paid by users, the split has 
remained at about 50-50. One of the counter 
arguments made for keeping a portion of the costs on 
the general taxpayer is that some of the major 
regional systems of MWD have considerable excess 
capacity. This excess capacity might be considered as 
an investment in meeting future requirements. 
Hawaii 
The Department of Land and Natural Resources 
operates three irrigation systems which support 
farming operations at Waimanalo on Oahu, Lalamilo 
on Hawaii, and in West Molokai. The Board of Land 
and Natural Resources has the power to fix and adjust 
rates and charges so that the revenues derived from 
the irrigation systems are sufficient to cover the cost 
of operation, maintenance, replacement, and the 
capital costs. Water rate schedules for these three 
irrigation systems are shown in Appendix A. 
Indiana 
The Department of Natural Resources is empow-
ered to sell water from impoundments constructed by 
the state or from impoundments of the Corps of 
Engineers in which the state has acquired water 
supply storage. Sales have been made from both 
classes of impoundments and in all cases the sales have 
been for municipal water supply. Revenues from these 
sales are deposited in a dedicated water resources 
development fund to be used for the acquisition of 
additional water supply storages. 
Kansas 
In 1974, the Kansas legislature passed legislation 
authorizing the purchase of water supply storage 
space in federal reservoirs and the sale of water from 
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this state-managed conservation storage. Provisions 
in the legislation for setting charges are as follows: 
a. Provision for charges, which shall be set by 
the board, at a rate which the board shall 
fix of not less than five cents (5.) per one 
thousand (1,000) gallons of water at the 
point of withdrawal from the reservoir and 
not greater than ten cents (10.) per one 
thousand (1,000) gallons of water at the 
point of withdrawal from the reservoir; 
b. Provisions for a minimum charge to be paid 
in equal annual installments during the 
term of the contract, the sum of which shall 
be fifty percent (50%) of the total amount 
of water contracted for during the term of 
the contract multiplied by the rate fixed 
under paragraph (a), and that such mini-
mum charge is to be paid each calendar year 
whether or not such amounts of water is 
withdrawn during the calendar year (Sen-
ate Bill No. 633). 
Louisiana 
When the diversion works for the Toledo Bend 
Reservoir (constructed jointly by Texas and Louisi-
ana) are completed, the state will sell water at a rate 
of 4 1/4 cents to 511z cents pt:. { r ,000 gallons. However, 
the money derived from this r1y"oject will not be used to 
support state-wide water dt:>vt'lopment. 
Nevada 
The Southern Nevada Water System under the 
Division of Colorado River Resources is financed by 
Nevada general obligation bonds, and a federal grant 
from the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment. Pumping and transmission facilities were 
constructed by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. The 
bond service and the construction costs of pumping 
and transmission facilities are being repaid from 
revenues. Water user fees are not being charged to 
finance further water development but cover the 
state's actual cost of operation and maintenance plus 
debt service. 
The Marlette Lake Water System under the 
Nevada Department of General Services sells water 
wholesale according to executed contracts with Storey 
County, Carson City, Lake View Subdivision, and the 
State of Nevada Department of Buildings and 
Grounds. The universal wholesale cost to these 
entities is $0.16 per 1,000 gallons, less 10 percent for 
evaporation, and revenues are used to pay for 
operation and maintenance costs. 
New Hampshire 
The Board of Water Resources operates three 
water projects: 
1. Pittsburg Dam at the headwaters of the 
Connecticut River which off(>rs conservation storage 
for hydroelectric power genpration downstream. 
2. Lake Winnipesaukee Dam at Lakeport 
which offers public recreation and water conservation 
for hydroelectric generation downstream. 
3. Greenville Water Supply Reservoir which 
provides flood control benefits and domestic water 
supply for the town of Greenville. 
Contract sales to water users make the projects 
self-supporting. "The compensation for the use of the 
stored water or other benefits created by the project 
shall be made equitable as between different users" 
(State of New Hampshire, Revised Statutes Annoted 
481:1). Revenue pays for capital costs, interest 
charges, supervision, maintenance, and operation of 
the projects with no expense to the state general 
funds. 
New Jersey 
The state's major role in water supply is in 
wholesaling raw water to water purveyors and other 
public and private users. New Jersey does not 
construct or subsidize treatment, transmission, or 
water distribution facilities. 
Sources of revenue from water sales from state 
owned and operated facilities are as follows: 
1. The Delaware and Raritan Canal. This 
canal, constructed in the 1930s was rehabilitated in 
the 1940s with state appropriations to provide a 
source of raw water supply for public and industrial 
use. Revenue in 1973 from water sales on a peak 
demand charge basis amounted to $555,000 ($250,000 
in excess of operation and maintenance expenses) and 
this was returned to the state treasury. Cost per 
million gallons recently was increased from $35 to $50 
to establish rates compatible with charges on other 
state projects. 
, 
2. Round vaUey Spruce Run Proiect. Con-
struction of this reservoir was authorized and funded 
by the New Jersey Water Supply Bond Act of 1958. 
The charge for water from this project covers all 
operating and maintenance costs; however, the state 
pays the cost for bonding and interest on the unsold 
balance of water which the project can develop. 
Ohio 
The Department of Natural Resources supplies 
water from surface water impoundments constructed 
by the state or by the Corps of Engineers. When a 
water customer is identified, treatment and distribu-
tion works are constructed and sales begin as soon as 
the pool reaches the required level. Water supply 
capacity is sometimes allocated for future expansion 
anc held in escrow until needed. Rate schedules vary 
from location to location with the amount of available 
supply and the amount of operation, maintenance, and 
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capital costs assumed by the customer. The general 
formula for determination of the rate is: 
Operation +Maintenance+ Interest+ Amortization Unit price 
Available supply 
Calculations for Corps projects utilize a 50 year 
project life, and those for state projects use a 40 year 
project life. Factors are estimated conservatively so 
that the program will be self-sustaining when all 
impoundments are operating. In the beginning, a 
portion of the operation and maintenance is financed 
by appropriation from the General Revenue Fund. 
The Department of Public Works supplies water 
to various activities throughout the state from an old 
canal system and feeder lakes. The major customers 
are industries. See Appendix A for rate schedules. 
A number of cooperative arrangements for water 
supply have been negotiated between the Department 
of Natural Resouces and municipalities. For example, 
the Department agreed with the City of Clyde to share 
the cost of a reservoir recommended in the Northwest 
Ohio Water Development Plan. After the final costs 
were determined, the state's equity in the reservoir 
amounted to 39 percent of the impoundment space. 
The state shares operation and maintenance costs on a 
39-61 percentage ratio. The state also shares in the 
receipts from water sales. In 1974, the City of Clyde 
and the State of Ohio sold an average of 2,500,000 
gallons of water per day to an industrial user, 
Columbia LNG. The arrangement is unique in that the 
State of Ohio has assured the quality parameters of 
the water which Columbia LNG withdraws at the 
reservoir outlet. 
Another cooperative arrangement was made 
between the Department of Natural Resources and 
Kelleys Island. Until recently, Kelleys Island was 
using chlorinated surface water from Lake Erie, and 
the State Park on the Island was one of the largest 
water users. In this instance the state advanced 
$65,913 to Kelleys Island to assist in the construction 
of a slow sand filter treatment plant. Kelleys Island 
will repay this advance by giving the State Park "free" 
water service until such time as the $65,913 advance 
funding is repaid. 
At Alum Creek Reservoir, the state has 
undertaken the option of a low interest, 50-year 
repayment schedule, which the Corps of Engineers 
customarily offers for water supply storage in Corps 
dams. The state has contracted with the cities of 
Columbus and Westerville to provide water from state 
water supply equity in the impoundment. In this 
example, the state acts as the middle man, collecting 
payments from the cities and passing them to the 
Corps. No state profit or loss is involved. 
Ohio regional water plans are designed to provide 
water needs over a 50-year period. Accordingly, when 
a multi-purpose water project is recommended in one 
of the regional plans, it is assumed that the engineers 
have correctly assessed the amount of water that will 
become available and the regional needs. State 
assistance is considered only after the municipality 
applies for help in the construction of a project 
identified in the regional plan. 
Generally, the state participates in impound-
ments which include water for recreation, municipal 
water supply, agricultural irrigation, and sustained 
stream flow. In some cases, without any charge to 
downstream landowners, the state intentionally 
releases water to maintain low flows. However, 
sustained stream flow releases are not made to dilute 
waste loads as this would be at variance with the 
provisions of the Water Quality Act of 1972. 
If the state is petitioned to release water for 
downstream withdrawal for agricultural irrigation, 
the water is sold to the user at prevailing rates. 
Reeent Experience of Washington 
State with Water User-fee 
Legislation 
A bill which would have required irrigators and 
other water users to pay a fee to the state for the use 
of water per se was introduced in the 1975 session of 
the Washington State Legislature at the request of 
the governor. The governor explained his request as 
follows: 
In 1917 the legislature passed the water code 
for the State of Washington and legislatively 
stated very clearly that 'all waters within the state 
belong to the public.' We gave it away and have 
consistently given it away because we thought 
that it was abundant. But water today, just like 
land, is scarce. 
Fifty-eight years after adoption of our water 
code we now face a water shortage in essentially 
every river basin in the state with the exception of 
the lower Snake and the mid-Columbia. So 
existing water supplies in many areas of our state 
are today inadequate. Irrigation is the largest 
potential use of water in the state. We today use 
more water for irrigation than for all other 
purposes combined. Today about a million and a 
half acres of Washington State land is under 
irrigation. Ten million more acres are potential for 
irrigation. 
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My concern was expressed ... in the conversa-
tion and agricultural messages I presented to the 
legislature near the beginning of this session, 
indicating my belief, which I still hold strongly, 
that the future of this state is very much involved 
with the development of agriculture. The agricul-
tural surpluses of a few years ago are now world 
wide shortages. 
The governor explained that his bill specified 
that 80 percent of the proposed charge for water 
would go into a fund 'which would be used for a 
grant and loan program to expand and develop the 
very thing that we are talking about: the 
enormous agricultural future of the State of 
Washington (The Idaho Falls Post Register, 
September 19, 1975). 
The bill (House Bill No. 458; copy in Appendix G) 
specified that "the fee shall relate only to rights to 
divert or withdraw and make use of significant 
amounts of public waters for industrial, commercial, 
and agricultural irrigation purposes." Initial and 
immediate opposition arose from irrigation interests. 
One real estate developer saw the bill as a "socialistic 
drive" to gain state control of water, and a threat to 
private development (Tri City Herald-Pasco, Kenne-
wick, Richland, Washington, February 19, 1975). An 
Eastern Washington legislator said that fee would 
amount to double taxation, noting that "farmers pay 
taxes on their land and charging for water would be 
another tax" (Tri City Herald-Pasco. Kennewick, 
Richland, Washington, February, 13, 1974). Legisla-
tors observed that it was a drastic break with 
tradition, and that no other states are "taxing farmers 
for water." One Senator and former Farm Bureau 
leader expressed concern that the Winters doctrine 
would apply and that Idaho and Canada could justly 
come in for a portion of the revenues (Idaho Falls Post 
Register, September 30, 1975). Some individuals 
argued that the governor seemed to be overly 
influenced by environmental and ecology interests 
(Idaho Falls Post Register, September 23, 1975). 
Although there was some expressed support for the 
bill and the user-fee concept within the Washington 
legislature, the upshot of the adverse publicity and 
strong special interest opposition killed the bill in 
committee. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORY OF USER FEES 
ADD-ON FEE (EXCISE TAX) 
Introduction 
Since the user fees examined in this study are a 
type of excise tax, the theory on excise taxes is 
relevant. "Excises" are of two types, a "unit tax" for 
which the base of the tax is the physical amount of the 
resource being taxed and an "ad valorem tax" for 
which the base is the value of the resource. A broad 
based "ad valorem" tax is generally known as a "sales 
tax." 
Price Effect 
The impact of excises on price is a very important 
consideration in evaluating their feasibility and one 
which economic theory addresses in detail. If no 
account is taken of how the money raised by the tax is 
spent, then the impact depends on who pays the tax. 
It could be passed along to the consumer in the form of 
higher prices, absorbed by the producer in reduced 
profits, or shifted back on to the resource owners in 
the form of lower wages, rents, royalties, interest 
charges, etc. The way the tax burden is shared among 
these three groups depends on the market structure 
for the industry and the nature of demand. Generally, 
speakinK the more important and essential the good, 
the more likely the tax will be passed along to the 
consumer in the form of higher prices; however the 
ability to pass the tax along is influenced greatl~ by 
market structure. Only in the case of constant 
production costs and a competitive situation can the 
tax be passed along fully to the customer. The 
geometric and algebraic proofs of these statements 
are found in Appendix F. 
In monopoly situations, the prices being charged 
before the tax are already inflated by monopoly profit. 
The price increase associated with a tax in this 
circumstance can be expected to be about one-half of 
what it would be in the competitive market. More 'of 
the tax would be absorbed by the producer out of 
profits. In general, an excise will be only partially 
pas.sed. along to the cu~tomers, and only that part 
which IS passed along will reduce consumption. 
Unit Tu and Ad Valorem Tu Compared 
A unit tax is based on only one variable-"output" 
while an ad valorem tax is based on two-"output" and 
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"price." An ad valorem tax will generate larger 
revenues than a unit tax when demand is high and 
lower revenues than a unit tax when demand is low. If 
the purpose of the tax is to curtail consumption of the 
product, then the obvious choice is the ad valorem tax 
since it will lead from a similar initial burden to a 
higher price and a smaller output and use. 
Administrative Considerations 
The broader the base of an excise tax, the simpler 
it would be to administer. It is easi~r to tax all boats 
than just those used for recreational purposes. The 
tax is more likely to be passed along to the consumer 
since the broader base would undoubtedly mean more 
firms would be involved. 
Excise taxes also are subject to geographical 
considerations. Local excise taxes easily can be 
avoided by making purchases elsewhere. The oppor-
tunity for tax avoidance is reduced as the geographical 
range of the tax is increased. 
Imposition of the Tax 
An excise tax can be levied at the manufacturing, 
who!~saling, or retailing level. The advantages at the 
retailing level are several. It imposes the tax on the 
actual selling price so as not to discriminate against 
the means of production and distribution. Lower rates 
can be used for the same amount of revenue than at 
the other levels. It also avoids the problems of tax 
pyramiding in which the tax is imposed more than 
once within the productive and distribution processes. 
The fact that the tax is not hidden in the price 
encourages uniformity of treatment of customers. The 
problem of how to handle taxed inventories is 
removed. The major disadvantage of the retail excise 
is that the collection process increases the number of 
taxpayers substantially and makes auditing more 
costly. 
Other Considerations 
Excise taxes could in some cases alter the quality 
of the products produced and the size of market areas 
if the tax is included in transportation costs. Also, if 
the tax is hidden, customers may confuse the tax with 
general inflation and their demand curves will shift 
accordingly. As a result, prices might rise more than 
theory would indicate. 
FULL COST FEE (PRICING SCHEMES) 
When the fee is to cover the cost of the product or 
service and not just be a percentage additional to the 
base price, more general micro economic theory is 
applicable. When the structure, goals, and manage-
ment of a monopoly water supply system are 
analyzed, the theory suggests three broad strategies 
that might be used in relating price to costs of 
production. These strategies are marginal cost 
pricing, average cost pricing, and monopoly pricing. 
Although the user fees (excise tax) considered in 
this study for generating state water development 
funds do not necessarily relate price to costs at the 
state level, it is useful to examine pricing policies in 
designing fee structures and establishing fee levels. 
Local organizations-mutual irrigation companies, 
municipalities, etc.-that have a state water fee 
imposed upon them can be expected to distribute this 
tax burden to their shareholders or customers. The 
effects of this distribution will depend to some extent 
on the pricing strategy a local unit employs. The state 
imposed fee may be considered in effect as an element 
of operating cost to these local organizations. 
Marginal and Average Cost Pricing 
Marginal cost pricing is the policy most conducive 
to the efficient use of resources. This policy sets the 
price at a level at which the marginal costs and 
benefits are equal. In other words, the user is charged 
a price for a resource that is equal to the incremental 
(marginal) cost of production. In Figure 1 marginal 
cost is represented by curve MC, average cost is 
represented by curve AC, and demand is represented 
by line D. 
Pric:e 
Quanti tv 
Figure 1. Marginal cost pricing. 
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The most efficient price is located where the MC 
curve intersects the D curve (P e)' When the price is 
set below marginal costs (PI) resources will be 
overused (Ql)' Alternatively, if prices are set above 
marginal costs (P2)' resources will be underused (Q2)' 
At price PI the costs of producing quantity Ql far 
exceed the price and result in a loss. At price P2' the 
price far exceeds the cost of producing quantity Q2' 
Only at P e are the costs and revenues equated. 
Costs, however, do not always follow the pattern 
shown on Figure 1 in which marginal costs are 
increasing where they cross the demand curve. 
Municipal services are frequently thought to be 
decreasing cost industries (each additional unit up to 
the total demand costs less to produce than the 
previous unit). In this case, pricing at marginal cost 
will fail to cover the costs of production (Hoggan and 
Asplund, 1974), competing industries will be forced 
out of business, and the remaining monopoly will then 
be able to raise its prices to more than cover its costs. 
In Figure 2, AC represents the average cost of 
producing a commodity and includes a "fair" rate of 
return on the capital investment. MC represents the 
marginal cost of producing an additional unit, and D 
represents the demand of the commodity at any given 
price. Typically, the regulated price for a monopoly (a 
decreasing cost industry) allows costs to be recovered, 
along with a "fair" return on investment. This is 
referred to as average cost pricing. At Pc' in Figure 2, 
the firm is covering costs as well as earning a fair rate 
of return on its investment. The determination of 
average cost is relatively easy, and given that costs 
are clearly specified, this approach is straight forward 
and considered equitable politically. However, if the 
price is set at the most economically efficient price P e' 
the firm operates at a loss equal to the rectangle 
PI GHP ~' and a subsidy would be required to maintain 
productIon. Either efficient pricing is sacrificed or the 
utility is subsidized. 
Priee 
Figure 2. Decreasing cost industry. 
AC 
MC 
Quanti tv 
Some economists argue that water service, at 
least in instances where more distant sources must be 
sought is not a decreasing cost industry. All economies 
of scale have disappeared due to increasing costs of 
providing for treatment and for system expansion. 
Figure 3 graphically represents an increasing cost 
industry. Setting the price equal to average cost, P a' 
encourages over use as Qa will be demanded. The 
marginal cost of producing the last unit, however, 
exceeds the price by PaP c. Average cost pricing in 
this situation is obviously a poor business practice. 
With the price set equal to marginal cost, conservation 
is encouraged as the quantity demanded is reduced to 
Q . The price reflects the costs of production, 
alfocates the resource efficiently, and generates a pure 
economic profit equal to the rectangle PbP eAB. 
Price 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\~m 
Figure 9. Increasing cost industry. 
Monopoly Pricing 
D 
Quant in 
When the primary objective of a water utility is to 
raise money, monopoly pricing is the most effective 
because it maximizes profit with the firm producing at 
the point where marginal cost and marginal revenue 
are equal. If marginaJ costs are below marginal 
revenue, selling one or more unit will increase profits. 
Alternatively, if marginal cost is above marginal 
revenue, additional units decrease profits. In Figure 
4, MR represents the marginal revenue curve. At 
point G, where marginal cost equals marginal 
revenue, the price is Pm' the quantity demand is Q , 
and the firm generates a profit equal to the rectan~e 
ABCPm. Clearly, the"result of maximizing revenue is 
under utilization of resources. 
Price Discrimination 
Some resources are purchased by various distinct 
groups of buyers (residential and industrial water 
users, for example). When it is possible to separate 
markets in this way, it also is possible to practice 
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Figure 4. Monopoly pricing. 
discriminatory prlcmg by charging different user 
groups different prices for the same commodity. 
Because marginal revenue is a function of demand 
elasticity, a monopoly can divide the market and 
allocate output among sub markets equating marginal 
revenue in each submarket with the aggregate 
marginal revenue at the marginal cost point. In this 
situation, price is established by the demand in each 
submarket. The more elastic the demand in the 
submarket, the lower the equilibrium submarket 
price. 
Figure 5 shows how profit maximization is 
achieved with price discrimination. There are two 
market demand curves. Dl Dl represents one and 
D2D~ represents another. MRl represents the 
margmal revenue in the first submarket and MR2 
represents the marginal revenue in the other 
submarket. The curve MR represents the aggregate 
marginal revenue. By including the aggregate 
marginal and average cost curves, the profit 
maximizing prices can be determined. The profit 
maximizing performance is now reduced to a 
monopoly problem. The total output should be Q at 
which MC = EMR. 
In sub market 1 the price is set at Pl and the 
quantity sold is Ql. In submarket 2 the price is P2 and 
the quantity sold is Q2. 
Marginal revenue in submarket 1 equals marginal 
revenue in submarket 2 equals r with this sales 
distribution. If total output and sales were less than 
Ql marginal revenue in one market or the other (or 
both) would be greater than r and marginal cost less 
than r. Increases in quantity up to Q would therefore 
add more to total receipts than to total costs and 
would increase profits. If total output and sales were 
expanded beyond Ql marginal cost would exceed rand 
marginal revenue in one or both markets would be less 
than r. Such increases in production would add more 
to total costs than to total receipts and would decrease 
profits. 
D 
B r-----~--~~~~~~~ 
A 
Figure 5. Profit maximization with price discrimi-
nation. 
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SUMMARY 
In summary, the theory of excise taxes and user 
charges suggests that the most efficient approach to 
collecting user fees to finance additional water 
resources development programs would be through a 
full-cost fee rather than through an add-on fee or 
excise tax. In a competitive pricing situation, rather 
unlikely for water supply and other water project 
services, higher charges would alter previous re-
source allocation, probably in the direction of reduced 
efficiency. In the more likely monopoly situation, a 
monopoly position can be used to collect extra 
revenue, and price discrimination can be used to 
collect even more. Such additional revenue can be 
used as capital to finance water resource develop-
ment. This approach to financing should be more 
equitable than financing through general tax revenues 
because having users pay the fixed cost for serving 
them as a group enhances overall resource allocation 
efficiency. 
CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF APPLICATIONS OF WATER 
PRICING POLICIES 
GENERAL 
Prices are used to allocate scarce resources. 
Buyers offer prices that reflect their valuation of a 
resource, and sellers quote prices that reflect the costs 
of production. This suggests that over the long run 
revenues collected will equal or exceed costs of 
production (Howe, 1967). 
An increase in the consumption of a commodi-
ty produces a benefit to the consumer. Every 
expansion in output usually requires, however, the 
withdrawal of resources from the production of 
some other item. Therefore, the expansion of 
output entails a cost to the would be consumers of 
foregone alternate products and services. The 
general role of prices is to balance benefits and 
costs at the margin, i.e., to assert proper checks 
and balances on both production and consumption 
in any economy. Therefore, prices have two 
functions: to discourage excessive consumption of 
a commodity and to induce the desired supply of 
that commodity. Prices can act not only on the 
marketing of private goods but also in regulating 
the production and consumption of certain com-
modities produced by governments (Hanke and 
Davis, 1973, p. 808). 
U ser-fees are similar to market prices and 
provide the best results where the cost of exclusion is 
low, few or no consumption externalities exist, and 
the reSUlting redistribution of income appears 
favorable. 
Chapter II describes such policies as marginal 
cost pricing, average cost pricing, monopoly pricing, 
and price discrimination. This chapter looks at the 
various uses of water and describes the pricing 
policies for each use. In irrigation and M and I uses, 
the fees are designed to cover all relevant costs. In 
pollution and recreational uses, the fee is designed to 
cover only costs to achieve that benefit and not for the 
entire project. 
IRRIGATION PRICING POLICIES 
The federal government has long followed a policy 
of increasing the productive capacity of agriCUlture. 
This policy is based on two goals: first, insuring low 
foo~ prices through abundant supplies of agricultural 
products; and second, improving the standard of living 
for the rural population. When western expansion 
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reached the semiarid regions, the federal government 
began building irrigation projects. The Reclamation 
Act of 1902, a major landmark in federal water policy 
has provided massive support for irrigation of arid 
lands (Howe et al., 1971). 
Irrigation water pricing policy of the federal 
reclamation program reflected the social goals of 
settlement and equity of opportunity for the nation's 
farmer. Evidence of this can be seen in the repayment 
policies of the reclamation program. First, irrigators 
are not required to pay interest charges on 
reclamation project costs attributed to irrigation. 
Second, there is a waiting period of 10 years after 
water delivery until the first payments must be made. 
Third, excess power revenues are employed to cover 
part of the costs of producing water for agriculture. 
According to one estimate, farmers pay only about one 
third of the costs of supplying an acre foot of water 
(Brown, 1968). 
A study by the Stanford Research Institute (1958) 
indicated that the interest waiver alone reduced the 
repayment responsibility of the typical irrigator by 
about half. Further reduction resulted from a policy 
that the irrigator should not be charged more than his 
ability to pay. This policy charges more project costs 
attributable to irrigation to power users and the 
general tax payer. 
Some of the adverse effects of these policies can 
be readily observed. Since a significant portion of 
irrigation (project) costs are borne by others, 
resulting in an inordinately large demand for cheap 
irrigation water, a disproportionate amount of project 
water is allocated to irrigation, and water projects 
may be oversized. "Agricultural output within the 
project service area is greater than it otherwise would 
have been implying that the agricultural sector 
purchases a relatively greater quantity of the scarce 
resources such as chemicals, machinery, and research 
talent. Because the quantitative demand for these 
resources is relatively greater, the other economic 
sectors using these resources must pay higher prices" 
(Brown, 1968). 
To overcome some of the problems of current 
pricing policies, Davis and Hanke (1971) recommend 
cost-based pricing at the source for irrigation water. 
Beneficiaries of any new development projects would 
have to pay for the resulting externalities, operation 
and maintenance, and capital costs. Charges would 
vary with the distance of water transmission as well as 
seasonal changes in flow. 
Under the present system, efficient water use is 
not the primary objective of administrative agencies. 
The legal and institutional constraints on the trading 
of water rights sometimes make allocation to the most 
productive uses difficult. Farmers and irrigation 
districts seek the lowest possible price to the user. In 
many cases water administrators do not even measure 
the water delivered (National Water Commission, 
1973). 
Many state constitutions in the west assert that 
water resources are owned by the public. Following a 
policy of promoting economic development, states 
have not levied fees on the rights to use water (Howe 
et al., 1971). The doctrine of prior appropriation in 
water rights was developed on a first-come-first-
served basis. 
Much of the privately developed water used in 
agriculture is groundwater. The National Water 
Commission (1973) suggests that groundwater reser-
voirs be treated as if in single ownership. Practically, 
this means the organization of a water management 
district for allocating the resource. In terms of pricing, 
this might mean that a pump tax could be levied on 
each acre foot withdrawn from the underground 
reservoir to build a development and operating fund. 
One arrangement for water pricing in irrigation 
districts is a combination of land value assessment and 
a toll for water use. 
The assessment is an integral part of the 
pricing device of public water districts which also 
includes a charge per unit used or water toll. 
These two components jointly determine the 
payments members make to their district. 
Assessments are levied annually on privately 
owned land within the district. The water toll is 
incident only upon members using water supplied 
to them by the district. Customarily, the toll is 
defmed in terms of a volume unit, such as an acre 
foot, although occasionally it is based on the area 
irrigated with district water. The most usual 
practice is to specify a seasonal charge for each 
acre irrigated from the district supply. This may 
be the same for all crops, but most commonly 
varies in rough proportion to the relative amount 
of water applied to each irrigated crop. 
The entire payment incident upon a member 
for a given amount of water may change either in 
terms of its total magnitude or the proportion that 
the toll and assessment components bear to each 
other. Although emphasis is placed on the district 
assessment, it cannot be considered relevantly in 
isolation from the water toll (Brewer, 1961). 
The following alternatives are used for valuing 
land within a district: (1) a single value per acre on all 
land assessed; (2) a set of per acre values, applied to 
land and water use; (3) a set of per acre values that are 
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relative to the cost incurred by the district for 
supplying a particular land parcel; and (4) a set of per 
acre values applied according to the relative soil 
characteristics of particular parcels. 
Generally, the assessment is in dollar~ per $100 of 
the property base value; however, procedures for 
valuing property differ widely among districts and 
even within districts over time. "Old valuation 
practices generally used either a flat rate value for all 
land or some fraction of the value assigned for county 
tax purposes. Many districts have modified these 
early methods to make allowance for land of different 
agricultural potential" (Brewer, 1961). 
Another way for recovering costs of water 
projects was proposed by the Stanford Research 
Institute. 
It appears that the state must recover all of 
the costs allocated to water and encourage the 
maximum use of its water facilities by dividing its 
water charges into two parts. The first part would 
be an annual fixed (or capacity) charge, payable by 
the contracting agency even if it bought no water 
at aU and covering aU of the annual capital costs 
allocated to that agency. The charge would be 
fixed in the sense that it would depend not on the 
amount of water actually used by the agency in a 
given year, although it might vary from year to 
year because (1) total capital costs are repaid in 
amounts which change (increase) each year over 
the lifetime of the project, or (2) because the share 
of the tota1 annual capital costs allotted to any 
given agency might be revised to reflect changed 
conditions. Provision also might be made for the 
state itself to assume the obligation of repaying 
the fixed charge allocated to certain public water 
districts during some initial development period, 
providing the district agreed in turn to repay the 
state subsequently with interest. 
The second part of the charge would be a 
variable amount designed to cover the operation 
and maintenance costs of producing the water 
actually used by the contracting agency (Stanford 
Research Institute, 1958). 
Three other alternatives are set forth for 
recovering the costs of irrigation water: 
1. The state could market water on a per-unit 
basis, charging the water user a price designed to 
recover annual costs under conditions of full capacity 
operations. Of course, such a policy would not pay for 
itself until the project reached full capacity operation. 
2. The state could set a price designed to 
cover all costs year by year regardless of the level of 
operations; however, such a price would be so high at 
the outset that almost no water would be sold. 
3. The state might attempt to set a price to 
remain unchanged over the lifetime of the project and 
still recover all the costs over the long run. Such a 
price would require very difficult forecasts of future 
use and costs in addition to discouraging the growth of 
water use in the early years of the project's operation 
(Stanford Research Institute, 1958). 
Municipal and Industrial Water 
Supply Pricing Policy 
Municipal and industrial water supply covers a 
wide variety of uses. Within cities, uses range from 
domestic to street and sewer flushing to irrigation of 
parks. Industries require process and cooling water as 
well as dilution water for disposing of wastes. 
Under the California Water Plan, it was 
suggested that the beneficiaries of all water supply 
(municipal, industrial, and irrigation) pay full repay-
ment of costs so that no water users would be 
subsidized by other segments of society. The hope was 
that this would promote more efficient allocation of 
water among agency and user groups. 
The revenue to be returned by a public water 
utility is paramount in establishing rates. In pricing 
urban water, the base may be determined by the costs 
incurred by the unit of government to produce the 
water. 
The standard practice is to classify water 
supply costs by customer, commodity, and 
demand. Customer costs increase with the number 
of system customers, because of counting the 
meter reading expense. Commodity costs increase 
with volume supplied, because of costs for 
treatment chemicals and power. Demand costs are 
related to the capital investment in the system's 
capacity and are a function primarily of the 
maximum demands made upon a system. For 
example, treatment facilities are generally de-
signed to meet maximum daily demand, so the 
amortized cost of the treatment plant is considered 
a demand cost (Mann, 1970). 
Another view is that costs incurred by govern-
ment can be said to consist of two parts, costs at the 
source (wholesale) and costs at the place of use 
(retail). 
According to Patterson (1962), service costs 
have three main components. Base water costs are 
those associated with the average need. Extra 
capacity costs are those associated with additional 
capacity built into a system to provide at certain times 
and to certain customers water above the average or 
usual demand. Customer costs are those that increase 
as the number of users increase (e.g., meter reading 
billing, etc.). The most common water rate structures 
are presented in Chapter IV. 
Water Pollution Control 
Pricing Policy 
Water quality standards generally have been 
employed rather than effluent charges to control 
water pollution in this country. However, the National 
Water Commission (1973) recommended that requir-
ing polluters to pay effluent or user charges would be 
the most equitable and economically efficient ap-
proach. An "effluent charge" is a direct charge, 
ust;ally proportional to the concentration of waste, for 
the discharge of a pollutant into a natural water-
course. In contrast, a "user charge," usually propor-
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tional to the amount of waste, is levied for the 
discharge of pollutants into a waste disposal system. 
Thus, effluent charges are designed primarily to 
discourse and provide funds to remedy external 
diseconomies imposed by polluters. User charges 
provide revenue to pay for the construction, 
operation, and maintenance of a disposal or treatment 
system. 
Support for such fees is based on two grounds: 
first, reimbursement of public costs for constructing 
dams, aeration devices, or other devices which 
increase a body of water's ability to absorb wastes, 
and second, inducement of polluters to recognize the 
costs they impose on downstream users. Either of 
these charges could be used to make polluters pay the 
marginal opportunity costs of utilizing a water course 
for disposing of waste. 
In recent years, it has been argued increasingly 
that polluters should be compelled to bear the social as 
well as the private costs of their activities. As Charles 
L. Shultze argues: 
In the field of water pollution control, for 
example, public policy emphasizes the subsidized 
construction of waste-treatment plants, dams for 
low-flow augmentation, and the separation of 
storm drains from sewers, as a means of treating 
pollution once created. But it generally fails to 
consider means of altering the price signals 
received by polluters through the mechanism of 
user charges and effluent charges. (Excise taxes 
may be included in these charges.) Through such 
charges, industrial polluters would be assessed the 
social and economic costs of pollution, and in many 
cases would find it profitable to change their 
internal processes to reduce the amount of 
pollution they create. In general, it is cheaper to 
improve the quality of our streams by combination 
of prevention and treatment than by treatment 
alone. But because the private sector is primarily 
responsible for prevention and the public sector 
for treatment, public policy excessivly concen-
trates on the latter aspect. And to the extent it 
does deal with the prevention aspect of pollution 
control, it does so by attempting to enforce, 
through the police power, a set of water quality 
standards rather than providing economic incen-
tives to individuals which would induce them, in 
their own interests, to take action to improve 
water quality (Shultze, 1969). 
Recreation Pricing Policy 
Water for recreation is used for swimming, 
boating, water skiing, and fishing, and provides an 
aesthetic complement to non-water based activities 
such as camping, picnicking, and hiking. Traditionally 
in the United States, outdoor recreation has been 
thought to provide great benefits to society. 
Consequently, it has been argued that citizens should 
have unlimited access to recreation areas. Collection 
of user fees has been opposed by some as a violation of 
the national tradition of free use of waterways and a 
congressional commitment to free access to reser-
voirs. This position has been challenged in recent 
years by acts of Congress and pressures from state 
and local governments. Recent federal recreation 
policy (Land and Water Conservation Fund Act and 
the Federal Water Recreation Projects Act) stresses 
the need for the user to pay. Nevertheless, only 
nominal charges have been employed, usually an 
entrance fee, and little revenue has been raised. It has 
been estimated (Davis and Hanke, 1971) that $10 
million in fees collected from federal recreation areas 
amounts to 5 cents for each of the 200 million visitors 
to national parks and forests. 
Davis and Hanke (1971) suggest a two-part fee 
system for waterbased recreation. The first part 
would be a user's general pass and the second an 
additional fee levied at peak periods such as holidays, 
summer season, and weekends, and for special 
services such as campgrounds, marinas, swimming 
areas, etc. 
Crutchfield (1962) points out that the fund-raising 
potential of fees on sport fishing is apparent from the 
huge rentals paid on land bordering salmon streams in 
the Canadian Maritimes and the high license fees paid 
by nonresidents. In England, fishing rights for 1.25 
miles on the River Lune were sold at auction in 1961 
for L20,750 ($54,000). For charging, a recognizable 
product must be defined and specific users identified. 
In the case of fishing, the product is fishing and not 
fish, and the value of fishing areas vary greatly. 
Crutchfield suggests several approaches to valua-
tion of sport fishing. A gross value could be estimated 
by surveys of angler expenditures. The biggest 
problem with this approach is that it excludes indirect 
expenditures made by the community or others on 
behalf of the. angler. Out-of-pocket fishing costs cover 
only the costs of necessary equipment and transporta-
tion to the fishing area. Another alternative, the net 
value approach, attempts to meet this objection by 
valuing the fishing opportunity at cost, including all 
costs of providing the fishery, transportation, and 
equipment. Yet another approach estimates the 
market value of fish caught as the value of recreational 
fishing. However, fish are not the product, but 
fishing. One last approach which Crutchfield discusses 
is the valuation of fishing time. The basic assumption 
is that days fishing could have been spent earning 
income. This method would require lengthly income 
surveys, and it fails to differentiate between different 
types of fishing and other nonpriced recreation 
(Crutchfield, 1962). 
In practice, travel cost is frequently used as a 
gage of the benefit to be applied to recreational use. In 
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using this method, the disutility of overcoming 
distance should be estimated "to be the sum of at least 
three factors: money costs, time cost, and the utility 
of driving or traveling" (Knetsch and Davis, 1966). 
These benefit estimates provide an upper limit to 
revenues that could be collected by user fees. 
Flood Control Prieing Poliey 
Traditionally flood control projects have been 
viewed as a pure public good for which no fair price 
could be set. Major reservoir projects have gene-rally 
been provided out of federal revenues 011 a 
nonreimbursable basis. Local beneficiaries have been 
required on minor reservoirs and other flood projects 
to provide lands, easements, and rights-of-way, and in 
the case of local protection projects, to operate and 
maintain the projects after completion. Since occu-
pants of flood prone areas face quantifiable financial 
risks from flood hazards, user charges for flood 
protection are possible. Compulsory flood insurance is 
an example pricing scheme in this area. 
Navigation Pricing Poliey 
Under a policy of subsidization dating back to the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 which states that the 
waterways shall be free forever, users of the nation's 
waterways pay none of the costs of inland waterway 
development. However, the beginnings of a move-
ment toward user-pay principles can be seen in the 
Presidents budget of 1972 which recommends that 
users of inland waterways begin sharing part of the 
costs of waterway development and operation. 
User fees for navigation might be set equal to 
average variable costs to cover the operation and 
maintenance of facilities. Possibilities for collection of 
fees include license fees, fuel taxes, and segment tolls. 
Complementary to segment tolls, a system of 
congestion tolls could be levied where lock usage is 
heaviest. Opportunity cost of waiting time could be 
calculated to arrive at some level of fee (Hanke and 
Davis, 1971). 
The National Water Commission (1973) advocates 
that carriers maintain a record of their use in terms of 
ton miles, and periodically submit a report. Along 
with this report, somewhat like an income tax return, 
payment could be made according to the number of 
units reported. 
CHAPTER IV 
USER FEE DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
In order to evaluate the various user fee 
alternatives, a set of evaluative criteria was needed. 
Those identified were: equity, economic efficiency, 
allocational effectiveness, administrative simplicity, 
and revenue generating potential. Through system-
atic application of these criteria, the different user fee 
alternatives were analyzed and evaluated. 
EQUITY 
Two facets to equity are fairness and redistribu-
tion. Fairness requires equal treatment of equals. 
Since this concept is generally accepted by society, 
fairness principles are concensus criteria. Redistribu-
tion, on the other hand, requires income transfers 
among groups; and no social concensus exists on the 
ideal division of income. Redistribution principles 
involve a conflict of interest among groups that payor 
receive income. 
Shoup (1969) defines six characteristics of equity 
that pertain to consensus criteria as relevance, 
certainty, impersonality, continuity, uniformity of 
mispayment, and uniformity of cost compliance. 
Relevance suggests that individuals be equally 
circumstanced with respect to the conditions that the 
community believes should pertain to any given 
situation. A community might properly feel that water 
use charges should be based on the quantity of water 
used. In communities that meter water, this criterion 
would be relevant; in communities without a metering 
system, it would not be. Relevant circumstances need 
to be defined broadly enough so that impersonality is 
preserved and precise enough so that an individual can 
know in advance the consequences of any particular 
course of action. Certainty is important because an 
individual will want to be treated equally in successive 
periods, providing the same relevant circumstances 
pertain. Impersonality is important because an 
individual may prefer preferential treatment on an 
individual basis, but will appreciate impersonality as a 
general rule. Continuity implies that changes occur 
only concurrently with changes in relevant circum-
stances and that these changes would reflect 
proportionately. In other words, a small change in 
relevant circumstances would not lead to large 
changes in payments. Uniformity of mispayment, in 
principle, suggests that any payment error should be 
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the same for all who make the payment. Uniformity of 
cost compliance means that the cost for an individual 
in complying with a law should be the same percent of 
his tax as it is for all others. 
Shoup also identifies five characteristics of equity 
for conflict of interest or redistribution of income 
criteria. Because of the conflict, criteria deemed good 
at some times are deemed bad at others. They consist 
of: 
(a) Distribution of burdens progressively, and 
benefits regressively, by income and wealth .... (b) 
Distribution of these benefits and burdens among 
households of like income or wealth to take account 
of type of income, size and composition of family, 
including age and occupation (e.g., clergy) of 
members and use of income. (c) Distribution of 
burdens and benefits by geographic area, princi-
pally to export burdens to other countries to the 
degree feasible, and, within the country, to favor 
depressed regions. (d) Distribution of benefits or 
burdens in a manner that does not discriminate 
against ethnic, color, or status groups .... (e) 
Distribution of tax burdens by methods that 
promote widespread tax consciousness (in some 
nations the negative of this criterion is the 
accepted one) (Shoup, 1969, p. 33-34). 
These criteria can be used to analyze the characteris-
tics of any tax instrument. 
In an analysis of taxes it is useful to consider 
incidence or who actually pays. The problem of 
incidence relates to the ability of a taxpayer to shift 
the burden of a charge to others. For the example of 
rented housing, if water rates are increased to a 
landlord, he may choose to increase rents to his 
tenants. The fairness and redistribution criteria 
enumerated could then be used to evaluate the equity 
of a given tax from information on who actually pays in 
the end. 
Fairness or equity are unscientific terms, but the 
perception of fairness is most important if any tax or 
fee is to be acceptable and successful. This section has 
identified several characteristics of charges which 
determine whether or not people will consider them 
fair. Some of these are universal standards; others are 
considered fair by one group but unfair by another, 
and the viewpoint of a given group may change with 
time. 
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
In competitive markets, prices respond to 
automatic, impersonal market mechanisms that 
balance the quantity of goods supplied with the 
quantity of goods demanded. The resulting allocation 
of resources is considered to be economically efficient. 
When government provides goods or services, 
there is generally no competing source of supply, and 
thus no forces of competition to establish fair prices 
and efficient resource allocation. A government policy 
to set fair prices becomes necessary. As political 
forces begin to set pricing policy, individuals in their 
political bargaining find it advantageous to conceal 
their true preferences thus giving a distorted view of 
market demand. For example, individuals may seek to 
enjoy benefits while passing the costs on to society. 
Government agencies may tend to conceal true price 
(based on cost) in the interest of expanding programs 
and influence. 
ALLOCATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
Over the years, the public policy has been to look 
to many criteria besides economic efficiency in the 
allocation of water among uses. In the past, the 
economic development of arid regions on a national 
scale and a desire of communities to promote 
attractive landscaping on a local scale have been 
important objectives. Communities have considered it 
desirable to require suppliers to provide water to 
whomever wants it, whenever he wants it, and in 
whatever amount he wants. Many others have 
stressed the importance of wise long-term water use. 
Twenty years ago this meant fuller development for 
the benefit of future generations, but today the stress 
is on conservation of the natural environment. No 
matter which social goals are emphasized, the point is 
that the chosen goals affect optimal water allocation, 
and prices charged affect the allocation achieved. 
Allocational effectiveness, with respect to current 
social goals, becomes an important consideration in 
setting user fees. 
ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLICITY 
The more uniform or simple fee structures are 
very easy to administer while efforts to vary fees to 
promote economic efficiency and allocational effective-
ness require more complex fee schedules and become 
more difficult and costly to administer. The capability 
of water utilities and related governmental agencies to 
administer more complex schedules is often a factor 
constraining the ability to achieve efficiency goals. 
REVENUE GENERATING POTENTIAL 
The amount of revenue generated to pay for 
operations, maintenance, debt service, etc. is obvious-
ly an important criterion for assessing the merits of a 
fee structure. The potential of a fee to generate 
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revenue is limited by two effects upon demand of 
higher fees. The first is a reduction in consumption 
(except when demand is perfectly price inelastic). The 
second is substitution of alternative products. A 
formula for revenue maximization within these limits 
(Hoggan and Asplund, 1974) is discussed in Chapter V. 
RATE STRUCTURE EVALUATION 
In this section, some of the more commonly used 
rate structures are evaluated against the above five 
criteria. The rate structures evaluated are uniform 
flat rate, decreasing block rate, constant block rate, 
increasing block rate, and demand metering and 
summer differential rates. James and Lee (1971) and 
Hirshleifer, Dehaven, and Milliman (1960) also discuss 
these utility rates. 
Uniform Flat Rate 
The uniform flat rate covers the cost of a water 
system by charging each user an amount equal to the 
total revenue required divided by the number of 
connections (rights to use the system). Every user 
pays the same fee regardless of the quantity of water 
used. There is no financial incentive to conserve since 
the user's marginal cost of consumption is zero. Users 
are less likely to repair leaks, conserve on sprinkling 
uses, reduce peak consumption, etc. The results are 
waste and over-expansion of system capacity. 
The flat rate does not allocate resources 
efficiently and has economic justification only where 
the costs of installing meters exceed the costs of 
meeting the extra demand due to nonmetering or 
where everyone uses nearly the same amount of 
water. 
The most positive characteristic of the flat rate is 
administrative ease. The flat rate is the easiest charge 
to administer and is used frequently in small 
communities in which systems of metering are not 
available or there is insufficient staff to manage 
complex billing systems. Because users are assessed 
monthly, it is a continuous charge system and a user 
can know in advance what his payment will be and 
that he will be treated the same in consecutive 
periods. All customers are charged the same and can 
be excluded from service in the case of mispayment. 
This insures that the charge will be uniform and 
impersonal. Cost of compliance is equal for all who 
make the payment and because no substantial amount 
of time is involved, collection costs for the community 
are minimal. 
The conflict criteria are more difficult to apply. 
The progressivity and regressivity of benefits and 
burdens depends on the correlation between water 
charges paid and income. With a flat rate, everyone is 
charged the same, but everyone does not use an equal 
quantity of water. This favors large users at the 
expense of small users. If water use increases with 
income as has been indicated (Gardner and Schick, 
1964) the burden of the flat rate is regressive and the 
distribution of the benefits is progressive. The poor 
are subsidizing the rich. 
The flat rate cannot distribute benefits and 
burdens equally among households of like income, 
size and composition of family, including age and 
occupation of members, or use of income. The 
objective of distributing benefits and burdens to favor 
depressed geographic regions cannot be achieved. For 
most municipal water works, the depressed regions 
would be core city areas in which low income families 
are frequently located. The flat rate penalizes these 
users and subsidizes the more affluent areas. The 
suburban dweller uses considerably more water than 
does an inner city dweller. Sprinkling is the primary 
use associated with consumption of large quantities of 
water, and because suburban dwellers have larger 
lawns and gardens, they are responsible for the peak 
demands and hence system expansion. 
It is desirable that a fee not unduly burden ethnic, 
color, or status groups directly or indirectly. Since 
certain groups such as blacks are predominant in core 
city areas, which have low rates of use, the flat rate 
indirectly discriminates against such groups. 
In summary, the flat rate gets a very good score 
on the criterion of administrative simplicity and is 
quite acceptable with respect to the fairness aspects of 
equity. It cannot promote allocational effectiveness 
unless the dominant goal is to minimize charges to 
promote greater water use. The flat rate does not 
further economic efficiency except in the exceptional 
situation where the marginal cost of service is 
approximately equal for all users. The more undesir-
able effect of the flat rate, however, is its tendency to 
concentrate the financial burden on the poor and on 
minority groups. 
Modified Flat Rate 
The modified flat rate schedule varies from the 
flat rate charge by varying the rate according to the 
type of customer. This modification works to allocate 
payment among user groups more efficiently but 
within a group produces no incentives to conserve 
water. Even though large users are charged more, 
their individual charge is not based on consumption 
and as individual users they have no economic 
incentive to hold their use to the point where marginal 
value received equals marginal cost. The modified flat 
rate has greater revenue potential (groups with a high 
ability to pay can be charged more) than a flat rate, 
but it is not significantly more complex to administer. 
A modified flat rate scores well on all consensus 
criteria except relevance (charge not related to use). 
Impersonality is preserved because of the equal 
treatment of equals. Customer classes are assessed 
and billed the same for consecutive periods. Certainty 
and continuity are insured because of the predictabil-
ity of the fee in consecutive periods. There is no 
mispayment and the cost of compliance is negligible. 
The conflict criteria are better satisfied by the 
m~ified flat rate than the flat rate. Separating users 
into customer classes reduces the regressivity of the 
burden. The charge also narrows the distortion of 
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benefit distribution. Under a modified flat rate, larger 
users may be charged more and in this way pay more 
toward the benefits they receive from water use. The 
extra burden on the poor may be reduced by a 
modified flat rate if users on the periphery of the city 
with large yards are assessed more than apartment 
dwellers of the inner city. The degree of progressivity 
and regressivity can only be determined by examining 
how customer classes are separated and how much 
each is charged. 
Because the modification to the flat rate is not 
based on type of income, size and composition of 
family, or use of income, it cannot distribute the 
benefits and burdens in accordance with these 
principles. It can, however, take account of uses which 
may be similar because of income and water use 
correlation. 
Widespread consciousness of the charge is not 
characteristic of the modified flat rate. Because 
marginal cost is zero, there are no incentives to 
conserve and because the measure of consciousness is 
based on marginal use it can be said that there is little 
consciousness of the charge. If the system capacity is 
adequate, this may not be of great importance to 
either users or political leaders who assess the charge, 
but if the capacity is limited, it will soon become an 
issue of concern. 
Decreasing Bloek Rates 
Decreasing block rates are based on the premise 
that costs of providing the service decrease with 
increased volume of use. This is the case for utilities 
that gain economies of scale from increased produc-
tion, high density population, and small service areas. 
If water cost for a municipality follows this type of 
decreasing cost function, the decreasing block rate is 
the most economically efficient user fee structure. 
One problem associated with the decreasing cost 
function is that if marginal price is set at marginal cost 
the utility will have insufficient revenues. In this 
situation, the utility will either have to be subsidized 
or it will instead have to practice average cost pricing 
or some type of price discrimination. 
A major advantage of a declining block rate is 
that it permits a utility both to cover costs and 
practice marginal cost pricing. In Figure 6, the market 
demand is represented by line D, average cost is 
represented by AC, and marginal cost is represented 
by MC. The efficient price and quantity are Pa and Qa, 
respectively, located at the point where the marginal 
cost curve intersects the market demand curve. If 
price is set at this point, however, the utility faces a 
loss equal to the rectangle P aGCPa. 
A declining block rate is a form of discriminatory 
pricing that can generate sufficient revenue to cover 
this loss. If price Pl is charged for the initial block 
quantity OQl the revenue generated will be equal to 
the rectangle Pl AQl O. If the next block quantity sells 
for price P2' the revenue is represented by the 
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Figure 6. Second best marginal cost pricing in a 
decreasing cost industry. 
rectangle XBQ2Ql. The remaining quantity can be 
sold for a price Pa (the efficient price) and the revenue 
collected is equal to the rectangle YCQaQ2. Notice 
that in each case the price follows the marginal cost 
curve and that the total quantity consumed is equal to 
the efficient level of resource use. Prices and block 
sizes can be set so that the sum of the revenue 
rectangles, PtAQtO+XBQ2Q+YCQaQ2, equals the 
costs represented by rectangle P aGQaO which would 
cover all costs. 
This system charges the most for the initial 
quantity consumed, but reduces the cost for additional 
consumption. Large users are given preferential 
treatment in that they pay a lower marginal cost, but 
it is also larger users who create the economies of 
scale which enable the water utility to sell water at 
this price. 
If the utility follows decreasing block prices based 
on average costs, the revenues far exceed the costs. If 
the price increments are set equal along the average 
cost (AC) curve (Figure 7), the total cost is equal to 
the rectangle PaCQaO. The revenue is equal to the 
sum of rectangles PtAQtO+XBQ2Qt +YCQaQ2 and 
exceeds by the sum of rectangles PtAZPa+XBYZ. 
Not only are revenues substantially above costs, but 
resources are under utilized by quantity QaQc' The 
efficient price and quantity would be P e and Qc 
respectively. If the available supply is limited, this is a 
good way to reduce use while at the same time 
generating sufficient revenues to pay for system 
expansion. 
Decreasing block rates have built in conservation 
incentives because water is metered and priced 
according to use. This assigns a positive cost to water 
use, and the marginal cost is equal to the price of each 
consecutive block. Economic efficiency is also en-
hanced by the metered water rate scheme. Substan-
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Figure 7. Average cost price discrimination in a 
decreasing cost industry. 
tial revenue potential exists without making the 
system significantly more complex to administer. 
Under the consensus criteria of equal treatment 
of equals, the declining block rate scores well. It is 
based on relevant circumstances, including volume of 
water use. It is impersonal yet precise, and a user can 
calculate his bill or charge in advance. A bill may 
fluctuate in successive periods; but a user can be 
certain that it will always be based on the same 
circumstances. 
A declining block rate is progressive in that as use 
increases, the charge also increases. However, it does 
not increase proportionately. Those who use more pay 
more, but have a lower average cost than those who 
use less. For a declining block rate to be progressive, 
water use must increase faster than income. Benefits 
increase with increased use but in a declining marginal 
benefit way, which indicates that benefits are 
progressive with income or wealth, providing water 
use and incoine are positively correlated. 
The declining block rate does not distribute the 
benefits and burdens equally among households of like 
income or wealth or take account of the type of 
income, size and composition of family, or use of 
income. When a fee is based on volume of use, only by 
accident are these criteria satisfied. However, 
because families of like income or wealth tend to locate 
in close proximity and have similar water use 
patterns, this type of fee may score better with 
respect to at least some of the income redistribution 
criteria. 
Poorer social groups may be disadvantaged by a 
decreasing block rate. Large volume users tend to 
locate toward the periphery of a city and small volume 
users, including the poor, tend to locate toward the 
core. Since small volume users pay a higher average 
price than do large volume users, it might be argued 
that the affluent area is being subsidized by the poorer 
core area. On the other hand, if the large volume users 
are responsible for scale economies, charging them a 
higher price would essentially be socializing the costs, 
which is not economically efficient. Furthermore, if 
there were no large volume users, the system would 
be operating at higher overall costs and rates to core 
city residents might be higher rather than lower as a 
result. 
Consciousness of the charge is high with any 
metering and block pricing system because as use 
increases, the user finds that the associated charge 
also increases. 
Constant Block Rate 
The constant block rate is the most efficient 
method of allocation for a utility paying equal unit cost 
for each increment of water supplied. The determina-
tion of the price is simple, and there is no 
discriminatory pricing. One need only divide total 
costs by the total quantity used to arrive at the 
average total cost. Because marginal and average 
costs are equal in a constant cost industry, average 
cost pricing is the same as marginal cost pricing. 
Under a constant block pricing policy, the water 
is metered and the marginal cost to consumers is equal 
throughout the entire range of quantities taken. The 
incremental cost for additional units consumed 
though constant, creates incentive to conserve. 
The constant block rate may generate revenues 
above the actual costs of supplying a given quantity of 
water, However, when revenues are set above costs, 
there is a distortion of the market system and 
resources are under utilized. 
Under constant costs the constant block pricing 
policy will satisfy all of the consensus criteria of equity 
and economic efficiency. It is impersonal, and a user 
knows exactly what his bill will be with increased use. 
He also can be certain that the same relevant 
circumstances will apply in consecutive periods. 
The constant block pricing policy is generally 
more progressive than any of the previously discussed 
user fee structures and more egalitarian in its 
distribution of benefits and burdens. Each user is 
charged according to amount of use and each pays the 
same average price for units consumed. Water use and 
income increases have been found to be positively 
correlated, but the fee is not progressive unless water 
use increases faster than income. If water use and 
income increase proportionately the charge is neither 
progressive nor regressive. 
Since this pricing policy does not vary the charge 
with income, size and composition of family, age and 
occupation of family members, and use of income, it 
21 
can satisfy these criteria only by accident. When 
individuals of similar income characteristics have 
similar use patterns, their water charge will be 
similar. However, data are not available for an across 
the board determination of how user fees and family 
composition and income are related. 
The constant block rate stimulates widespread 
tax consciousness and provides incentives to conserve 
found in the marketplace. Each consecutive unit 
consumed has a positive marginal cost and the 
marginal costs are equal throughout the range of 
consumption. With this pricing policy, each individual 
can consume to the point where his marginal benefit 
and marginal cost are equal thus maximizing returns. 
Increasing Block Rates 
Increasing block rates follow a marginal cost 
curve increasing with volume of water supplied. Such 
a curve is typical of rapidly growing city facing the 
increased costs of seeking more distant water sources 
after exhausting nearer and less expensive ones. Such 
a city is often also faced with construction of expensive 
new water treatment facilities and with expanding its 
distribution system into low density suburban areas 
requiring more pipe per customer served. 
Figure 8 shows an increasing cost function. The 
accompanying efficient price is located where the 
marginal cost curve intersects the demand curve at 
point A. If the price is set at this point, total revenues 
are represented by the rectangle P eAQeO and exceed 
costs by the rectangle P eAHP c' Thus, the water 
supply utility is making a pure economic profit. 
Although point A locates the efficient price and 
quantity, utilities ordinarily are required to operate 
on a rate of return basis and are not allowed to make a 
pure economic profit. In this case, the fee structure 
that preserves marginal price P a is obtained by 
setting price at Pi for the quantity Qi and then 
increasing the price in increments (blocks) to the 
efficient price P e' 
With an increasing block rate, low volume 
consumers are able to gain from past economies of 
scale, but large volume consumers, whose use is 
causing system expansion, pay higher prices. 
An increasing block rate pricing policy can meet 
all of the efficiency criteria and provide marginal cost 
pricing for a utility that actually has an increasing cost 
function. It is also an effective conservation tool. The 
increasing marginal cost to the consumer generates 
strong incentives to conserve. 
Administrative cost is the same for an increasing 
block rate as for decre'\sing block rates and slightly 
higher than for the less complex constant. Metering 
and billing are the only added functions which the flat 
rates do not have. Revenue potential increases with 
increased demands and can be used to generate a pure 
economic profit by simply applying the marginal cost 
pricing rule. As is the case with the previous user fee 
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Figure 8. Efficient priC't'ng under increasing costs. 
structures, the consumer bears the burden of the 
charge. He cannot avoid the charge and he cannot shift 
the burden to others. The increasing block rate 
satisfies all of the consensus criteria. 
With respect to its income redistribution effects, 
the increasing block rate is generally the most likely to 
be progressive of the charges discussed thus far. The 
marginal cost to the consumer increases as water use 
increases. However, as with other block rates, volume 
of use must increase faster than income for the charge 
to become progressive. It allocates resources effec-
tively under increasing cost conditions and assesses 
the user a charge in proportion to his responsibility for 
the costs to the system. The increasing block rate as 
are the other rates is not geared toward the 
distribution of benefits and burdens among households 
of like income or wealth nor can it effectively meet 
these criteria. 
An important characteristic of the increasing 
block fee structure is that it favors low income user 
groups. Low volume users are typical in these areas 
and their rates are low on the block scale. An 
increasing block generates more consumer conscious-
ness than any of the other fees because of the 
increasing marginal cost to consumers. 
Demand Metering and Summer 
DiHerentiai Rates 
Demand metering is a complex but rational way 
to cover the extra cost of providing water during 
periods of peak consumption. Capacity expansion is 
generally the result of demands during peak use 
periods. Under the general policy of supplying all such 
demands, the system must be expanded to meet 
future demands when no excess capacity remains. 
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Demand metering measures peak flows so that 
users can be charged proportional to the peak 
demands they place on the system. A summer 
differential rate follows the same principles without 
the metering by charging higher rates during summer 
months when use is generally higher. 
A demand metering system is geared to reduce 
consumption during times of peak demand and raise 
capital for system expansion resulting from peak 
demands. It is a complex system to administer, 
requiring every meter to be set on a time table which 
allows for calculations to be made monthly. The staff 
requirements are high and may make this system 
impractical except for large water users. 
Both the summer differential rate and demand 
metering can be designed to meet the efficiency 
criteria. Fees which charge higher prices to customers 
during peak periods increase revenues while limiting 
use. A fee based on peak demand, however, leaves an 
element of uncertainty to consumers. An individual 
can be sure that the charge will increase with 
increased use, but he may be uncertain what the 
charge will be in consecutive periods. This is not a 
problem with a differential rate because although the 
rate is increased or decreased the consumer knows in 
advance what the rate will be and for what periods of 
the billing cycle. 
It is difficult to forecast the progressivity charges 
based on demand metering policy, but the results may 
be slightly progressive. On the other hand, under 
demand metering all customers would be penalized for 
using water during peak periods even though some 
users may not use more water than they did during 
winter low use periods. This effect, at least 
superficially, gives this rate the appearance of being a 
regressive charge. 
The summer differential rate, when increased, 
penalizes large volume users during peak periods. 
Individuals with similar use patterns are treated 
equally, which in essence suggests that this fee 
scheme satisfies income criteria. The summer differ-
ential rate may favor poorer socioeconomic groups. 
Most of the peak demand can be attributed to 
sprinkling uses which is not significant in core city 
areas. 
Demand metering promotes the most cost 
consciousness by increasing marginal costs to consum-
ers. They are aware that their charges will reflect 
their patterns of use and that when they add to peak 
periods, they will be faced with a higher per unit rate. 
Conclusions of Rate Structure 
Evaluation 
User charges are most effective where the costs 
of exclusion are low, there are few or no consumption 
externalities, and any resulting income redistribu-
tion is not a major concern. User charges can satisfy 
economic efficiency criteria without significant effect 
on income distribution. Although taxes such as the 
income tax take account of income, size of family, etc., 
a user charge does not. If distribution of income is to 
be a factor in the design of a water rate, an increasing 
block structure is the most effective. 
Under any conditions it is possible to practice a 
discriminatory pricing policy which will allocate 
benefits regressively and burdens progressively 
(Figure 9). By setting the initial block quantity price 
(Pi) below marginal cost, low use customers are given 
water below their cost to the system. This is 
essentially a subsidy to low use customers. The next 
block is priced equal to marginal cost (Pm) which gives 
those customers in the middle range a subsidy for the 
initial quantity followed by a charge equal to their 
responsibility for the costs. The last rate (P e) is above _ 
the marginal cost curve over most of the range and 
equal to the marginal cost only at the marginal 
cost-demand intersection (point E). The revenues 
generated by the third block make up the difference 
lost by the initial subsidy. The rates then begin as a 
subsidy for low volume users approach, actual costs at 
the margin, and finally collect a tax from large 
consumers to pay the subsidy. The total revenue in 
Figure 9 is equal to the sum of the rectangles PiEQiO, 
FDQrnQi' and CAQeQm, which is equal to the total 
cost represented by rectangle P cBQe 0. 
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Figure 9. Increasing block rate under increasing cost 
conditions which accounts for distribution of 
income. 
RATE STRUCTURES IN UTAH 
A survey of rate structures used by cities and 
towns in Utah was conducted in 1975 to sample 
cm'rent practice. A questionnaire designed jointly by 
the staffs of the Utah League of Cities and Towns and 
the Utah Water Research Laboratory was used to 
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gather information about user fees and connection 
charges (where applicable) for three municipal 
services: culinary water, sanitary sewerage, and solid 
waste disposal. Participants were also encouraged to 
provide information regarding their established user 
fee policies. 
The questionnaire was mailed to every city in 
Utah with a population greater than 1,000 (as reported 
in the 1970 census) and to other selected municipalities 
(e.g., Manila and Randolph) included to ensure that 
each county would be represented. From this sample 
of 91 cities, 54 responded (59 percent). The 
information collected was published in a separate 
report (Houston, Ballard, and Hester, 1975). Only the 
information on water user fees obtained from this 
survey will be reviewed here. Appendix B contains 
several comparisons of water costs derived from this 
information. 
Culinary water in Utah is generally supplied by 
municipally owned water utilities. All of the utilities 
which are not publicly owned are subject to 
regulations by the Utah Public Service Commission at 
rates based on costs and rate of return on capital 
investment. Privately owned utilities which sell water 
on a retail basis are few in number and serve only 
relatively few Utah residents. However, to get an 
accurate assessment of service charges in Utah, 6 of 
the 29 privately owned utilities were sampled. 
In a national survey, over 90 percent of the cities 
were found to be using the declining block rate (Gysi 
and Loucks, 1971). However, only 23 of the 54 
responding cities in Utah used this fee structure. The 
most common pricing policy in Utah (30 cities) is the 
constant block rate. The other fee schemes used were, 
the flat rate, which was found in five cities; the 
increasing block rate found in two cities, and the 
summer differential rate, which was found in only one 
of the Utah cities in this survey. Seven of the survey 
cities acknowledged using two pricing policies. 
The culinary water rates submitted by the 54 
municipalities responding to the survey are shown in 
Table 2. The rates shown in this table do not include 
hidden water charges such as water conservancy 
district taxes, etc. Nine monthly water volumes were 
then selected, and the total cost for each volume in 
each city is shown in Table 3. In Appendix B, these 
costs by city are grouped by population of the city 
(Tables B-1 to B-6) and subareas within the state 
(Tables B-7 to B-14) for ready co~parison. In these 
tables, each city is followed by several numbers which 
denote various rates used in that city. The number 
enclosed in parantheses following the name of a city or 
town, indicates an unusual rate design upon which the 
fee is calculated and is explained in the footnotes 
following Table B-6 in Appendix B. 
Declining Block Rates 
Only 23 of the responding cities in Utah use the 
declining block rate structure. For example, the 
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Table 2. Culinary water rates for 51, Utah cities, 1975. 
===--=========------~=-==---=--=----=============================== 
Name of City 
BOUNTIFUL 15 
CENTERVILLE 1 
CENTERVILLE 7 
CEN'TERVILlE 1 OT 
CENTERVILLE 7 OT 
CLEARfIELD 2357 
DELTA 21 
DELTA 27 OT 
EA S T CAR eo N 17 
EPHRAIM 8 
fAR"1 N G TON 21 
FA R"I HG (1) .3 
Fl LU40RE 11 
.. E8ER 1& 
HEBER 4 
HE 8ER 7 
H Y-D'E PARK 2 
KANAS 11 
K4YSVILLE 17 
LAY lON Z 
LA YTO N Z OT 
LAY TO (Z) 3 
LAYTON 5 
LAYTON 7 
LEHI 11 
LOGAN 3/4.1"CON 
LO GAN 1.5" COH 
LO GAN 2" CON 
LOGAN 3- CON 
LOGAN 4" CON 
LOGAN 6" CON 
LO GAM 8" CON 
"ANILA 15 
MANILA 7 
MANILA (3) 3 
Minimum 
Charge Quantity 
($) (1000) 
3.00 
4.50 
s.oo 
6.75 
7.50 
3.00 
3.00 
5.00 
6.30 
4.50 
4.00 
a.oo 
5.00 
5.00 
4.00 
6.50 
3.33 
4.00 
2.SQ 
3.00 
6.00 
5.30 
3.00 
3.GO 
3.GO 
2.50 
5.00 
9.00 
11.00 
30.00 
61.50 
129.50 
1.50 
15.00 
11.25 
10.0 G 
10.0 G 
10.0 G 
1 C.O G 
10.0 G 
1<l.0 G 
8.0 G 
8.0 G 
0.0 G 
r.o G 
10.0 G 
2 0.0 G 
10.0 G 
0.0 G 
0.0 G 
17.0 G 
20.0 G 
15.0 G 
10.0 G 
1.0 G 
7.0 G 
11.0 G 
7.0 G 
1.0 G 
1.5 G 
10.0 G 
22.0 G 
42.0 G 
82.0 G 
152.0 G 
352.0 G 
882.0 G 
10.0 G 
2 0.0 G 
15.0 G 
2nd Block 3rd Block 
Rate Quantity Rate Quantity 
($) (1000) ($) ( 1000) 
.200 
.350 
.350 
.450 
.500 
.200 
.120 
.240 
o 
.200 
.250 
.250 
.150 
a 
a 
.220 
.100 
.200 
.200 
.200 
.400 
.200 
.200 
.200 
.20 a 
.200 
.200 
.200 
.200 
.200 
.200 
.200 
.500 
.500 
.500 
0.0 
0.0 
<10.0 
90.0 
90.0 
20.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
30.0 
40.0 
30.0 
100. a 
o. {) 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
5.0 
20.0 
23.0 
23.0 
24. a 
o. a 
24.0 
92.5 
V.O 
o. a 
0.0 
o. a 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
o. a 
0.0 
0.0 
a 
o 
.30 a 
.40 a 
.450 
.18 a 
o 
o 
a 
.180 
.20 a 
.20 a 
.100 
a 
o 
a 
a 
.250 
.180 
.16 a 
.36 a 
.18 a 
o 
• IB a 
.180 
o 
a 
a 
a 
a 
o 
a 
o 
o 
o 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
50.0 
50.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
5.0 
50.0 
50.0 
50.0 
50.0 
0.0 
50.0 
50.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
4th Block 
Rate Quantity 
($) (1000) 
a 
o 
.250 
.35,0 
• 4u a 
o 
a 
a 
a 
o 
.180 
.180 
a 
a 
a 
o 
o 
.300 
.150 
.1~0 
• 3U 0 
.150 
o 
.150 
.160 
a 
o 
a 
a 
a 
o 
a 
o 
o 
a 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
50.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
5th Block 
Rate Quantity 
($) (1000) 
o 
a 
a 
o 
a 
a 
a 
o 
a 
o 
a 
a 
a 
o 
o 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
a 
.140 
a 
a 
a 
o 
o 
o 
a 
o 
o 
o 
o. () 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
O.Q 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
O.Q 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 .. 0 
6th Block 
Rate 
($) 
• 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
a 
o 
o 
o 
a 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
a 
o 
o 
o 
o 
a 
o 
o 
Table 2. Continued. 
Minimum 2nd Block 3rd Block 4th Block 5th Block 6th Block 
Charge Quantity Rate Quantity Rate Quantity Rate Quantity Rate Quantity Rate 
Name of City ($) (1000) ($) (1000) ($) (1000) ($) (1000) ($) (1000) ($) 
MANTI 8 8.50 10.0 G .200 45.0 .160 100.0 .140 150.0 .120 200.0 .100 
MAPLETON 11 3.63 15.3 G .120 10.0 .10 a 20.0 • 60 0.0 a 0.0 a 
MILfORD 17 11.75 0.0 G 0 0.0 a 0.0 a 0.0 a 0.0 a 
MOA8 (4) 1 2.50 2.0 G .220 O. a a 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 
.. OA8 7 3.50 3.0 G .300 41.0 .260 50.0 .230 400.0 .190 500.0 .160 
HOA8 1 or 5.00 2.0 G .440 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 a 
MOAB 1 or 7.00 3.0 G .600 41.0 .52 a 50.0 .4bO 400.0 .360 500.0 .120 
M T PL E A SAN T a 3.00 5.0 G .200 0.0 a 0.0 a 0.0 a 0.0 a 
HU RRAY (5) 2351 3.00 1.1 CF .11t a 48.9 .12 a 50.0 .100 0.0 a 0.0 0 
HU RRA Y HOSP 25.00 1.1 CF .140 48.9 .120 50.0 .100 0.0 a 0.0 0 
HURRAY 2351 or 4.00 1.1 Cf .200 48.9 .150 50.0 .130 0.0 a 0.0 0 
NORTH LOGA N 27 4.00 8.0 G .250 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 a 
OGDEN 1/2+ 5/8- 3.10 7.6 G .250 92.4 .225 100.0 .lB8 300.0 .150 5(j0.0 .125 
k..,) OGD(N 3/1t-CON 4.05 11.3 G .250 88.1 .225 100.0 .168 300.0 .150 500.0 .125 CI'I OGDEN 1" CON 5.95 18.8 G .250 81.2 .225 100.0 .18a 300.0 .150 500. U .125 
OGDEN 1.5- CON 11.20 37.6 ~ .250 62.4 .225 100.0 .168 300.0 .150 500.0 .125 
OGDEN 2- CON 17.50 6 0.1 G .250 39.9 .225 100.0 .186 300.0 .150 500.0 .125 
OGDEN 3" CON 31.85 114.0 G .225 86.0 .18d 300.0 .150 500.0 .125 0.0 0 
OGDEN 4- CON 51.85 197.3 G .225 2.7 .188 300.0 .150 50CJ.0 .125 0.0 0 
OGDEN OW CON 101.25 446.8 G .138 53.2 .150 500.0 .125 0.0 0 0.0 0 
OG DEN 6" CON 191.50 1070.2 G .125 0.0 0 0.0 0 c.o a 0.0 0 
OGDEN 1/2+5/8"OT 6.20 1.6 G .500 92.4 .450 100.0 .375 300.0 .300 500.0 .250 
OGDEN 3/4"CON or e.10 11.3 G .500 88.1 .450 100.0 .375 300.0 .300 500.0 .250 
OGDEN 1- CON OJ 11.90 18.8 G .500 81.2 .450 100.0 .375 300.0 .300 500.0 .250 
OGDEN 1.S"CON OT 22.40 37.6 G .500 62.4 .450 100.0 .315 30 O. 0 .300 500.0 .250 
OGDEN 2" CON OT 35.00 () 0.1 G .500 39. '1 .450 100.0 .375 300.0 .300 500.0 .250 
OGDEN 3" COH OT 63.70 114.0 G .450 86.0 .375 300.0 .3uO 500.0 .250 o. a 0 
OGDEN 4" CON OT 103.70 197.3 G .4S0 2.7 .375 300.0 .300 500.0 .250 0.0 0 
OGDEN 6" CON aT 202.50 446.a G .375 53.2 .300 500.0 .250 0.0 0 0.0 0 
OGDEN a" CON aT 395.00 1070.2 G .250 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 Ol'\) 0 
OREN 21 4.65 12.0 G .150 15.0 .10 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 
OREM (6) 35 8.10 21.0 G .180 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 
OREH 21 OT 9.30 12.0 G .300 15.0 .20 a .0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 
ORE" 35 OT 17.40 21.0 G .360 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
Table 2. Continued. 
Minimum 2nd Block 3rd Block 4th Block 5th Block 6th Block 
Charge Quantity Rate Quantity Rate Quantity Rate Quantity Rate Quantity Rate 
Name of City ($) (1000) ($) (1000) ($) (1000) ($) (1000) ($) (1000) ($) 
PA NGU ITCH 21 3.00 15.0 G .150 15.0 .12 a 20.0 .100 0.0 0 0.0 0 
PARK CITY 1 5.00 0.0 G 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
PA YSON 6 3.00 10.0 G .170 90.0 .150 90.0 .ll5 0.0 () 0.0 0 
PAYSON 8 OT 6.00 10.0 G .340 90.0 .300 90.0 .250 0.0. a 0.0 0, 
PLAIN CITY 2 5.50 0.0 G 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 O· 
PR OVI DENCE 17 3.00 10.0 G .150 o. a 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 0 •. 0 0' 
PRllwa 3/4- CON 3.50 1.0 Cf .160 0.0 0 0.0 0, 0.0. 0 0.0 0 
PROVO 1- CON 4.50 1.0 Cf .160 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
PROVO 1·1/2- CON 10.0~ 1.0 cr .160 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 
PR:OfO 2" CON 15.00 1.0 Cf .160 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0. a 0.0 • 0 
PROVO 3- CON 3 c.oo 1.0 Cf .160 0.0 a 0.0 a 0.0 a 0.0 0 
PROVO 4" CON 5e.oo 1.0 Cf .160 0.0 0 0.0 0 o. a 0 0.0 0 
PROVO 6- CON 100.00 1.0 Cf .160 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
PROVO 8" CON 150.00 1.0 Cf .160 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 
PROVO 10- CON 200.00 1.0 Cf .160 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 a 0.0 0 
w PROVO lZ" CON 250.00 1.0 cr .160 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 ~ 
PROVO 3/4 CON OT 10.50 1.0 Cf .480 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
PROVO 1- CON OT 13.50 1.0 Cf .480 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 a 
PROVO 1-112 C OJ 30.00 1.0 Cf .460 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
PROVO 2- CON OT 45.00 1.0 CF .480 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 a 
PROVO 3- CON OT 90.00 1.0 Cf • leS a 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 
PROVO 4- CON OT 150.00 1.0 cr .480 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 a 0.0 0 
PROVO 6- CON OJ 300.00 1.0 Cf .480 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
PROVO 8" CON aT 450.00 1.0 Cf .480 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
PROVO 10" CON or 600.00 1.0 cr .480 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 O.Q a 
PROVO lZ" CON OJ 75C.OO 1.0 cr .480 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 
RANDOLPH 11 3.50 15.0 G .250 15.0 • 10 a 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 • 0 
RICHfiELD 2 3.15 15.0 G .250 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
RIVEROAi.E 17 3.25 lO.O G .180 0.0 a 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 
RI WER T ON 21 4.00 S.O G .200 O. a a 0.0 0 0.0 0 o.() 0 
RIVER T or. 21 OT 5.00 5.0 G .zoo 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 () 
RI vERTOtHl) 9 z.oo 5.0 G .200 O. a a 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
ROOs[VElT 11 5.00 lO.Q G .350 10. a .30 a 10.0 .250 0.0 a 0.0 0 
ROY 11 2.50 10.0 G .190 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 
ROY 11 OJ 6.25 10.0 G .350 O. a a 0.0 a 0.0 a 0.0 0 
Sf.GEORGE 1 3.00 3.0 G .200 191. a .170 0.0 a 0.0 a 0.0 0 
Table 2. Continued. 
Minimum 2nd Block 3rd Block 4th Block 5th Block 6th Block 
Charge Quantity Rate Quantity Rate Quantity Rate Quantity Rate Quantity Rate 
Name of City ($) (1000) ($) (1000) ($) (1000) ($) (1000) ($) (1000) ($) 
Sf.GEORGE 51 3.00 3.0 G .250 191.0 .220 300.0 .190 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SlC 3//.,.1" CON 1.15 1.1 Cf .160 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SlC 1.5- CON 3.50 2.2 Cf .100 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SLC 2" CON 5.60 3.5 Cf .160 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SlC 3" CON 11.20 1.0 Cf .160 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 
SlC 4" CON 11.50 10.9 CF .160 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 
SlC 6" CON 35.00 21.9 Cf .160 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SLC 8" CON 56.00 35.0 Cf .160 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SLC 10" CON 80.50 '50.3 Cf .160 o. a 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SLC 3/4.1" CO OT 2.50 1.0 Cf .24 a 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SlC 1.5" CON or 5.00 2.1 Cf .21t0 O. a 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SlC Z" CON OT 8.00 3.3 Cf .21t 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SLC 3" CON aT 16.00 6.1 Cf .240 O. a 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SlC 4" CON aT 25.00 10.4 Cf .24 a 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SlC 6" CON aT 50.00 20.8 Cf .240 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 • 0 ~ SlC 8" CON OT 80.00 3 3.3 Cf .240 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 O. a 0 ~ 
SLC 10" CO N OT 115.00 47.9 Cf .240 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 o. a 0 
SANDY 17 8.00 20.0 G .250 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SANTAQUIN 11 4.15 10.0 G • 60 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SANTAQUIN 11 OT e.IS 10.0 G .160 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SMITHfIELD 27 3.00 10.0 G .150 30.0 .120 50.0 • 60 0.0 a 0.0 • 0 
SOUTH OGDEN 11 2.Z5 10.0 G .200 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 
S S Al T l A I( £ Z 1 2.50 12.0 G .Z20 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
S SAL T (8) 3 4.00 20.0 G • ZZO 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 
SP ANI SH fa RK 6 3.50 15.0 G .150 25.0 .125 20.0 .1UO 0.0 0 0.0 0 
SUN SE T 3 /It - CON 3.65 10.0 G .230 10.0 .Z10 10.0 .190 10.0 .170 0.0 0 
SUNSET 1· CON 4.50 10.0 G .210 10.0 .210 10.0 .1:1 0 10.0 .170 0.0 0 
SUNSE T 4- CON 9.15 10.0 G .230 10. a .210 10.0 .190 10.0 .170 0.0 0 
SUNSET 0- CON 13.60 10.0 G .Z30 10.0 .210 10.0 .190 10.0 .170 0.0 0 
SYRACUSE 1 6.15 10.0 G • ZOO 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 
SYRACUSE 7 6.15 10.0 G .150 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
TOOELE (9) 2357 2.75 1.5 Cf .115 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
Y E RNA l (10) 2 3.00 10.0 G .150 10.0 .200 10.0 .250 10.0 .300 10.0 .350 
WERNAl 351 3.00 10.0 G .150 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
VERNAL (10) 2 OT 6.00 10.0 G .300 10.0 .350 10.0 .400 10.0 .450 10.0 .500 
VERNAL 351 or 6.00 10.0 G .250 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
Table 2. Continued. 
Minimum 2nd Block 3rd Block 4th Block Sth Block 6th Block 
Charge Quantity Rate Quantity Rate Quantity Rate Quantity Rate Quantity Rate 
Name of City ($) (1000) ($) (1000) ($) (1000) ($) (1060) ($) (1000) ($) 
WASHING TER 2 3.75 10.0 G .ZOO 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
WA SHI NG( 10) Z 4.25 11.0 G .200 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 
WASHING TER 3 5.75 1 ~.o G .200 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
WASHING 3/4" CON 4.25 11.0 G .200 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 
WASHING I" CO~ 5.75 19.0 G .200 o. a a 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
WASHING 1.5" CON 9.50 38.0 G .200 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
WASHING 2- CON 14.00 60.0 G .200 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 
WASHING 3" CON 24.50 114.0 U .200 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 
WASHlhG 4" CON 39.50 19 r .0 G .200 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
WELLSVILLE 23 5.00 35.0 G .250 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 o.a a 
W 80UNTIfUl 11 3.00 12.0 G .230 8.0 .210 10.0 .19 a 10.0 .170 72.0 .150 
WEST BO( to ) 2 5.00 22.0 G .230 8.0 • 2l 0 10.0 .1 ~ 0 10.0 .170 15.f) .150 
\If JaR D A( 11 ) 235 4.00 6.0 G .250 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 
w wEST POINT 17 3.80 12.0 G .250 ~. 0 0 0.0 a 0.0 0 0.0 a 00 GOLDEN GAR DEN 1 6.00 6.0 G .500 14. a .45 a 30.0 .35 a 0.0 a 0.0 0 
NORDIC ~ Al LEY 1 8.50 10.0 G .850 0.0 0 0.0 a u.o 0 0.0 0 
SU .. HI T PAR K 1 12.00 12. () G .900 28.0 .800 60.0 .100 0.0 0 0.0 0 
TERRA 1 3.21 2.5 G .350 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 a.o 0 
WH I TE CITY 1 1.15 1.0 Cf .150 23.3 .120 0.0 a 0.0 a 0.0 0 
WOOOL AND BENCHl 2.50 1.2 Cf .200 13.8 .170 35.0 .120 0.0 0 0.0 0 
Numbers which are not in parentheses indicate the type or Class of customer, as shown Following the column entitled "Minimum Quantity" are the letters "G" or "CF." A "G" 
below, to which the rate applies. indicates that the quantity is expressed in gallons, rates are expressed as dollars per thousand gallons; and block quantites are expressed as thousands of gallons. A "CF" 
indicates that the quantity is expressed in cubic feet; block quantities are expressed as 
For example, the numbers "1" and "7" as shown for Centerville indicate the rates that apply thousands of cubic feet; rates are expressed as dollars per hundred cubic feet. 
to residential units and commercial users respectively. The number "17" as shown for East 
Carbon indicates that the rate applies to both residential units (1) and commercial users (7). 
The letters "OT" indicate the rate applies outside of the city limits. 1. Charged per residential unit 
2. Single residence rate only 
3. Multiple units charged per structure 
4. Multiple units charged per unit 
Several cities base their water rates on the size of connection. In these cases the size of 5. Mobile homes charged per park 
connection is noted rather than numerical codes (for example, see Ogden). Occasionally, the 6. Mobile homes charged per unit 
information received from the cities did not differentiate enough between types of users to 7. Commercial 
allow proper descriptions. In these cases only those two types of users to which the rate 8. Charged. per meter-no other account 
clearly applied were recorded. 9. Miscellaneous 
Centerville declining block rate for commercial users 
charges a minimum of $5.00 for any amount up to 
10,000 gallons. For the next 90,000 gallons consumed, 
the rate is $.35 per 1,000 gallons; and the rate for 
additional monthly consumption is $.25 per 1,000 
gallons. Figure 10 represents Centerville's decreasing 
block rate. 
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Figure 10. Centerville, Utah, commercUd water 
rate. 
Constant Block Pricing 
On the national scale, constant block pricing is 
less popular than the declining block rate. However, 
30 of the cities surveyed in Utah use this rate. Provo 
recently converted to a constant block structure, 
except for a higher charge for very small uses. 
Referring again to Table 3, a minimum charge of 
$3.50 and a quantity of 1000 cubic feet is found for a 
3f4" connection. For all consumption over 1000 cubic 
feet, a rate of $.16 per 100 cubic feet is charged as 
represented in Figure 11. 
Uniform Flat Rate 
Only five of the municipalities participating in the 
survey use the uniform flat rate. To illustrate the 
reduced revenues and greater utilization of resources 
associated with a flat rate, a comparison might be 
made between East Carbon and Roosevelt. East 
Carbon uses a flat rate pricing policy while Roosevelt 
uses a declining block rate. For fiscal year 1974-1975, 
East Carbon received a total revenue of $56,008.90 for 
water services, while Rooselvelt collected $147,881.21 
and used less water. The total water consumed by the 
two communities is 688,890,000 gallons for East 
Carbon and 421,320,000 for Roosevelt. Although 
Roosevelt is nearly double the size of East Carbon, its 
residents used nearly 40 percent less water, while its 
water rates generated 260 percent more revenue. 
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Figure 11. Provo, Utah, water rate for 3f4" 
connection. 
Increasing Block Rate 
The increasing rate is used in only two of the 
survey <;ities: Kanab and Vernal. See Figure 12 for 
residential rates in Vernal. 
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Figure 12. Vernal, Utah, residential water rate. 
Demand Metering 
Several Utah cities charge a summer differential 
rate, but these are reduced rates. For example, Provo 
charges $.01 per 100 cubic feet less during summer 
months to reimburse customers for the cost of 
sprinkling city property bordering streets. 
Table 9. Comparative culinary water charges. 
--~----. ---
.. '. - -----,--
Name of city Minimum 30,0001 60,0001 120,000 I 250,000 I 500,000 I 1 ,OOO~OOO I 2,000,000 I 20,000,000 I 
charge - quantity 7,926 gal 15,852 gal 31,704 gal 66,043 gal 132,Og6 gal 264.173 gal 5215,346 gal 5,283,457 gal ($) (1000 I) 1,060 co ft 2,120 co ft 4,240 cu ft 8,1529 cu ft 17,658 cu ft 35,3] 7 cu-ft '70,634 cu ft 706 ,345 cu ft ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) (~L_ _ ____ _ i!l_ (S) 
-----_. ----------_._-------
80 UNT I rUL 15 3.00 37.9 3.0 0 4.11 7.34 14.21 21.42 53.83 106.61 105'.69 CENTER VILLE 1 4.50 31.9 4.50 6.55 12.10 24.1 Z 41.23 93.46 1'85.9Z 1850.21 CENTER~ILLE 1 5.00 J 1. ~ S.OO 1.05 12.60 24.62 46.13 82.54 14'8.59 1337.'36 C E N TE R Y III E lOT 6.15 31.9 6.15 9.38 16.52 31.91 60. 08 109.71 202.17 1866.46 
CENTERVILLE 1 OT 1.50 31.9 7.50 10.te3 18.35 35.52 66.94 123.17 228.8'4 2110.88 Cl E.ARf I[LD 2351 3.00 31.9 3.00 4. 17 7.31 13.49 25.38 49.15 96.70 9'52.62 DELTA 21 3.00 30.3 3.00 3.94 5.84 9.91 11.89 33.14 65.44 636.05 
DELTA 21 OT 5.00 30.3 5.00 6.88 10.69 18.93 14.18 66.48 129.88 1211.11 
EAST CARBON 17 6.30 0.0 6.30 6.30 6.30 6.30 6.30 6.30 6.30 6.l0 
EPHRA I" 8 4.50 26.5 4.69 6.27 9.44 15.13 21.62 51.39 96.94 954.86 
FARMINGTON 21 4.00 31.9 4.00 5.46 9.43 17.21 29.18 53.55 101.10 957.02 
FARMING (1) 3 a.oo 15.7 8.1)0 8.00 10.93 18.71 31.28 55.05 102.60 958.52 
FILLMORE 11 5.00 31.9 S.OO 5.68 8.26 13.4 t 22.21 35.42 61.83 5.H.35 
HEBER 16 5.00 0.0 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
HE8ER .. 4.00 0.0 4.00 It.Ou 4.00 4.0(, 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
~ HEBER 7 6.50 64.4 6.5'l 6.50 9.73 17.29 31.82 60.88 119.VO 1165.12 = HYDE PA~K 2 3.33 75.7 3.33 3.33 4.50 7.93 14. ')4 27./5 54.16 529.68 
KA NAB 11 4.00 56.8 4.00 4.11 8.26 18.56 38.38 18.00 157.25 1583.19 
KAYSVILLE 11 2.50 3 7.~ 2.50 3.67 6.81 12.99 23.31 43.13 82.75 796.02 
LAYTON Z 3.00 26.5 3.19 4.77 7.91 14.09 24.41 44.23 tH.85 191.12 
LA Y TON 2 or 6.00 26.5 6.37 9.54 15.61 28.18 48.83 66.45 167.10 1594.24 
LAYlO (2) 3 5.30 41.6 5.30 &.27 9.44 15.69 26.16 45.96 85.60 198.87 
LAYTON 5 3.00 26.5 3.19 4.17 1.94 lit.el 28.02 54.43 107.27 1058.2~ 
LA YTON 7 3.00 26.5 3.19 4.11 7.93 14.11 24.46 44.28 83.90 797.11 
LEHI 17 3.00 28.4 3.09 4.67 1.84 14.11 21.28 47.48 84.47 750.16 
LOGAN 3/' .. 1-CON 2.50 31.9 2.50 3.67 6.84 13.71 26.92 53.33 106.17 10 51.19 
LOGAN 1.5- CON 5.00 83.3 5.00 5.00 6.94 13.81 27.02 53.43 106.27 1051.29 
LOGAN 2- CON 9.00 159.0 9.00 9.00 9.00 13.81 21.02 53.43 106.27 1057.29 
LOGAN 3- CON 17.00 310.4 11.00 11.00 17.00 17.00 27.02 53.43 106.27 1057.29 
LOGAN 4- CON 30.00 515.4 30.aO 30.00 30.00 30. 00 30.00 52.43 105.21 1356.29 
LOGAN 6- CON 61.50 1332.5 61.50 61.50 61.50 61.50 61.50 61.50 ~6.71 1047.79 
LOGAN 8- CON 129.50 3338.1 129.50 12i.50 129.50 129.50 129.50 129.50 129.50 1009.19 
MANILA 15 1.50 31.9 7.50 10.te3 18.35 35.52 68.54 134.59 266.67 26'4.23 
MANIL A 1 15.00 15.1 15.00 15.00 20.85 38.02 71.04 131.09 2 & 9.17 2646.73 
MANIL A (3) 3 11.25 56.8 11.25 11.68 19.bO 36.71 69.19 135.84 261.92 2645.48 
MANTI II 8.50 3'.9 8.50 9.67 12.84 19.27 29.83 48.18 80.83 556.35 
MAPLE TON 11 3.63 56.8 3.63 3.13 5.63 9.29 13.26 21.18 37.03 322.34 
MILFORD 11 It.15 0.0 11.15 11.15 11.15 11.15 11.15 11.75 11.75 11.75 
Table 9. Continued. 
Name of city Minimum 30.000 I 60.000 I 120.000 I 250,000 I 500.000 I 1,000,000 I 2,000,000 I 20,000,000 I 
charge - quantity 7,926 gal 15.852 gal 31,704 gal 66,043 gal 132.086 gal 264.173 gal 528,346 gal 5,283,457 gal 
($) (1000 I) 1,060 cu ft 2,120 cu ft 4,240 cu ft 8,829 cu ft 17,658 cu ft 35.317 cu ft 70,634 cu ft 706,345 cu ft 
($) ($) ($) ~~__ _ ____ JSL _ __ _ J~ ____ ($) ($) 
"DAB (4) 1 2.50 7.6 3.80 5.55 9.03 16.59 31.12 60.18 118.30 1164.42 
"DAB 1 3.50 11.4 4.98 7.36 12.11 21.11 37. ~e 68.36 127.99 902.95 
MOA8 1 or s.oo 7.6 7.61 11.09 18.07 33.18 62.24 120.36 236.5~ 2328.84 
MOA8 , or 1.00 11.4 9.96 14.71 24.22 43.54 75.96 136.72 255.97 1805.91 
.. T PL E A SAN T 8 3.00 18.9 3.59 5.17 8.34 15.21 28.42 54.83 107.67 1058.69 
HURRAY (5) 2351 3.00 31.1 3.00 4.43 7.39 13.82 2&.18 50.90 ~6.22 737.80 
MURRAY HOSP Z~.OO 31.1 25.00 26.43 29.39 35. e2 48.18 72.90 118.22 159.80 
MURRAY 2351 OT 4.00 31.1 4.00 6.04 10.28 19.46 37.12 72.43 132.75 965.05 
NORTH LOGAN ZI 4.00 30.3 4.00 5.96 9.93 18.51 35.02 &8.04 134.09 1322.86 
OGDEN 1/2·5/a- 3.10 28.8 3.18 5.16 9.13 11.11 33.4Z 60.16 109.35 115.53 
OGO£N l/4"CON 4.05 42.8 4.05 5.19 9.15 17.14 33.44 60.79 109.38 715.56 
OGDEN 1" CON 5.95 7 1.2 5.'15 5.95 9.18 17.76 3 J •• 7 6u.81 109.40 715.56 
OG DEN 1.5" CON 11.20 142.3 11.20 11.20 11.20 16. 31 34.02 61.36 109.515 116.13 
OGOEN 2" CON 11.50 227.5 17.50 11.50 17.50 16.99 3'.69 &2.04 110.63 716.61 
OGDEN 3" CON 31.65 431.5 31.85 31.65 31.85 31.65 35.92 &3.26 111.65 716.03 
~ OGDEN 4" CON 51.65 746.9 51.85 51.85 51.85 51.85 51.85 64.52 113.11 119.29 
~ OGDEN 6" CON 101.25 1691.3 101.25 101.25 101.25 101.25 101.25 101.25 115.50 721.68 
OGDEN 8- CON 197.50 4051.1 197.50 191.50 Ijl.50 197.50 197.50 l'U.50 1 97.50 124.16 
OGDEN 1/2+ 5/6"OT 6.20 28.8 6.36 10.33 18.25 35.42 66.84 121.46 218.40 1430.76 
OGDEN 3/4-CON OT a.l0 
" 2.8 6.10 10. 38 1B.30 35.47 6&.89 121.51 21B.45 1430.81 
OGDEN 1" CON aT 11.90 7 1.2 11.'10 11. 90 18.35 35.52 66.94 121.56 218.50 1430.86 
OGDEN 1.5"CON OT 22.40 142.3 22.40 22.40 22.40 36.62 b6.01t 122.&6 219.60 1431.96 
OG OEN 2- CON OT 35.00 227.5 35.GO 35.00 35.00 37.91 69.39 124.01 220.95 1433.31 
OGDEN 3" CON OT 63.70 431.5 63.70 63.10 63.70 63.70 71.84, 126.46 223.40 1435.1& 
OGDEN 4" CON OT 103.10 746.9 103.10 103.1 J 103.70 103.70 103.70 128.98 225.92 1438.28 
OGDEN 6- CON or 202.50 1691.3 202.50 202.50 202.50 202.50 202.50 202.50 230.95 1443.31 
OGDEN 8" CON aT 395.00 4051.1 395.00 395.00 3 95.0 I) 395.00 395.00 39).00 395.0C 1448.31 
ORE" 21 4.65 " 5.4 4.65 5.23 1.37 10.80 17.41 30.62 51.03 532.55 
ORE" (6), 35 e.70 '9.5 8.10 8.70 10.63 16.81 28.TO 52.47 100.02 955.94 
ORE" 27 OT 9.30 45.4 9.30 10.46 14.74 21.61 34.82 61.23 114.07 1065.09 
ORE" 35 aT 17.40 19.5 17.40 11.40 21.25 33.62 51.39 104.94 200.04 1911.88 
PANGUJ TCH 21 3.00 56.8 3.00 1.13 5.45 9.25 15.66 29.01 55.48 531.00 
PARK CITY 1 5.00 0.0 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.011 5.00 5.00 5.00 
PAYSON 8 3.00 37.9 3.00 3.99 6.69 12.53 23.11 41.07 14.09 668.'8 
PAYSON 8 OT 6.00 31.9 6.00 7.99 11.38 25.05 46.23 82.14 148.19 1336.96 
PL AIM CI Tf 2 5.50 0.0 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 
PROVIDENCE 11 3.00 37.9 3.00 3.8a 6.2& 11.41 21.31 41.13 80.75 194.02 
PROVO 3/4· CON 3.50 28.3 3.60 5.29 8.68 16.03 10.15 56.41 11~.92 1132.05 
Table j. Continued. 
Name of city Minimum 30,0001 60,0001 ]20,0001 250,000 I 500,000 I 1,000,000 I 2,000,000 I 20,000,000 I 
charge - quantity 7,926 gal 15,852 gal 31,704 gal 66,043 gal 132,086 gal 264,173 gal 528,346 gal 5,283,457 gaJ 
($) (1000 I) 1,060 cu ft 2,120 cu ft 4;240 co ft 8,829 cu ft ]7,658 cu ft 35,317 cu ft 70,634 cu ft 706,345 cu ft 
($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
PROVO 
'" CON 4.50 28.3 4.60 6.29 9.68 17.03 31.15 59.41 115.92 1133.05 
PROVO I-liZ" CON 10.00 28.3 10.1u 11.79 15.16 22.53 36.65 64.91 121.42 1136.55 
PROVO 2" CON 15.00 Z e.3 15.10 1&.79 20.18 27.53 41.65 69.91 12&.42 1143.55 
PROVO 3" CON 30.00 ZB.3 30.10 31.19 35.18 42.53 56.&5 84.91 141.42 1156.55 
PR avo 4" CON 50.00 28.3 50.10 51.19 ~5.18 62.53 16.&5 104.91 161.42 1178.55 
PROVO 6- CON 10C.OO 28.3 100.10 101.79 105.16 112.53 126.65 154.91 211.42 1226.55 
PR OVO 8" CON 150.00 28.3 150.10 151.19 155.16 162.53 11&.65 204.~1 261.42 lZ76.55 
PROVO 10" CON 200.00 28.3 200.10 201.19 205.18 212.53 22&.&5 254.91 311.42 1328.55 
PR avo lZ· CON 250.00 28.3 250.10 251.79 255.18 262.53 276.65 304.91 361.42 1378.55 
PROVO 3/4 CON or 10.50 28.3 10.79 15.67 26.04 48.08 90.46 175.22 344.75 3396.15 
PROVO 1- CON OT 13.50 28.3 13.19 18.67 29.04 51.08 93."b 118.22 347.75 3399.15 
PROVO 1-1/2 C or 30.00 28.3 30.Z9 35.37 45.54 67.58 109.96 194. T 2 364.25 3415.65 
PROVO 2" CON OT 45.00 23.3 45.29 50.31 60.54 62.58 124.96 209.12 319.25 3430.65 
PROVO 3- CON or 90.00 28.3 90.29 95.37 105.54 127.56 169.96 254.72 424.25 3475.65 
PROVO 4" CO .. OT 15 CJ. 00 2e.3 150.29 155.31 165.54 167.56 229.96 314.72 464.25 3535.65 
tH PROVO 6- CON OT 300.00 28.3 300.29 305.31 315.54 331.5-8 319.96 464.' 2 634.25 3685.65 
~ PROVO 8" CON or 45C.00 Z 8. 3 450.29 455.37 465.54 467.58 529.96 614.72 784.25 3835.65 
PR 0'10 10- CON 0 T 600.00 28.3 600.29 605.37 &15.54 631.58 619.96 164.72 934.25 3985.65 
PROVO 12" CON or 150.00 28.3 150.29 T 55.31 765.54 r 67.58 829.96 914.72 loa4.25 ~115.65 
RANOOLPH 11 3.50 56.8 3.50 3.71 7.42 10.85 11.46 30.61 57.08 532.60 
RIC Hf I [LD 2 3.75 56.8 3.15 3.96 7.93 16.51 33.02 66.04 132.09 1320.86 
RIVERDALE 17 3.25 37.9 3.Z5 4.30 7.16 13.34 25.23 49.00 96.55 952.47 
~IVERTON ZI 4.00 18.9 4.59 6.17 9.34 1&.21 29.42 55.83 108.67 1059.69 
RIVERTON 21 aT 5.00 18.9 5.59 1.11 10.34 17.21 10.4Z 56.81 109.b7 10&0.69 
RIVERTON(') 9 z.oo 18.9 2.59 4.11 7.34 14 .21 21.42 53.83 106.67 1057.69 
ROOSEY£l T 11 5.00 31.9 5.00 1. OS 11.93 20.~1 31.02 rOe J4 136.09 1324.66 
ROY 17 2.50 31.9 2.50 3.61 6.62 13 .15 25.10 50.19 U)0.~9 1004.4·6 
ROY 11 OT 6.25 37.9 6.25 8.30 13.85 25.87 48.98 95.21 187.67 1851.96 
ST.GEORGE 1 3.00 11.4 3.99 5.57 8.74 15.61 26.62 53.31 98.22 906.59 
S T .GEORGE 51 3.00 11.4 4.23 6.21 10.16 18.76 35.27 66.37 123.64 1021.11 
SlC 3/4,1- CON 1.75 31.1 1.75 3.38 6.77 14 .12 28.24 5&.50 113.01 1130.11. 
SLC 1.5" CON 3.50 62.3 3.50 3.50 6.76 14.11 28.23 56.49 113.00 1130.13 
SLC 2- CON 5.60 99.1 5.60 5.bO 6.16 14 .13 26.25 5b.51 113.02 1130.15 
SLC 3- CON 11.20 198.2 11.Z0 11.20 11.20 lIt.13 26.25 56.51 113.02 1130.15 
SlC 4- CON 17.50 308.6 1'.50 17.50 11.50 17 .50 28.31 56.57 113.08 1130.21 
SLC 6" CON 35.00 6Z0.1 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 56.47 112.98 1130.11 
SLC 8- CON 56.00 991.0 5&.00 5&.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.;1 113.02 1130.15 
SLC 10" CON 80.50 1424.2 80.50 80.50 80.50 80.50 80.50 80.50 113.04 1130.1.7 
Table 9. Continued. 
Name of city Minimum 30,000 I 60,000 I 120,000 I 250,000 I 500,000 I 1,000,000 I 2,000,000 I 20,000.000 I 
charge - quantity 7,926 gal 15,852 gal 31,704 gal 66.043 gal 132.086 gal 264,1 73 gal 528.346 gal 5,283,457 gal 
($) (1000 I) 1,060 cu ft 2,120cu ft 4,240 cu ft 8.829 cu ft 17,658 cu ft 35.317 cu ft 70,634 cu ft 706,345 cu ft 
($) ($~- ($) ($) (S) (S) ($) ($) 
- -- -----_. -
- -- - -- - ----- ---.-- ----
SlC 3/4_1- CO OT 2.50 28.3 2.64 5.19 10.27 21.29 42.48 84.86 169.62 1695.33 
SlC 1.5- CON OT 5.00 59.5 5.00 5.05 10.13 21.15 42.34 84.72 169.48 1695.19 
SlC 2- CON OT 8.00 93.4 B.O\l 8. Oil 10.25 21.27 42.46 84.8 " 169.60 1695.31 SLC 3- CON aT 16.00 189.1 16.00 16.00 16.00 21.11 42.30 84.68 169.44 1695.15 
SLC It- CON or 25.00 294.5 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 42.42 84.80 16Y.56 1695.27 
SLC 6- CON OT 50.00 568.9 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 64.64 169. bO 1695.31 
SLC 8- CON OJ 6e.oo 942.9 80.00 80.00 80.00 BO.OO 80.0ll 84.64 169.60 1695.31 
SlC 10- CON OT 1tS.00 1356.3 115.00 115.00 115.00 115.00 115.00 1IS.()0 J.69.56 1695.21 
SANDY 11 a.oo 15.1 8.00 8.00 10.93 19.51 36.02 69.04 135.09 1323.86 
SANTAQUIN 11 4.15 37.9 4.15 4.62 5.89 8.63 13.92 24.48 45.62 426.03 
SANTAQUIN 11 or 6.15 37.9 8.15 9.09 11.62 17.12 21.b8 48.62 91.09 851.90 
SHITtfflElD II 3.00 37.9 3.00 3.88 6.26 10.63 16.61 27.43 48.57 428.98 
SO UTH OGOE N 17 2.25 37.9 2.25 3.42 6.59 13.46 26",67 53.08 105.92 1056.94 
S SAL 1 LAKE 21 2.50 45.4 2.50 3.35 6.83 14.39 28.92 51.98 116.10 1162.22 
S SAL T (8) 3 4.00 75.1 4.00 4.00 6.57 14.13 28.66 57.72 115.84 1161.96 C.H SP ANI SH FO RK 8 3.50 56.8 3.50 3.63 6.01 10.35 16.96 30.17 56.56 532.10 C.H 
SUN SE t 3/4 - CON 3.65 31.9 3.65 5.00 8.37 .... 38 25.6C) 48.0& 92.91 901.34 
SUNSE T 1- CON 4.50 31.9 4.50 5.85 9.22 15.23 26.45 48.91 93.82 902.19 
SUNSE T 4- CON 9.15 31.~ 9.15 10.50 13.87 19.88 31.10 53.56 98.47 906.84 
SUNSE T 6- CON 13.60 37.9 13.60 14.95 18.32 24.33 35.55 SH.Ol 102.92 911.29 
SYRACUSE 1 6.15 31.9 6.15 1.32 10.49 17.36 30.51 56.98 109.82 1060.84 
SYRACUSE 7 6.15 37.9 6.15 7.03 9.41 14.56 24.46 44.26 63.90 191.17 
TOOELE (9) 2351 l.15 42.5 2.75 3.83 7.54 15.58 31.03 61.93 123.14 1236.23 
VERNAL (10) l 3.00 37.9 3.00 3.88 6.93 11.62 40.13 86.96 119.42 1843.71 
VERNAL 351 3.00 31.9 3.00 3.88 6.26 11.41 21.31 41.13 80.15 794.02 
VERNAL (10) l or 6.00 37.9 6.00 7.16 13.18 29.02 62.04 126.09 260.11 2631.73 
VERNAL 357 or 6.00 37.9 6.00 1.46 11.43 20.01 36.52 69.54 135.59 13l4.36 
WASHING lER 2 3.15 37.9 3.15 4.92 8.09 14.96 28.17 54.58 107.42 1058.44 
WASHING(10) 2 4.25 41.6 4.25 5.22 8.39 15.26 28.47 54.88 101.12 1058.14 
WASHING IER 3 5.75 11.9 5.15 5.15 8.29 15.16 28.37 54.78 11l7.62 1058.64 
MASHING 3/4- CON 4.25 41.6 4.25 5.22 8.39 15.26 28.41 54.88 107.12 1058.14 
WA SHI NG 1- COH 5.15 11.9 5.15 5.75 8.29 15.16 26.37 54.18 101.62 1058.64 
WA S"I NG 1.5- CON 9.50 143.8 9.50 9.50 9.50 15.11 28.32 54.13 107.51 1058.59 
'I. SHI NG Z- CON 14.00 227.1 14.00 14.00 14.00 15.21 28.42 54.83 101.61 1056.69 
'I. SHI IlAG 3- CON 24.50 431.5 24.50 24.50 24.50 Z4.50 28.12 54.53 107.37 1058.39 
~ 
Table 9. Continued. 
Name of city Minimum 30,0001 
charge - quantity 7;926 gal 
($) (1000 I) 1,060 cu ft 
W~SHING .. - CON 39.50 7lt5.1 
WELLSVilLE 23 5.00 132.5 
W 8 au Nfl fU L 17 3.00 45.4 
~EST 80(10) 2 5.00 83.3 
W JORO A'( 11) 235 4.00 22.7 
WE S T POI NT 11 3.80 45.4 
GOl DE N GAR DEN 1 6.00 22.7 
NOR 0 I C V ALL [ Y 1 8.50 31.9 
SU"HI T PAR K 1 12.00 45.4 
TERRA 1 3.21 9.5 
WHITE CITY 1 1.75 28.3 
WOOOL AND 8ENCH1 2.50 .3 4.0 
This table lists the prices associated with the 
consumption of various quantities of water for all 
cities according to the same coding as Table 2. For 
example, a single residence in Bountiful would be 
($) 
39.50 
5.00 
3.0~ 
5.00 
4.46 
3.80 
6.96 
8.50 
12.00 
5.11 
1.84 
2.50 
60,000 I 120,000 I 250,000 I 500,000 I 
15,852 gal 31,704 gal 66,043 gal 132,086 gal 
2,120 cu ft 4,240 cu ft 8,829 cn ft 17,658 cn ft 
($) (5) (5) ($) 
39.50 39.50 39.50 39.50 
5.00 5.00 12.76 29.21 
3. 8 ~ 7.26 13.27 24.09 
5.00 7.20 13.57 Zit.o5 
6.46 10.43 19.01 35.52 
4.76 8.13 17.31 33.82 
10.93 18.27 32.12 55.23 
13.47 26.95 56.14 112.21 
15.47 29.73 56.03 107.&6 
1.88 13.43 2'5.45 40.51 
5.43 6.61 13.49 2b./4 
4.34 8.56 17.76 34.&2 
charged $7.34 for consumption of 120,000 liters of 
water. A liter is approximately .25 gallon or .02 cubic 
foot. In reading Table 3, only those rates for a 
particular consumer class should be compared. 
1,000,000 I 2,000,000 I 20,000,000 I 
264,173 gal 528,346 gal 5,283,457 gal 
35,317 cn ft 70;634 en ft 706.,345 en ft 
($) ($) (5) 
52.93 105.77 1056.19 
62.29 128.34 1317.11 
4.3.91 83.53 796.80 
44.47 84.09 797.36 
68.54 134.59 1323.36 
66.64 132.89 1321.c66 
101.46 193. 92 1858.21 
224.55 449.09 4490.94 
200.12 385.04 3713.62 
94.~0 181.26 1851.55 
49.~2 92.30 855.15 
64.blt 114.36 877.21 
CHAPTER V 
REVENUE POTENTIAL OF WATER· USER FEES 
REVENUE ESTIMATION AND POTENTIAL 
User fees perform two major functions. First, 
they can be used to allocate resources or control use, 
such as in pollution control. Second, they can be used 
to raise capital or revenue to support governmental 
services. The latter function is of primary interest in 
this study, and in this chapter estimates are made of 
amounts of funds that may be generated by fees 
imposed on major water uses. 
At least two options are available for making 
these estimates. One is to find the maximum 
revenue-generation possible and then determine the 
level of fee that is implied. Another method is to select 
a "typical" or reasonable fee and estimate what 
amounts of revenue would be generated by it. A 
simple but appropriate formula has been developed in 
this research that will allow either type of calculation. 
The formula assumes that supply will not be affected 
and that anyone who demands water can get it. 
Revenue Potential Formula and a 
Simple mustration 
A fee levied on a product has two demand effects. 
One is to reduce consumption because of the increase 
in price and the other is to induce substitution when 
alternative products exist. Both of these effects will 
reduce the revenue generating PQtential of a user fee 
or excise tax. 
Let q be the quantity demanded before the fee, p 
be the prefee price, and f be the fee. It follows then 
that the total revenue raised by the fee: 
T.R. = fq - fdq ............................ (1) 
From the definition of the elasticity of demand (e 
= p/q dq/dp), dq = e{dp)q/p. For perfect 
competition and constant costs, f = dp (dp = llzf for 
monopoly where marginal revenue equals half of 
demand). 
Substitution in (1) gives: 
T .R. = fq - f2 ~ (perfect competition) ............... (2) 
P 
f2 eq 
T.R. = fq -"-""2p (monopoly)· .................... (3) 
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Differentiating with respect to f gives: 
dTR 2feq dr = q - -p- = 0 (perfect competition) .......... (4) 
dTR = q _ feq (monopoly) ....................... (5) 
df p 
Setting this equal to zero in order to maximize 
revenue and solving for f gives: 
f = E. (perfect competition) ...................... (6) 
2e 
f = .£. (monopoly) ............................. (7) 
e 
Thus, the fee which maximizes revenue depends 
on the price and the elasticity of demand. 
To illustrate the concept, suppose that the water 
monopoly of the City of Logan, Utah, wanted to 
improve its water system with funds generated by a 
water user fee. In 1970, the price of 1,000 gallons of 
water was 15.6 cents and approximately 1,700,000 of 
these units were consumed. The elasticity of demand 
for Logan City water is not known exactly, but assume 
it to be .75 (Gardner and Shick, 1969). 
The fee which will maximize revenue is given by: 
f = E... = 0.156 = 0.21 
e 0.75 
which substituting in Equation 3 makes the maximum 
revenue potential about $180,216. 
Estimates for the United States 
For the United States as a whole and several 
individual states, Table 4 shows the revenue potential 
from relatively low levels of fees. A sample calculation 
for the State of Utah is presented in Appendix C. It is 
obvious that there is a potential for the generation of 
substantial funds if society should deem it desirable to 
raise money by this means. 
Table 4. Estimated revenue from user fees on public supply and irrigation uses in 10 selected states. 
Annuala Useb Annualc 
State Type of Use Use Fee (mgd) ($/1000 gal.) Revenue ($1000's) (1000 ac-ft) ($/acre-ft) 
Ariz. Public Supply 470 0.40 34,310 
Irrigation 7,000 2.50 8,750 
Calif. Public Supply 3,400 0.40 248,200 
Irrigation 37,000 2.50 46,250 
Fla. Public Supply 880 0.40 64,240 
Irrigation 2,500 2.50 3,125 
La. Public Supply 380 0.40 27,740 
Irrigation 1,700 2.50 2,125 
Mass. Public Supply 750 0.40 54,750 
Irrigation 65 2.50 81 
Minn. Public Supply 340 0.40 24,820 
Irrigation 23 2.50 29 
New York Public Supply 2,600 0.40 189,800 
Irrigation 31 2.50 39 
Okla. Public Supply 260 0.40 18,980 
Irrigation 920 2.50 1,150 
Utah Public Supply 280 0.40 20,440 
Irrigation 4,100 2.50 5,125 
Wash. Public Supply 910 0.40 66,430 
Irrigation 6,300 2.50 7,875 
Total for all states Public Supply 27,000 0.40 1,971,000 
Irrigation 140,000 2.50 175,000 
aSource: U.S. Geological Survey, 1972 (public supply figures do not include supplies for rural use). 
bFees are illustrative only, computed on the basis of assumed prices for public supply and irrigation of $.30/1000 gal. and 
$5.00/~c-ft respectively. See Appendix C. 
cRevenue is calculated with Equation 3 assuming the elasticity for public supply and irrigation uses to be 0.75 and 2 
respectively. 
ESTIMATES FOR UTAH 
Narrowing the focus to Utah, it is possible to get a 
clearer picture of the generating potential of water 
use fees. Estimates are made below for water used in 
agriculture, industry, homes and businesses, and in 
recreation. 
Irrigation User Fees 
Much of the water allocated to agriculture in Utah 
is distributed by mutual irrigation companies. It 
would be administratively easier from a state 
perspective to levy a fee against a mutual company 
than an individual. Under such an arrangement the 
company would distribute the fee to its stockholders. 
Companies from two counties, Weber and Utah, were 
selected to estimate revenue generation if the state 
were to levy a fee to extract the maximum revenue 
from each company given present rate structures. To 
do this, it was necessary to determine the elasticity of 
demand for irrigation water. Estimated elasticities for 
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various regions of Utah are shown in Table 5. Taking 
the total amount of water used for irrigation in Utah 
and the average price and elasticity, it was found that 
the fee which would generate the most revenue would 
be $2.50 per acre/ft and it would bring in 
approximately 5 million dollars annually. Revenue, 
average fee, and average burden/stockholder, for 
Weber and Utah counties are shown in Tables 6 and 7. 
Some problems would be encountered in estab-
lishing and administering a comprehensive system of 
user charges on irrigation water in Utah. Mutual 
companies hold water rights and distribute water to 
users according to the number of shares in the 
company each user holds. Although records of each 
company's dealings with the state with respect to 
water rights are available in the Utah Water Rights 
Division, the water rights picture is complex and in a 
state of flux with companies continually making new 
applications for appropriation and changes in point of 
diversion. A perspective on this situation may be 
gained by examining the history of one of the 
companies, the Alpine Irrigation Company, in Appen-
dix D. 
Table 5. El4sticity of demand for irrigation water in Utah by region. 
Q
a * P 
Actual Price 
Quantity Read 
Region Used from MVP 
1,000 Schedule 
ac ft at Q 
$/ac 1t 
1 Great Salt Lake Desert 59 $ 8.80 
2 Bear River 354 8.90 
3 Weber River 236 14.40 
4 Jordan River 310 9.30 
5 Sevier River 436 7.30 
6 Cedar-Beaver 137 9.20 
7 Uinta Basin 293 5.20 
8 West Colorado 114 8.70 
9 South & East Colorado 30 2.80 
10 Lower Colorado 34 9.40 
Total or average 2,003a 8.64 
Source: M. H. Anderson et aI., 1973. 
b10 a lO 
~ Q. 2,003 
i=1 ~ 
~ Qi 2,349 
i=l 
Industrial User Fees 
Industrial water-user fee revenues are estimated 
herein as the sum of those estimated from the present 
level of industrial use and those from the future 
increased industrial use. "Present diversions" refer to 
the summation of water consumption by nine heavy 
use industries in Utah for 1970. This particular year 
was selected because of the availability of data. 
Increased water use after 1970, along with projected 
future increased demands, are termed "new diver-
sions." 
Present level of industrialuBe 
To estimate present industrial water use in Utah, 
data were drawn from 196'8-69 U.S. Bureau of Census 
records on average national water use for the nine 
heavy use industrial categories shown in Table 8. 
From these data, it was possible to derive a coefficient 
for water use per employee in each of these industries. 
This coefficient was then applied to the number of 
employees involved in the same respective industries 
for the year 1970 in Utah, with a resulting 
consumptive use figure determined for each industry 
as presented in Table 9. A summation of these figures 
yielded a total annual industrial water use of slightly 
less than 55 billion gallons (168,000 acre feet) and is 
assumed to be the present level of industrial use for 
1970. This quantity of intake, categonzed as "present 
dh-ersion," is presumed to be supplied through 
existing systems in which the only costs are for 
system operation and maintenance. 
/\ 
Q 
~uantity 
stimate 
17QP* 17QaP* 
on Regression Elasticity Elasticity Regression 
at P* A * * 
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1,000 
ac ft 
67.9 
394.5 
168.0 
367.8 
609.8 
155.2 
369.7 
99.0 
65.9 
51.2 
2,349.0b 
atQ,P 
-1.49 
-0.95 
-2.86 
-1.33 
-3.07 
-1.43 
-1. 73 
-2.46 
-2.19 
-2.68 
-2.00c 
d iO 
~ Qa ·17 QP*i 
i=l 
at Qa,P R2 
-1.71 0.88 
-1.05 0.97 
-2.04 0.97 
-1.57 0.97 
-4.29 0.92 
-1.62 0.89 
-2.19 , 0.95 
-2.13 0.98 
-4.80 0.93 
-4.03 0.90 
-2.38d 
Future increased ,,'ndustrial water use requirements 
The projections presented here are not intended 
to include all future increased industrial requirements 
for Utah's water. They are based on future diversion 
requirements of proposed energy development pro-
jects (and operational projects completed since 1970) 
within the state (Table 10). In the case of the 
Huntington Canyon project, for example, which 
accounts for the 7,000 ac ft increase in 1974, the 
system is already operational. Since these require-
ments are supplemental to the present diversion 
quantities shown for 1970, they are considered as 
"new diversions." 
The data compiled in Table 10 are taken from the 
Colorado River Regional Assessment Study prepared 
by the Utah Water Research Laboratory at Utah 
State University in June 1975 for the National 
Commission on Water Quality. The water require-
ment column in Table 10 represents a cumulative total 
of increased yearly intake as proposed new energy 
development projects are completed and commence 
operation. Increases are shown annually through 1986 
and summarized beyond that point. These figures are 
used as the basis for computing the user fee potential 
of future increased industrial water consumption. 
Industrial water-user fee potentuu 
By reason of the indispensible nature of industrial 
water use and the relatively small portion of total 
production costs accounted for by water quantity 
demanded is not likely to change appreciably with 
Table 6. Revenue potential from irrigation user fees (Utah County). 
Total Tax Rate Per Cost Per 
Company Stockholders Amount Cost per Acre Foot Revenue a Stockholder 
Used (acre foot) Acre Foot (Dollar) (Dollar) (Dollar) 
Alpine 200 6,125 0.85 0.64 1,960.00 9.80 
Alta Ditch 10 1,113 22.21 16.70 9,293.55 929.35 
American Fork 1,100 18,386 2.05 1.54 14,157.22 12.87 
Cedar Fork 31 1,750 0.52 0.39 314.25 10.14 
Coffman Springs 11 339 0.69 0.52 88.14 8.01 
Current Creek 28 7,500 1.18 0.89 3,337.50 119.20 
Dixon 15 1,100 2.50 1.88 1,034.00 68.93 
East River Bottom 70 1,379 0.48 0.39 268.90 3.84 
East Warm Creek 12 3,500 0.12 0.09 157.50 13.13 
Fairfield 26 2,100 1.63 1.22 1,281.00 49.27 
90 229 0.64 0.48 54.96 0.61 
Fortfield-Little Dry Creek 126 3,027 0.99 0.74 1,120.00 8.89 
Goshen 115 3,924 0.51 0.38 745.56 6.48 
Holladay Fld. Ditch 9 693 0.76 0.57 197.50 21.94 
Hollow Water 51 1,925 0.19 0.14 134.75 2.64 
Lake Bottom 92 3,535 0.82 0.62 1,095.85 11.91 
Lake Shore 110 7,835.6 0.73 0.55 2,154.79 19.59 
Lake Side 16 2,345 0.08 0.06 70.35 4.40 
Lehi 860 20,580 1.56 1.17 12,039.30 14.00 
Lindon Pumping 100 1,365 0.21 0.16 109.20 1.09 
Mapleton 450 11,277.1 1. 70 1.28 7,217.34 16.04 
Matson Spring 10 779 1.77 1.33 518.03 51.80 
Mitchell Hollow 39 480 2.10 1.58 379.20 9.74 
North Union 354 6,272 1.92 1.44 4,515.84 12.76 
Pioneer Pumping 7 525 0.57 0.43 112.88 16.12 
Pleasant Grove 782 16,622 1.89 1.42 11,801.62 15.09 
Provo Bench Canal 800 40,906 0.49 0.37 7,567.61 9.50 
Provo River Water Users 10 75,102 1.66 1.25 46,938.75 4,693.87 
Rock Canyon 68 1,855 0.48 0.36 333.90 4.91 
Salem 375 8,230.6 1.34 1.01 4,156.45 11.08 
Salem Pond 35 2,100 0.40 0.30 315.00 9.00 
South Ditch 30 438 4.38 3.29 720.51 24.02 
South Fields 15 700 3.85 2.89 1,001.50 66.77 
Spanish Fk. South 200 15,301 1.06 0.80 6,120.40 30.60 
Spanish Fk. E. Bench 200 15,957.2 1.43 1.07 8,537.10 42.68 
Spanish Fk. West 195 16,196.9 0.82 0.62 5,021.04 25.75 
Spring Creek 76 2,800 0.71 0.53 748.00 9.76 
Strawberry Wat. Users 1,200 70,031 0.91 0.68 23,810.54 19.84 
Stra wberry Highline 600 48,211.1 1.03 0.77 18,561.27 30.93 
Summit Creek 160 12,250 3.95 2.97 18,191.25 113.67 
Timpanogus Canal 310 4,314 0.54 0.41 884.37 2.85 
Upper East Union 210 4,636 0.56 0.42 973.56 4.64 
Utah Lake District 350 16,629 0.76 0.57 4,739.26 13.54 
Warm Spring 12 4,550 0.20 0.15 341.25 28.44 
Wash Creek 12 931 0.46 0.34 158.27 13.19 
West Union 1,030 7,454 4.29 3.22 12,000.94 11.65 
Woods Springs 15 1,550 0.57 0.43 333.25 22.22 
Other companies exist but either no records were kept or their water was used other than by stockholders. 
Total Revenues = $235,607.45 
2 ~.R. = fq _ f eq e = 1.33 2p 
price and thus can be considered relatively inelastic. 
Since the maximum fee assessable is inversely related 
to elasticity of demand, the smaller the elasticity the 
greater the fee that can be imposed. Although low 
elasticity of demand is probable, a range of values for 
elasticity is considered in computing user fee capital 
generating possibilities. 
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Another major consideration in user fee deter-
mination is the cost of supplying water to the user. 
The costs in Table 11 are generalized estimates for 
moving water from the source to the user facilities. 
Storage and collection costs at points of origin and 
distribution and treatment costs at the point of use are 
not included. 
Table 7. Revenue potentialfrom irrigation water user fees (Weber County). 
Total Company Stockholders Amount 
Used (acre foot) 
Bambrough 24 1,356 
Co-op Farm 7 2,262.6 
Crooked Creek 7 270 
Davis and Weber Co. Canal 1,700 65,143 
Dinsdale Water 102 698.6 
Davis Ditch Water 15 654.6 
Eden 31 8,292 
Evertsen 13 604.2 
Felt, Peterson and Slater 9 952.6 
Glenwood Ditch 78 388.88 
Hooper 545 3,654 
Huntsville 300 7,617 
Huntsville So. Bench 25 883.8 
Liberty 57 3,359.2 
Marriot 63 2,312 
Mound Fort No.6 6 373 
North Ogden Irr. 245 8,822.8 
Old Wilson 47 926 
Perry 30 1,507.8 
Pioneer Irr. Canal 10 627 
Riverdale Bench 60 2,285 
Shupe & Middleton 16 325.37 
South Weber 23 1,704 
Uintah Central Canal 44 1,009 
Warren 125 19,340 
Weber Canal Water 115 242 
Western 310 10,889 
Wilson 250 15,642 
Total Revenue = $34,950.53 
~.R. f
2 eq 
e = 2.86 fq---
2p 
The cost of present diversions relate to distribut-
ing water costs for municipal and industrial use 
through existing facilities for transport. Operation 
and maintenance costs only are considered. The costs 
for groundwater include the cost of pumping and the 
cost required to boost to line pressue. 
The cost of new diversions include the costs of 
constructing and maintaining new facilities for 
transporting water to the point of use. Capital costs 
are included with the 0 and M costs. Cost of pumping 
and boosting to line pressure is included in the 
groundwater costs. 
In order to estimate the total revenue that can be 
raised by charging fees for industrial water use, it is 
necessary to establish appropriate values for price and 
elasticity of demand for Equation 3. Data drawn from 
King et a1. (1972) indicate an average supply cost for 
water to industrial users of $23.80 per ac ft for present 
diversions and $42 per ac ft for new diversions (Table 
11). Using these costs as estimates of price (p) and the 
arbitrarily selected values of e = 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8, as 
given in Table 12, Equation 3 assuming monopoly 
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Tax Rate Per 
Revenuea 
Cost Per 
Cost per Acre Foot Stockholder 
Acre Foot (Dollar) (Dollar) (Dollar) 
1.56 0.54 366.12 15.25 
2.12 0.74 837.16 119.59 
0.14 0.05 6.75 0.96 
1.20 0.42 13,680.03 8.05 
3.15 1.10 384.23 3.77 
0.81 0.28 91.64 6.11 
0.59 0.21 870.66 28.08 
0.33 0.11 33.23 2.56 
0.46 0.16 76.21 8.47 
0.77 0.27 52.50 0.67 
1.85 0.65 1,187.55 2.18 
0.75 0.26 990.21 3.30 
6.50 2.27 1,003.11 40.12 
0.45 0.16 268.74 4.71 
0.57 0.20 231.20 3.67 
0.57 0.20 37.30 6.22 
1.56 0.54 2,382.16 9.72 
0.41 0.14 64.82 1.38 
0.62 0.22 165.86 5.53 
0.32 0.11 34.48 3.45 
0.90 0.31 354.17 5.90 
0.94 0.33 . 53.69 3.35 
0.56 0.19 161.88 7.04 
1.30 0.45 227.02 5.16 
1.01 0.35 3,384.50 27.08 
8.80 3.08 372.68 3.24 
1.54 0.54 2,940.03 9.48 
1.73 0.60 4,692.60 18.77 
conditions yields corresponding fees of $119.00, 
$47.60, and $29.75 per ac ft for present diversions and 
$210.00, $84.00, and $52.50 per ac ft for new 
diversions, as indicated in Table 13. 
Assuming that neither the M and I distribution 
costs (or prices) for both present diversions and new 
diversions nor the inelasticity of demand for water 
change, the additional revenues from future water use 
are shown in Tables 14 through 17. To obtain total 
revenue for a given year, after 1970 total revenue for 
1970 is added to the additional revenue for that year. 
Two fee alternatives that would raise half this 
maximum may be calculated if desired. An upper fee 
and a lower fee both yield half the maximum revenue. 
Municipal Water··User Fees 
It is assumed that most municipal water supply 
utilities, because they are monopolies, have set prices 
above the paraeto optimum; and the monopoly 
revenue formula (Equation 3) is appropriate. By using 
this formula, the revenue projections are twice as 
large as they would be under competitive conditions. 
Table 8. Heavy water user industries-1968. 
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 
Wa ter In take 
Code Industry Group 
Water Intake Number of From Private From Private Water Employees Water Systems Systems Per 
20 
28 
29 
32 
33 
34 
36 
37 
39 
Food and Kindred Products 
Chemical and Allied Products 
Petroleum and Coal Products 
Stone, Clay, Glass Products 
Primary Metal Industries 
Fabricated Metal Products 
Electric, Electronic Equipment 
Transportation Equipment 
Misc. Manufacturing Industries 
(1,000) 
1,632.4 
856.3 
141.0 
590.1 
1,274.7 
1,357.8 
1,882.7 
1,887.6 
430.7 
(Billions of Gallons) 
603.6 
4,221.9 
1,252.3 
216.1 
4,808.8 
20.5 
38.0 
190.8 
8.2 
Employee 
(Co1.2 -;'-Col. 1) 
369,762.3 
4,930,398.2 
8,881,560.1 
366,204.1 
3,772,495.4 
15,097.9 
20,183.7 
101,080.7 
19,038.7 
All Nine Heavy Use Industries 10,053.3 11,360.2 1,129,997.1 
Source: Column 1 is from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Annual Survey of Manufactures 1968-1969, General Statistics by Major 
Industry Groups. 
Column 2 are from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures 1967, Series No. 67(1)-2. 
Table 9. Estimate of industrial water use for the State of Utah, 1970. 
Code 
20 
28 
29 
32 
33 
34 
36 
37 
39 
Industry Group 
Food and Kindred Products 
Chemical and Allied Products 
Petroleum and Coal Products 
Stone, Clay, Glass Products 
Primary Metal Industries 
Fabricated Metal Products 
Electric, Electronic Equipment 
Transportation Equipment 
Misc. Manufacturing Industries 
All Nine Heavy Water Use Industries 
CoLA 
Number of 
Employees a 
6,928 
1,999 
1,204 
(NA) 
8,115 
4,093 
9,794 
5,405 
5,417 
42,955 
Water Intake 
From Private 
Water Systems 
(Million Gallons) 
Col. A x Col. 3,Table 8 
2,561.7 
9,855.9 
10,693.4 
(NA) 
30,613.8 
61.8 
197.7 
546.4 
103.1 
54,633.8 
aNumbers of Employees are from Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economics Information System, Employment 
by Selected Industrial Sectors (Utah). 
In i974 Bountiful, Utah, sold 1,256,669,390 
gallon$ of water at an average price of 26.8 cents per 
1,000 gallons. Assuming the price elasticity of demand 
to be .75 based on a recent study of urban water use 
(Gardner and Schick, 1964), the revenue maximizing 
water user fee would be 35.7 cents per 1,000 gallons. 
This makes the total rate, including the add-on fee, 
62.5 cents per 1,000 gallons and the maximum revenue 
generating potential 5224.315. 
Table 16 shows the maximum revenue generating 
potential for 16 Utah cities which provided enough 
information about revenues and water volume in the 
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1975 water rate survey discussed in Chapter IV to 
enable calculations. These 16 cities with combined 
population of 133,136, represent 11.33 percent of the 
projected 1974 Utah population (Utah Population 
Work Committee, 1975). A multiplier of 510.87/capita 
was calculated by dividing the sample's total revenue 
by total popUlation. 
Applying this multipier to Utah's projected 1974 
population (UPWC, 1975) yields a revenue of 
512,771,000. This number, as would be expected, is 
lower than the estimate for Utah shown in Table 3. 
Public supplies in Table 3 include quantities for some 
industrial uses. 
Table 10. Future ind:ustri4l water increases for 
Utah. a 
Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Beyond 1986 
Water Requirement Increases 
(ac ft/yr) 
7,000 
7,000 
7,000 
14,205 
21,205 
27,965 
100,895 
131,625 
131,625 
131,625 
131,625 
152,625 
152,625 
289,740 
aSource: Utah Water Research Laboratory, 1975. 
Reereational Water User Fees 
In the case of recreational fees, the circumstances 
are different since water is necessary but is not 
sufficient for a successful activity. Fishing requires 
fish in the water. The fee, therefore, is calculated on 
the right to take part in an activity. It is clear from the 
experience related in Chapter III that more revenue 
could be generated from fishing, hunting, or camping 
rights. Frequently, however, such rights are consid-
ered as public benefits, like education, which ought to 
be funded from taxes, at least for local residents. Out 
of state people are generally compelled to pay a higher 
fee. High fees on recreational activities would be 
opposed as a way of rationing poor people out of the 
market and leaving these activities as a privilege only 
of the rich. 
Table 17 gives some indication of the additional 
fees which could be collected if the purpose was to 
extract the maximum amount of rent from the present 
licensing privileges to fish and hunt. Sufficient data 
Table 11. Water cost per acre foot for Utah in 1970. 
M&I Distribution Cost 
Present 
Table 12. Total revenue [1970]. 
Elasticity 
0.2 
0.5 
0.8 
p 
q 
Present Diversions 
cost = $23.80 per acft 
168,000 ac-ft 
Fee 
(Dollar) 
119.00 
47.60 
29.75 
Table 1 S. Additional revenue for 1976. 
Elasticity 
0.2 
0.5 
0.8 
New Diversions 
p = cost = $42.00 per ac ft 
Additional q = 7,000 ac ft 
Fee 
(Dollar) 
210.00 
84.00 
52.50 
Total Revenue 
(Dollar) 
9,996,000 
3,998,400 
2,499,000 
Additional 
Revenue 
(Dollar) 
735,000.00 
294,000.00 
183,750.00 
were not available to make estimates for other types 
of recreation. 
COMMENTS 
The preceding very approximate calculations 
clearly indicate that all of the revenue potential from 
our public waters are not being captured. If it is felt 
that the capital to improve and expand the present 
water system should come from the users, then our 
analysis has clearly demonstrated that the potential is 
there. In Utah over two million dollars could be raised 
annually from agriculture, over 9 million from 
recreation, just under 13 million from municipal users, 
and several million more from industry. 
Maximum Fees 
Diversion New Pre sen t Diversions New Diversions Hydrologic {O&M} Diversions Study Unit 
Ground- Ground- e = 0.2 e = 0.5 e = 0.8 e = 0.2 e = 0.5 e = 0.8 
water water 
$/a.f. $/a.f. $ $ $ $ $ $ 
1 23.80 42.00 119.0 47.6 29.8 210.0 84.0 52.5 
2 23.80 42.00 119.0 47.6 29.8 210.0 84.0 52.5 
3 29.50 49.00 147.5 59.0 36.9 245.0 98.0 61.8 
4 29.50 49.00 147.5 59.0 36.9 245.0 98.0 61.3 
5 23.80 42.00 119.0 47.6 29.8 210.0 84.0 52.5 
6 23.80 42.00 119.0 47.6 29.8 210.0 84.0 52.5 
7 23.80 42.00 119.0 47.6 29.8 210.0 84.0 52.5 
8 42.00 210.0 84.0 52.5 
9 42.00 210.0 84.0 52.5 
10 23.80 42.00 119.0 47.6 29.8 210.0 84.0 52.5 
Source: King et al. (1972) page 36. 
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Table 14. Additional reven1.i~ /0+ 1980. Table 15. Additidnal revenUe for 1986. 
New Diversions New Diversions 
p = cost = $42.00 per ac ft p = cost = $42.00 per ac ft 
Additional q = 100,895 ac ft Additional q = 152,625 ac ft 
Fee Additional Fee Additional Elasticity (Dollar) Revenue Elasticity (Dollar) Revenue (Dollar) (Dollar} 
0.2 210.00 10,593,975.00 0.2 210.00 16,025,625.00 
0.5 84.00 4,237,590.00 0.5 84.00 6,410,850.00 
0.8 52.50 2,648,493.70 0.8 52.50 4,006,406.20 
Table 16. Revenue generating potentials in Utah cities. 
City Quantity of Average Maximum Available and 1973 Water Sold Revenue $ Fee Per 
Populationa Gallons 1000 g. Fee Revenue 
Bountiful 
29,220 1,256,669,390(2) $337,141(2) $0.268 $0.357 224,315 
Clearfield 
13,082 408,179,000(3) 155,284(3) 0.380 0.507 103,473 
East Carbon 
1,894 668,890,000(3) 56,009(3) 0.081 0.108 36,120 
Farmington 
2,912 243,918,700(2) 60,468(2) 0.248 0.331 40,369 
Fillmore 
1,626 190,525,000(2) 52,966(2) 0.278 0.370 35,247 
Heber 
3,488 326,996,400(2) 90,905(2) 0.278 0.370 60,484 
Kaysville 
7,007 520,708,300(2) 93,824(2) 0.180 0.240 62,485 
Layton 
15,766 1,298,193,999(2) 288,666(2) 0.222 0.296 192,133 
Manila 
205 23,389,000(2) 3,871(2) 0.139 0.185 2,163 
Moab 
4,375 418,014,000(2) 135,025(2) 0.323 0.431 90,082 
North Logan 
1,540 112,530,000(3) 30,698(3) 0.273 0.364 20,480 
Providence 
2,167 163,764,000(2) 29,248(2) 0.178 0.237 19,406 
Roosevelt 
3,431 421,320,000(3) 147,881(3) 0.351 0.468 98,589 
Roy 
15,643 1,392,705,000(2) 300,000(2) 0.215 0.287 199,853 
So. Salt Lake 
8,138 940,045,862(2) 126,770(2) 0.135 0.180 84,604 
Logan 
22,642 1,700,000,000(1) 265,200(1) 0.156 0.208 176,800 
TOTAL 
133,136 $1,446,613 
aSource: Bureau of Economic and Business Research (Bird, 1975), (1) 1970, (2) 1974, (3) 1975. 
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Table 17. Fishing and hunting water user fee potentials in Utah. 
1975-1976 Feesa Total Price Add On Total Sold Elasticityb Fee Revenue 
$ 2.00 Residen t Fishing (12, under 16) 43,041 -0.24 8.33 179,266 
$ 5.00 Resident Deer (16 and over) 82,973 -0.24 20.83 864,164 
$ 2.50 Resident Small Game (12, under 16) 16,522 -0.24 10.42 86,080 
$ 4.50 Resident Small Game (16 and over) 18,836 -D.24 18.75 176,588 
$ 5.00 Resident Fishing (16 and over) 117,925 -D.24 20.83 1,228,189 
$ 10.00 Resident Combination (16 and over) 115,436 -0.24 41.67 2,405,109 
$ 2.00 Residen t Fishing (63 and over) 10,796 -D.24 8.33 44,965 
$ 6.00 Resident Trapping (any age) 241 -0.24 25.00 3,013 
$ 0.50 Resident Fishing (Blind-Disabled) 123 -0.24 2.08 128 
$ 20.00 Resident Guide (21 and over) 88 1,760 
$ 3.00 Commercial Hunt Area (12 and over) 63 -0.24 12.50 394 
Total Resident Licenses Sold 406,044 4,989,656 
$ 2.50 Nonresident Fishing - 2 days (any age) 51,253 -D.24 10.42 267,028 
$ 5.00 Nonresident Fishing - 5 days (any age) 39,456 -D.24 20.83 410,934 
$ 15.00 Nonresident Fishing - season (any age) 5,720 -0.24 62.50 178,750 
$ 20.00 Nonresident Small Game (12 and over) 964 -D.24 83.33 40,165 a 
$ 75.00 N onresiden t Deer (16 and over) 19,757 -0.24 312.50 3,087,031 
$150.00 Nonresident Guide (21 and over) 2 300 
$ 40.00 Nonresident Guide's Agents (16 and over) 7 280 
Total Nonresident Licenses Sold 117,259 3,984,489 
TOTAL LICENSES SOLD 523,203 8,974,144 
aSource: State of Utah Division of Wildlife Resources. July 1974-July 1976 Biennial Report. 
bEstimated. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PROBLEMS AND POSSmILITIES OF 
INTRODUCING STATE 
WATER-USER FEES 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
The state must own the water or, at least, have 
legal control to charge fees for water use. The 
question of ownership is fraught with uncertainties 
and complications which may be resolved only through 
the courts. 
A brief treatise by Dewsnup and Jensen on the 
ownership question and other legal aspects of 
imposing state water-user fees in appropriation states 
is presented in Appendix E. General reference is made 
to this treatise in the discussion which follows; 
however, a number of extensions and additions have 
been made and these should not be attributed to the 
authors of. the treatise. Legal problems concerning 
user fees in riparian rights systems are not within the 
purview of the appended paper and are not discussed 
here. 
OWNERSHIP OF WATER 
Ownership of navigable waters in the United 
States developed from the law in England. The 
ownership rights of the Crown and Parliament of 
England went to the 13 American colonies as a result 
of the American revolution. Although the colonies 
granted the federal government regulatory powers 
over interstate and foreign commerce, they did not 
surrender ownership of the waters. The concept of 
state ownership of navigable waters, though never 
having been precisely dermed, was supported by the 
Supreme Court as related to the regulatory power and 
duty to protect public uses of the waters and 
associated beds and shorelands. 
There were no public rights to non-navigable 
waters under the law in England. The waters were 
considered to be privately owned by riparian land 
owners. Under the riparian water rights system as 
developed in England and adopted in the Eastern 
states of the United States, each riparian owner is 
entitled to reasonable use of the water to the extent 
that the flow in the water course is not materially 
diminished in quantity or qUality. 
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In appropriation states, all waters-both naviga-
ble and non-navigable-have been deemed to be 
owned by the "public," and not susceptible to private 
ownership while flowing in natural channels. 
When the federal government acquired territory 
by purchase or cession, it acquired the proprietary 
and regulatory rights connected with the territory, 
including riparian water rights along water courses. 
However, in the late 1800s Congress enacted mining 
and homestead legislation with apparent provision for 
acquiring water rights under the appropriation 
doctrines of the various states involved. The Supreme 
Court later held that these statutes evidenced a 
congressional intent that water-use in appropriation 
states be established pursuant to state systems of 
water rights. 
On the other hand, this was not a disclaimer by 
the federal government of all riparian water rights 
which it owned. It merely was a declaration that 
riparian water rights were not conveyed with land 
patented by the U.S. To obtain water rights, 
patentees must comply with state laws. Nevertheless, 
riparian water rights apparently have continued in 
existence in connection with lands that have remained 
in federal ownership. A number of court cases 
beginning with Winters vs United States, 207 U.S. 
564 (1908) have in eHect upheld the concept of 
"reserved" federal water rights for Indian and other 
federal reservations. Thus, one of the uncertainties 
associated with state ownership of water is how 
ownership rights of the U.S. are to be correlated with 
state rights. 
WATER SALES AND USER FEES 
Legal and quasi legal entities, including munici-
palities, special districts, and federal agencies, that 
have acquired appropriation water rights are allowed 
to sell water or charge fees to users under various 
arrangements. It appears that a state could likewise 
charge fees on waters it has appropriated. For 
example, in Utah the Board (Division) of Water 
Resources has acquired water rights through filings 
with the State Engineer. Although the Board of Water 
Resources has not charged user fees on these waters 
to date, the Board is not obligated by law to assign 
these applications or rights of water use under them, 
to water users free of charge. Apparently the Board of 
Water Resources could decide administratively to 
develop waters under its approved applications and 
impose a system of charges for the use of these 
waters. 
Although unappropriated waters are technically 
not owned, some legal scholars have suggested that 
states could establish procedures in interregional 
transfers for selling unappropriated waters to 
purchasers in other states. States have the power to 
create property rights in the waters by establishing 
procedures for appropriation, and, as mentioned, the 
state itseH can appropriate water. Such sales have 
been proposed by states within the "area of origin" in 
connection with interregional transfers. And, if a state 
is legally empowered to sell its water to another state, 
there is reason to believe because of the conceptual 
similarity that the state would also be empowered to 
impose water user fees within the state. It has also 
been suggested that it would be legal for states to sell 
unappropriated water to the highest bidder through 
procedures similar to those used in leasing state lands 
for extraction of oil, gas, and other minerals. 
In Utah the State Engineer is obligated by statute 
to process and act on applications to appropriate 
water, and to charge only a prescribed filing fee. 
However, it is likely, subject to some constitutional 
questions yet unresolved, that the state legislature 
could enact legislation to change the appropriation 
process and require that all new (future) uses be 
subject to a water user fee schedule. Under the 
restricted definition of a user fee as a fee on actual use 
of something, there seems to be no question that an 
appropriation state such as Utah could not impose 
user fees on already perfected water rights. Although 
no state apparently has attempted to impose such 
fees, and therefore, the courts have not had an 
occasion to speak on the subject, it seems clear that 
such a system of fees would be an unconstitutional 
interference with property rights under both the Utah 
and the federal constitutions. "All appropriation 
states view perfected water rights as property that is 
entitled to constitutional protection." Pertinent Utah 
cases are In re:Bear River Drainage Area, 2 Utah 2d 
208,271 P.2d 846 (1954); Salt Lake City v. Boundary 
Springs Water Users A88~ 2 Utah 2d 141, 270 P.2d 
453 (1954); Logan, Hyde Park, and Smithfield Canal 
Co. v. Logan, 72 Utah 221, 269 Pac. 776 (1928) 
(Dewsnup, 1975). 
There are, of course, some nonconsumptive water 
uses, including recreation, navigation, waste trans-
port, and hydropower generation that do not relate to 
the water rights issue just described. Furthermore, 
user fees as narrowly defined above, should be 
distinguished from regulatory fees, which a state or 
the federal government can impose under its general 
police powers to insure that property is used in 
accordance with particular regulations. Fees may be 
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assessed in amounts sufficient to defray the costs of 
regulation. This type of fee is quite common. Water 
right application fees charged by the State Engineer, 
for example, are designed to cover costs of processing 
applications. 
An expansion in the application of these fees and 
an increase in the level of the fees imposed by the 
State Engineer and other water regulatory agencies 
seems legally feasible. With higher fees and a broader 
range of application of regulatory (user) fees, imposed 
by regulatory agencies, a significant shift in funding 
support of these agencies from state appropriated 
funds to user fee revenues appears possible. If an 
analogy is drawn between this type of water user fee 
and hunting and fishing license fees, it could also be 
argued that the water user fees might be expanded to 
provide financial support for other functions of state 
government. Nonresident fishing and hunting licenses 
are higher than those paid by residents, and in some 
cases part of the license fee revenues from one 
activity, e.g., big game hunting, is used in managing 
another, such as fishing. 
User fees (as defined above in relation to 
constitutional protections afforded property rights) 
should also be distinguished from property taxes, 
which obviously also are quite common. Property 
taxes have been imposed on land and other property 
to provide funds for a variety of purposes. It is 
conceivable that a perfected water right viewed as 
property might be similarly taxed. That is, the right 
to use the water might be taxed rather than the use 
per se. In Utah, however, for irrigation use this would 
be precluded by a constitutional restriction which 
stipulates that irrigation water rights cannot be 
taxed separately (Utah Const. Art. 13, Sec. 2). 
Although other states may not have the same 
constitutional restriction that Utah has, there would 
still be a question of double taxation to consider in 
applying a separate property tax to water rights. 
Some property (farm land, for example) valuations 
upon which taxes are based reflect the value added by I 
available water supplies. Thus, irrigated land ordi-
narily is taxed higher than dry farm land. In such an 
instance, the water use or water right is in effect 
taxed with the land. 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 
Basic constitutional questions that would arise 
from the imposition of state water user fees relate to 
the concepts of "a guaranteed right of appropriation" 
and the "public nature of water." Since water 
traditionally has been appropriated without the 
payment of user fees, would the imposition of such 
fees be so fundamentally in opposition to the concept 
of appropriation that it would be unconstitutional? In 
some states that have constitutional provisions 
protecting the right to appropriate, the answer to this 
question would be extremely significant and would 
have to come from the respective supreme courts of 
these states. Of course, to states without this 
constitutional provision it would pose no problem. 
The concept of "public ownership" of water 
contained in the constitutions of appropriation states 
may be viewed in at least two different ways. Since 
private rights to water use under an appropriation 
system are merely usufructory, i.e., the right to use, 
not to own outright; the state may be viewed under 
existing arrangments as providing various individual 
users with free rights to the use of water that belongs 
to the public in general. In accordance with this view, 
the state as the legal guardian and administrator of 
these rights might logically impose rent or fees on the 
use of these public resources. 
On the other hand, under a somewhat different 
view of the "public ownership" concept, the state may 
be viewed as not "owning" the water in the sense that 
it owns land, buildings, and so forth, but that it merely 
regulates the water resources for the benefit of the 
public. In this view, it would only be appropriate for 
the state to charge regulatory fees as discussed 
earlier. 
Constitutional questions related to the imposition 
of state water user fees would, in the final analysis, 
have to be answered by state supreme courts in each 
of the states where the fees would be imposed. 
ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS 
An important advantage of user fees is their 
potential to subject government programs and 
operations to the discipline of a market test, thus 
replacing in part, if not entirely, a political evaluation 
process governing resource allocation and utilization. 
If government programs are subjected to the 
allocation function of the price system, which is 
commonplace for most goods and services, overinvest-
ment in many activities can be averted or mitigated 
and resources can be saved for other uses. 
Although there may be major advantages from 
the employment of fees, there are a number of forces 
which act to prevent their use or to reduce their 
effectiveness. The shifting of financing burdens from 
the general taxpayer to the user will not be easy to 
accomplish. Although some taxpayers may be con-
vinced that they are subsidizing water users through 
general taxes, the water user in most cases will 
contend his water prices are already too high. Then, 
too, many people simply like to get free goods and 
services. Indeed the appeal of getting something for 
nothing is almost universal. Thus it is highly unlikely 
that any user accustomed to receiving free goods will 
welcome the imposition of user fees. 
According to Stockfish (1967) there are also 
strong internal forces within government organiza-
tions that operate against the rational use of fees. 
Most administrators prefer to avoid the discipline of 
external checks or constraints. Bureaus and agencies 
ordinarily are advocates of their own activities, and 
with no profit criterion to measure system perfor-
manre, crude physical output measures become the 
criteria of system effectiveness. More output is better 
than less. Charging prices for output curtails demand 
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and hence the size and prestige of the agency. Thus, 
government agencies are not likely to be sympathetic 
towards fees unless these fees constitute a source of 
funds that may facilitate financing an even larger 
operation. 
The imposition of user fees probably would be 
more acceptable to water users if the revenue 
produced therefrom were earmarked for water 
development or water management purposes only. In 
addition to financing project construction and cost 
sharing, these earmarked revenues might be em-
ployed to fund the operating costs of the state 
engineer's office and other water administrative 
agencies in the state. The trade off of course would be 
less general tax revenue funding required for these 
operations. 
There would be a loss in fiscal control by the 
legislature in an "earmarking" arrangement. Agencies 
with access to such committed funds enjoy a great deal 
of independence from the normal budgeting and 
appropriation process. A possible middle ground 
between the alternative of completely circumventing 
the legislature by funneling user fee revenues directly 
to water agencies, and the other extreme of merely 
putting the revenues into the general funds of the 
state, would be to dedicate the revenues to a central 
water development fund. This fund, though restricted 
to appropriate water development and management 
purposes, could be administered by the legislature or 
a state board. An example of this type of an 
arrangement is the highway trust fund used by the 
federal government. 
In establishing a user-fee system in a state, 
questions concerning measuring, recording, and 
reporting water uses would have to be carefully 
considered. If user fees were imposed upon water 
rights in some form. i.e., as a regulatory fee, property 
tax, or some other charge, the condition of water 
rights records would be of interest. 
In Utah where progress has been made in 
defining and recording rights through the adjudication 
process, the records are far from complete. 
In addition to records of adjudication, other 
records defining rights consist of diligence claims, 
court decrees, and rights applications. Thousands of 
rights based upon use prior to the establishment of the 
administrative water rights system in the state 
remain unrecorded in any form. It is estimated that 
perhaps 10 percent are unrecorded. Complete adjudi-
cation of rights in Utah is years away given the 
current level of funding for this activity. Some other 
appropriation states are not as far along as Utah. 
Dewsnup et al. (1971), after analyzing several 
measures, suggested an "Illustrative State Statute to 
Require Recording and Quantification of Water 
Rights." This suggested legislation would require all 
unrecorded or unfiled water rights to be filed for and 
recorded by a certain date. Those rights not recorded 
within the specified time period would lose their 
priority dates. Procedures also were recommended for 
clarifying inaccurate and inadequately defined rights. 
Measures such as these to more accurately define 
claims to rights of water use were taken as a first step 
in establishing the user fee or concession tax system in 
Ecuador, described in Chapter I. In that case, 
however, a new filing had to be made for all rights 
whether already recorded or not. The next step was to 
impose a tax on the rights as claimed. 
The problems of imposing fees on the rights to 
water use in eastern states that adhere to a riparian 
doctrine of water rights would be quite different than 
those for appropriation states. The first and most 
significant action required of these states probably 
would be the establishment of state ownership of the 
water and the institution of an administrative rights 
or permit system. The creation of a permit system in 
Florida in 1972 represents an eastern states trend 
toward increased regulation of both surface and 
groundwater resources. Thus, the prospects for 
imposing user fees on rights to use water. which, of 
course, depend upon records will be enhanced. 
Since the beneficiaries of municipal water service 
are easy to identify and those persons not willing to 
pay for the service can be excluded. this use lends 
itself to the application of pricing policies. Side 
stepping the issue of deficiencies in current pricing 
policies of municipalities, e.g., average cost instead of 
marginal cost pricing, one might conclude that this 
would offer the least complications to the state in 
establishing user fees. The municipality and its 
existing water rate structure presents an immediately 
available collection system for a state imposed 
surcharge. Water rates are by no means uniform 
across the nation or within a state, and rates could be 
raised substantially in many cities and still be 
relatively low. In light of this, a state surcharge could 
be designed as a "rate leveler," i.e., to be assessed on 
a graduated scale which would charge low rate payers 
more than high rate payers. In spite of the possible 
advantages, the fact that municipal water depart-
ments are faced with inflated costs of operation and 
that city dwellers, wielding substantial voting power, 
may feel they are paying more than their share of 
state water development costs through a new state 
surcharge could make such a course of action difficult. 
Instituting fees on navigation uses of water, 
subsidized by the federal government for almost two 
centuries, would require a drastic break with 
tradition. Recently, however, the policy of free use 
has been questioned, and a number of fee systems are 
possible including license fees, fuel taxes, and 
segment tolls. The prospects for the institution of 
state fees on this use do not appear to be good in light 
of the dominant federal powers granted by the 
Constitution. Legal questions pertaining to state 
rights with respect to navigation would have to be 
answered to determine if a system of state user fees is 
possible. 
Since occupants of flood prone areas face 
quantifiable financial risks in connection with property 
values as affected by flood hazards. the introduction of 
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a system of user charges for flood protection is 
possible. Compulsory flood insurance is an example of 
the use of pricing schemes in this area. 
Effluent charges have been studied and recom-
mended for controlling waste disposal in water 
courses. Because of long standing state authority and 
activity in water administration, states would seem to 
stand in a good position to impose state user charges 
not only for control, but for financing construction 
costs. 
Although institutional problems and problems of 
gaining public acceptance loom large with respect to 
imposing a new system of state user charges on 
outdoor recreation, fish and wildlife, hydroelectric 
power and irrigation use, the legal hurdles do not 
appear insurmountable. States already collect fees 
and sell licenses for outdoor recreation and fish and 
wildlife uses. Mechanically, the imposition of a 
surcharge for water use per se on top of existing fees 
would seem to be relatively simple. State charges on 
power produced from hydro plants appear to be fairly 
straight forward, too. 
Because of the multitudinous and diverse institu-
tional arrangements and inadequate metering under 
which irrigation water is distributed a comprehensive 
system for collecting fees from irrigation uses would 
be difficult to design. However, organized irrigation 
companies and districts afford a readily available 
mechanism for imposing charges on a substantial 
number of rights holders and users. In the case of 
irrigated uses, in western states there would be a 
question to settle on the legality of imposing state fees 
on irrigation supplies provided by federal reclamation 
projects. Since reclamation law recognizes state 
systems of water rights the problem may be minimal. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Because rather drastic changes from traditional 
ways of paying or not paying for water uses are 
entailed in instituting a system of state fees on water 
uses, the short run prospects of implementing a broad 
system of fees are poor. Implementing legislation 
would require the support of the public, all of whom 
are users of water in one way or another. 
Recognition that water development benefits 
bestowed upon a few are being paid by the public in 
general has not been of sufficient concern to policy 
makers to date to provide impetus for change. Social 
goals and political pressures for abundant low cost 
water are partly responsible. With mounting pres-
sures for additional water and fewer tax funds to pay 
for it, the long run prospects of implementing water 
use fees are better. 
It seems reasonable for states to move toward a 
greater role in financing water development, and user 
charges in one form or another constitute one 
approach to additional funds for states. The imposition 
of user fees, if fully understood by the public, may be 
just as acceptable a source of additional funds as 
increases in other forms of taxes that would be 
required if such fees are not used. That is, if it comes 
to a choice between higher income taxes or higher 
property taxes on the one hand and the introduction of 
state user fees on the other in order to fund desired 
water development, the latter may have a chance. 
Fees likely will be more palatable to various user 
groups if fee levels and the amount of funds to be 
obtained from a particular use are set to meet specific 
demands for that use and the funds when obtained are 
allocated to meet those demands. In order for the 
states budgetary and appropriation process not to be 
completely aborted in an earmarking process, ar-
rangements for some degree of legislative control and 
surveillance of the funds would be appropriate. 
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Given that many difficult questions must be 
resolved before introducing state water-user fees, it is 
apparent from the estimates of fund generating 
potential in Chapter V that water user fees could 
produce significant amounts of revenue for states with 
only modest increases in current prices of water. The 
increases in many cases would still leave the prices at 
bargain levels. 
In Utah, a particularly promising prospect for 
instituting a water-user fee program seems to exist in 
connection with the water needed for developing coal, 
oil, and other energy resources. Legally, socially, and 
economically, this is probably the most feasible user 
fee possibility available. 
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APPENDIX A 
W ATER-USER CHARGE SCHEDULES 
Ecuador 
Concession Taxes 
a) .0028 cents [.007 sucres] per cubic meter 
according to the volume specified in the concession for 
irrigation uses without a measuring device; b) .0045 
cents [.0012 sucres] per cubic meter used for irrigation 
uses with a measuring device; c) .0045 cents [.0012 
sucres] per cubic meter used for subterranean 
irrigation by pumping; d) $1.40 [35 sucres] annually 
per each horsepower of generating capacity per 
production of motor force; e) for industries uses 
according to the following table based on the total 
amount volume used. 
The volume is measured by meters installed at the 
expense of the user; f) .0028 cents [.0007 sucres] per 
cubic meter for electrical generation; g) .008 cents [.02 
sucres] per .26 gallons [liter] for mineral water which 
is industrially processed and sold in bottles; h) $40.00 
[1,000 sucres] for recreation purposes (Daines and 
Falconi, 1974 pg. 139) 
British Columbia 
Clearing-streams Purpose 
Annual rental payable in respect of each license $25.00 
Conservation Purpose 
(a) Where the water is to be or is stored: Application 
fee and annual rental shall be those fixed for 
storage purpose. 
Ecuador 
(b) Where water is to be or is used: 
Application fee, payable on the quantity 
applied for: 
10 cubic feet per second or less ....... $10.00 
And for each additional cubic foot per second 
or fraction thereof ................... $1.00 
Annual rental payable on the quantity allowed: 
10 cubic feet per second or less ....... $10.00 
And for each additional cubic foot per second 
or fraction thereof ................... $1.00 
(c) For the construction of works in and about 
streams for the purpose of conserving fish and 
wildlife: 
Application fee ........................ $5.00 
Annual rental ......................... $5.00 
Conveying Purpose 
Annual rental .............................. $10.00 
Domestic Purpose 
Application fee, payable on the quantity applied for: 
1,000 gallons per day or less ............ $5.00 
And for each additional 1,000 gallons per day or 
fraction thereof ....................... $2.00 
Annual rental payable on the quantity allowed: 
1,000 gallons per day or less ............ $5.00 
And for each additional 1 ,000 gallons per day or 
fraction thereof ....................... $2.00 
Fluming Purpose 
Annual rental payable on the quantity allowed: 
For each cubic foot per second or fraction 
thereof .............................. $1.00 
Minimum annual rental ............... $10.00 
BASE CUBIC EXCESS CUBIC TAX BASE SUCRES EXCESO C /10000rn3 
METERS METERS (25 to Dollar) 
- - --- 10,000 
- - - -- 15 Sucres 
10.000 100,000 150 Sucres 12 Sucres 
100.000 1,000,000 1,230 Sucres 10 Sucres 
1. 000. 000 10,000,000 10, 230 Sucres 8 Sucres 
10.000.000 100,000,000 82, 230 Sucres 6 Sucres 
100.000.000 - - - -- 622, 230 Sucres 5 Sucres 
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Hydraulicking Purpose 
Annual rental, payable on quantity allowed: For each 
cubic foot per second or fraction thereof ....... $10.00 
Industrial Purpose (Miscellaneous Uses) 
Where water is or is to be used for: 
(a) Pulp-mill use: 
Application fee, payable on the quantity of 
water applied for: For each cubic foot per 
second or fraction thereof ......... $100.00 
Annual rental, payable on quantity allowed: 
For each cubic foot per second or fraction 
thereof ......................... $100.00 
(b) Use in sawmills, food-processing plants, 
other manufacturing operations, and wash-
ing sand and gravel: 
Application fee, payable on quantity applied 
for: 
For each 10,000 gallons a day or fraction 
thereof up to 500,000 gallons ......... $4.00 
For each additional 10,000 gallons a day or 
fract~on thereof up to 1,000,000 gallons $2.00 
For each 10,000 gallons a day or fraction 
thereof over 1,000,000 gallons ........ $1.00 
Minimum application fee ........... $10.00 
Annual rental, payable on quantity allowed: 
For each 10,000 gallons a day or fraction 
thereof up to 500,000 gallons ......... $4.00 
For each additional 10,000 gallons a day or 
fraction thereof up to 1,000,000 gallons $2.00 
For each 10,000 gallons a day or fraction 
thereof over 1,000,000 gallons ........ $1.00 
Minimum annual rental ............ $10.00 
(c) Cooling: 
Application fee, payable on quantity applied 
for: 
For each 10,000 gallons a day or fraction 
thereof up to 500,000 gallons ......... $2.00 
For each additional 10,000 gallons a day or 
fraction thereof up to 1,000,000 gallons $1.00 
For each 10,000 gallons' a day or fraction 
thereof over 1,000,000 gallons ......... $.50 
Minimum application fee ........... $10.00 
Annual rental, payable on quantity allowed: 
For each 10,000 gallons a day or fraction 
thereof up to 1,000,000 gallons ....... $1.00 
For each 10,000 gallons a day or fraction 
thereof over 1,000,000 gallons ......... $.50 
Minimum annual rental ............ $10.00 
(d) Use in hotels, motels, restaurants, stores, 
service stations and similar enterprises: 
Application fee, payable on quantity applied 
for: 
For each 1,000 gallons a day or fraction 
thereof ............................ 5.00 
Minimum application fee ........... $10.00 
Annual rental, payable on quantity allowed: 
For each 1,000 gallons a day or fraction 
thereof ........................... $5.00 
Minimum annual rental ............ $10.00 
(e) Maintaining ponds for floating logs, fish-
culture, and fur-farming: 
Application fee .................... $10.00 
Annual rental ..................... $10.00 
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(f) Watering ground on golf courses, lawns, 
and ornamental gardens where such use is 
not authorized under domestic or irrigation 
purposes: 
Application fee, payable on quantity applied 
for: 
For each acre foot .................. $1.00 
Minimum application fee ............. 10.00 
Annual rental, payable on quantity allowed: 
For each acre foot .......... ' .......... 1.00 
Minimum annual rental ............ $10.00 
(g) For all other proposed uses under Industrial 
Purpose the application fee and the annual 
rental shall be those fixed by the Comptrol-
ler. 
Irrigation Purpose 
(a) Where the water is to be or is conveyed by a 
municipality, improvement district, devel-
opment district, or company for others: 
Application fee, payable on quantity applied 
for per acre-foot or fraction thereof ...... 10 
Minimum application fee ............ 10.00 
Annual rental, payable on quantity diver-
ted, per acre-foot or fraction thereof ..... 10 
Minimum annual rental .............. 5.00 
(b) Where the water is to be or is conveyed by 
other than as set out under (a): 
Application fee, payable on quantity applied 
for per acre-foot or fraction thereof ...... 10 
Minimum application fee ............ 10.00 
Annual rental payable on quantity allowed 
per acre-foot or fraction thereof ......... 10 
Minimum annual rental .............. 5.00 
Land -improvement Purpose 
Application fee .............................. 10.00 
Annual rental ............................... 10.00 
Lowering-water Purpose 
Annual rental payable in respect of each license .. 10.00 
Mineral-trading Purpose 
(a) Where the mineral water is to be or is sold 
in bottles or other containers: 
Application fee, payable on quantity applied 
for: 500 gallons per day or less ....... 20.00 
And for each additional 100 gallons per day 
or fraction thereof ................... 1.00 
Annual rental, payable on quantity allowed: 
500 gallons per day or less ........... 20.00 
And for each additional 100 gallons per day 
or fraction thereof ................... 1.00 
(b) Where the mineral water is to be or is used 
for baths: 
Application fee, payable on quantity applied 
for: For each 1,000 gallons per day or 
fraction thereof ..................... 5.00 
Annual rental, payable on quantity allowed: 
For each 1,000 gallons per day or fraction 
thereof ............................ 5.00 
Minimum annual rental ............. 20.00 
Mining Purpose 
Where water is or is to be used for: 
(a) Hydraulic mining: 
Application fee, payable on quantity of 
water applied for: For each cubic foot per 
second or fraction thereof ........... 10.00 
Annual rental, payable on quantity allowed: 
For each cubic foot per second or fraction 
thereof ........................... 10.00 
(b) Washing coal: 
Application fee, payable on quantity applied 
for: For each cubic foot per second or 
fraction thereof ................... 100.00 
Annual rental, payable on quantity allowed: 
For each cubic foot per second or fraction 
thereof .......................... 100.00 
(c) Processing of ore: 
Application fee, payable on quantity applied 
for: For each 100,000 gallons a day or 
fraction thereof ................... 100.00 
Annual rental, payable on quantity allowed: 
For each 100,000 gallons a day or fraction 
thereof .......................... 100.00 
(d) Where water is to be or is used for 
generating power: 
Application fee and annual rental shall be 
those fixed for power purpose. 
(e) Where the water is to be or is used for 
cooling engines and compressors in mining 
operations: Application fee and annual ren-
tal shall be those fixed for industrial 
purpose. 
Power Purpose 
Application fee payable: 
For each kilowatt up to 50,000 kilowatts ..... 20 cents 
For each additional kilowatt up to 100,000 
kilowatts ............................ 10 cents 
For each additional kilowatt over 100,000 
kilowatts ............................. 5 cents 
Minimum application fee payable ............. $10.00 
Annual rentals payable on construction capacity: 
For each kilowatt .......................... 5 cents 
Annual rentals payable on authorized 
capacity other than construction capacity: 
For each kilowatt ......................... 50 cents 
Annual rentals payable on output: 
For each megawatt-hour ................... 25 cents 
Minimum annual rental payable in respect of each 
license ................................ $10.00 
River-improvement Purpose 
Ap,lication fee ............................. $50.00 
Annual rental payable on the length of the stream 
authorized to be cleared and approved: .... 20.00 
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For each mile ........................... 20.00 
Minimum annual rental .................. 50.00 
Storage Purpose 
Application fee, payable on reservoir capacity applied 
for: 
For 5,000 acre-feet or less ................. 5.00 
And for each additional 1,000 acre-feet or fraction 
thereof up to and including 25,000 acre-feet .... 50 
And for each additional 1,000 acre-feet or fraction 
thereof up to and including 50,000 acre-feet .... 20 
And for each additional 1,000 acre-feet or fraction 
thereof over 50,000 acre-feet ................. 10 
Annual rental, payable on quantity allowed: 
For 5,000 acre-feet or less, per 1,000 acre-feet or 
fraction thereof .......................... 1.00 
And for each additional 1,000 acre-feet or fraction 
thereof up to and including 25,000 acre-feet .... 60 
And for each additional 1,000 acre-feet or fraction 
thereof up to and including 50,000 acre-feet .... 50 
And for each additional 1,000 acre-feet or fraction 
thereof over 50,000 acre-feet ................ .40 
Minimum annual rental payable in respect of each 
license ...................................... 2.00 
In addition to the fees, rentals, and charges 
payable by the holder of a license for storage purpose, 
where the operation, or intended operation, is made 
on the basis of an arrangement the purpose of which is 
the production of benefits at some point outside the 
Province, there shall be payable on or before the first 
day of December of each year in which the 
arrangement is in effect, a fee of forty cents per 
acre-foot of water-storage space made available. The 
foregoing provision does not apply to the quantities of 
storage set forth in Article 11 of the Columbia River 
Treaty for each of the storage reservoirs described 
therein. 
Waterworks Purpose 
Application fee, payable on quantity applied for: 
5,000 gallons a day or less ................ 10.00 
Each additional 5,000 gallons a day or fraction 
thereof ................................. 1.00 
First rental: One-tenth of application fee 
minimum ............................... 10.00 
Subsequent annual rentals, payable on quantity 
diverted: 
For each 100,000 gallons diverted ............ 05 
Minimum rental ......................... 10.00 
Provided that where accurate measurements of 
the quantity diverted are not available, the said 
quantity may be estimated for rental purpose at 
40,000 gallons of water per annum per inhabitant of 
the area within which water may be distributed. 
Permits Over Crown Land 
Application fee, per acre or fraction thereof to the 
area to be occupied ......................... 05 
Minimum fee ................................ 2.00 
Annual rental in respect of land used or to be used as 
the site of any power plant or dam; Per acre or 
fraction thereof authorized to be occupied .. 10.00 
Annual rental in respect of land on which any ditch, 
flume, pipe, transmission-line, or other conduit is 
or is to be constructed: Per acre or fraction 
thereof authorized to be occupied ........... 1.00 
Annual rental in respect of land to be flooded except 
for the storage of water for power purpose: Per 
acre or fraction thereof authorized to be 
flooded ................................... 25 
Annual rental in respect of land to be flooded for the 
storage of water for power purpose: Per acre or 
fraction thereof authorized to be flooded ..... 1.00 
Annual rental in respect of land occupied or to be 
occupied for any purpose not heretofore men-
tioned: Per acre or fraction thereof ......... 1.00 
Minimum annual rental in respect of any permit .. 2.00 
(Province of British Columbia, 1974 pgs. 8-12) 
California 
Adopted tax and water rates are shown, in 
Table A-I for the Metropolitan Water District of 
Southern California. 
Hawaii 
Waimonalo Irrigation System 
Acreage Assessment $2.50 per acre per month 
Water Use Charge $0.08 per 1,000 gallons 
Lalamilo Irrigation System 
Acreage Assessment $2.25 per acre per month 
Water Use Charge (Monthly basis) 
Molokai Irrigation System 
Hoolcuna 
Acreage Assessment $1.10 per acre per month 
Water Use Charge $0.08 per 1,000 gallons 
Molokai Ranch Land East of Kualapuu-No 
Distribution System 
Acreage Assessment 
Water Use Charge 
Wisconsin 
0.85 per acre per month 
$0.08 per 1,000 gallons 
Persons required to file effluent reports and 
exemptions. Each person, except a municipality, 
discharging industrial wastes or toxic and hazardous 
substances will be required to file an effluent report 
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with the Department if they fall into one or more of 
the following four reporting categories and are not 
exempted in any of the following exemption cate-
gories. 
1. Reporting categories. 
(a) Reporting Category I: Persons discharging 
treated or untreated effluent directly to surface 
waters of the state. 
(b) Reporting Category II: Persons discharging 
at least 10,000 gallons of effluent per day, one or more 
days during the year, to a land disposal system or to a 
municipal sewerage system. 
(c) Report Category III: Persons discharging 
less than 10,000 gallons of effluent per day to a land 
disposal system or municipal sewerage system, when 
the Department finds surveillance by the state is 
required, to protect the environment. 
(d) Report Category IV: Persons contributing 
more than 1 million British thermal units (Btu) per 
day, one or more days during the year, to the effluent 
discharged to surface waters. 
2. Exemption Categories. 
(a) Exemption Category I: Persons discharging 
effluents to which they have contributed none of the 
industrial wastes or toxic and hazardous substances 
listed in Table 1, or have contributed none in 
concentrations or quantities in excess of those listed in 
Table 1, are exempted from filing reports and paying 
monitoring fees on such discharges. 
(b) Exemption Category II: Persons may sub-
tract concentrations and quantities of industrial 
wastes or toxic and hazardous substances contained in 
the influent from those contained in the corresponding 
effluent prior to determining reporting levels and fees 
under these rules. 
(c) Exemption Category III: All cooling water 
discharges except those specified in Reporting 
Category IV are exempted unless substances are 
contributed to the effluent in concentrations or 
quantities in excess of those listed in Table I. 
(d) Exemption Category IV: Sanitary waste 
effluents reSUlting only from sanitary facilities 
including washrooms, toilets, and kitchens need not be 
reported. This exemption does not include effluents 
from laundromats, laundries or other commercial 
washing facilities. 
(c) Exemption Category V: Agricultural land 
runoff from land used exclusively for crop production 
need not be reported (Wisconsin Administrative Book, 
NY 101.03). 
Tabk A-l. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. 
Domestic, Municipal and 
Industrial Uses Agricultural Uses 
Fiscal Regular 
Year Tax Filtered Rate Untreated Filtered and Untreated Filtered 
Softened 
1964-65 $0.14 $25.00 $30.00 $ 34.00 $15.25 $ 20.25 
1965-66 0.14 28.00 33.00 37.00 16.00 21.00 
1966-67 0.14 31.00 36.00 40.00 17.00 22.00 
1967-68 0.14 34.00 39.00 43.00 18.00 23.00 
1968-69 0.16 37.00 42.00 46.00 19.00 24.00 
1969-70 0.17 40.00 45.00 49.00 20.00 25.00 
1970-71 0.17 44.00 49.00 53.00 21.00 26.00 
1971-72 0.17 C 48.00 53.00 57.00 22.00 27.00 
S 53.00 58.00 
* 
27.00 32.00 
1972-73 0.15 C 52.00 57.00 61.00 23.50 28.50 
S 57.00 62.00 
* 
28.50 33.50 
1973-74 0.14 C 56.00 63.00 68.00 25.00 32.00 
S 66.00 73.00 
* 
35.00 42.00 
1974-75 0.14 C 56.00 63.00 68.00 25.00 32.00 
(to Oct. 1) S 66.00 73.00 
* 
35.00 42.00 
1974-75 0.14 56.00 63.00 25.00 32.00 
(after Oct. 1) 
1975-76 0.13 C 58.00 67.00 25.00 34.00 
S 68.00 77.00 
* 
35.00 44.00 
1976-77 C 62.00 75.00 29.00 42.00 
S 68.00 81.00 
* 
35.00 48.00 
S State project water 
C Colorado River water 
* Softening of State project water not required. 
Surcharge Rate for softening discontinued after 10/1/74 
OHIO WATER RATES FOR CANAL WATER USERS 
Representative Table: 
Millions of 
Gallons 
Less than 1 Million $200.00 (Minimum Charge) 
1 Million 225.00 
10 Million 1,127.67 
75 Million 4,620.89 
100 Million 5,651.74 
1,000 Million 28,325.82 
5,000 Million 87,389.95 
10,000 Million 141,965.40 
Allowances may be made to those users who return 
the used water to the canal system of up to and including 50% 
of the total cost for a 10% return of water. 
aC = 225 MO.7 wherein: C = Yearly Dollar Cost 
M = Million Gallons of Water used 
S9 
Filtered 
and 
Softened 
$24.25 
25.00 
26.00 
27.00 
28.00 
29.00 
30.00 
31.00 
* 32.50 
* 37.00 
* 37.00 
* 
* 
* 
Groundwater 
Replenishment Uses 
Filtered 
Untreated Filtered and 
Softened 
$15.25 $20.25 $24.25 
16.00 21.00 25.00 
17.00 22.00 26.00 
18.00 23.00 27.00 
19.00 24.00 28.00 
20.00 25.00 29.00 
22.00 27.00 31.00 
24.00 29.00 33.00 
29.00 34.00 
* 27.00 32.00 36.00 
32.00 37.00 
* 30.00 37.00 42.00 
40.00 47.00 
* 30.00 37.00 42.00 
40.00 47.00 
* 30.00 37.00 
32.00 41.00 
42.00 51.00 
* 36.00 49.00 
42.00 55.00 
* 
g 
Table A-2. Register of Industrial Wastes or Toxic and Hazardous Substances, Wisconsin. 
Reportinl Leve" and Annual Fees for Industrial Wastes or Toxic and HazardollA Substances 
Discharged at Each Reporting Facility 
For the Combined Dis-
charge of all Effluents 
For the Combined Dis- to a Land Disposal Site For the Combined Discharge of all Effluents 
charf; of al1 Effluents or Sr::tem with No to Surface Waters Including Effluents to 
RepOrting Levels 
to a unlclpal Sewer- D rect Flow to Surface Waters from Land Disposal 
age System Surface Waters Systems or Other Treatment Facilities 
Substance Concen tra tion Facility 
Facility Facility Facility Facility 
Quantity Will Pay Facility WilJ Pay Facility Will Pay Add~~~~alees3 IntillAtrial Wute or Toxic and Code Added Added Will Base Fee2 Will Base Fee2 Will BaseFee2 
Hazardous Substance Discharged Number (mg/L-ppm) (lbs/Day) Report! (Dollars) Report! (Dollars) Report! (Dollars) (Dollars) 
Aldrin ___________________________ 89330 .0005 Yes 6.00 Yes 6.00 Yes 10.00 Ammonia ________________________ 00610 .2 No No Yes 10.00 Arsenic __________________________ 01002 .05 .1 Yes 6.00 Yes 5.00 Yes 10.00 Barium __________________________ 01007 1.0 1.0 No No Yes 10.00 Beryllium ________________________ 01012 .1 .1 Yes 6.00 Yes 6.00 Yes 10.00 Boron ___________________________ 01022 1.0 1.0 Yes 6.00 Yes 6.00 Yes 10.00 Cadmium ________________________ 01027 .06 .1 Yes 5.00 Yes 5.00 Yes 10.00 Chloride _________________________ 00940 60 60 Yes 6.00 Yes 5.00 Yes 10.00 ChloriDa. ________________________ 50060 1.0 1.0 No No Yes 10.00 Chromium _______________________ 01084 .1 .1 Yes 5.00 Yes 5.00 Yes 10.00 Cobalt ___________________________ 01037 2 2 Yes 5.00 Yes 5.00 Yes 110.00 Copper __________________________ 010(2 .1 .1 Yes 5.00 Yes 5.00 Yes 10.00 C)C&IIide _________________________ 00720 .025 .1 Yes 6.00 Yes 5.00 Yes 10.00 Dieldrin _________________________ 84880 .. 0005 Yes 6.00 Yes 5.00 Yes 10.00 Fecal Coliform Bacteria ___________ 31616 200/100 ml 
-2-- No No Yes 10.00 Fluoride _________________________ 00951 2 Yes 5.00 Yes 5.00 Yes 10.00 Heptachlor _______________________ 89410 .0005 Yes 6.00 Yes 5.00 Yes 10.00 Lead ____________________________ 01061 .1 .1 Yes 6.00 Yes 6.00 Yes 10.00 Manganese _______________________ 01055 .1 .1 Yes 6.00 Yes 5.00 Yes 10.00 Mercury _________________________ 71900 .0025 .01 Yes 5.00 Yes 5.00 Yes 10.00 NickeL __________________________ 01057 .2 .2 Yes 5.00 Yes 5.00 Yes 10.00 Nitrate Nitrogen __________________ 00620 .2 No No Yes 10.00 Nitrite Nitrogen __________________ 00615 .2 No No Yes 10.00 
NitroJen (Kjeldahl) __ - - - - - - -- - - - -- 00625 .2 No No Yes 10.00 
Oils, ats, Grease and Other 
Substances Measured by Oila, Fate 
and Graue Detection Methods ___ 00650 5.0 Yes 5.00 Yes 5.00 Yes 10.00 
Oxygen CODlluming Waates 
Measured by the 5-Day BOD 
Test or Equivalent Testa ________ 00810 5.0 10 Yes 6.00 No Y .. 10.00 r .04/lb. for an avg. 
days Discharge 
PbeD<tIa aDd Other mt:.tano. 
)(auund tl Ph_ol DetectiOD ethods ______________ 82'180 .05 Y. 5.QO Y- 5.00 Y- 10.00 --.--_.---------Pboephorua ______________________ 
00666 .1 y- 5.00 No 6:00 Y- 10.00 ----- --_.-------~Idi~"::~~t!i:::~~::::::::: 55555 • 0006 Y • 5.00 Y. Y- 10.00 -------- -- ------See J'ootDote 4 
--=i vii. 6:00 Ya. 6:00 vii. io:oo ----------------Selenium.. ________________________ 01147 .06 
-- --- -- ------ ---Sulfate __________________________ OON6 10 10 Y. 6.00 Y- 6.00 Y- 10.00 
-- --- -----------Sulfide ___________________________ 00746 1 1 Y- 5.00 y- 6.00 Y- 10.00 
----------------Sulfite ___________________________ 00'740 2 2 y- 5.00 Y. 6.00 Y- 10.00 Co:f~:~~i: Suapended80lids _________________ 00580 10 10 Y- 5.00 No Y- 10.00 
Tbal1ium ________________________ 01069 .06 .1 Y. 6.00 Y. 5.00 Y- 10.00 
-~Oiimiiii;D iiiU-Thermal Diacbarpa _______________ 00016 Report t.np. 41: voL of No No Y. 10.00 
2 thtIrmal dUie:T to for aD avarqe ~ waten Dot ciaya Diacharae exemcf:ted ID Nit 101.08 (1) ( ) Zinc _____________________________ 01092 .1 .1 Y- 6.00 Y. 6.00 Y- 10.00 .---------------
!Tbe facility will report If the CODcentration IIDd/or quantity reportiDc level_tabHahed for each nbnanee ID Table I III ueeeded one or more cia,. per year. 
2The base fee shall he charpd if the coDCBtratiOD aDd/or quantity reportiDr Inel ia ueeeded one or more da,. per year. 
IAn averal'! days diecharKe shall be calculated by cHvtdlq tm estfmate of the total di8charre for tha calmdar year by the Dumber of cia;n of dlacharKe durlnc the 
calendar year. 
fProvide duplicate reporta of radioactive mataiala dIIIcharpcI to the dUlllt If yoar faelUty III requfred to make ncb report. to the U.s. Atomic Enerv CoIDJDiMion. 
APPENDIXB 
COMPARATIVE WATER RATES FOR UTAH 
(Refer to Table 2, page 28, for coding of numbers 
and letters following the names of cities.) 
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Table B-1. Comparative culinary water charges-cities over 59,000 population. 
==================- -'-'-----=---:--:-------
Name of city 
OGDEN 1/2.5/8" 
OGDEN l/4"CON 
OG DEN 1· CON 
OGDEN 1.5" CON 
!lG DEN 2" CON 
OGDEN 3- CON 
OGDEN 4" CON 
OGDEN 6" CON 
OGDEN ,8" CON 
OGDEN l/Z.S/8"OT 
OGDEN 311."CON aT 
a G D EN 1- CON 0 r 
OGDEN 1.S·CON OT 
OGDEN 2" CON OT 
OGDEN 3" CON OT 
o G DEN 4" CON 0 r 
OGDEN 6" CON OT 
OGDEN 8ft CON OT 
PROVO 3/4- CON 
PROVO 1" CON 
PROVO 1-1/2" CON 
PROVO 2" CON 
PROVO 3" CON 
PROVO 4" CON 
PR OVO &" CON 
PROVO 8" CON 
PR 0 VO 10- CON 
PROVO 12- CON 
PROVO 3/4 CON or 
PROVO 1" CON or 
PR 0 VO 1-11 2 COT 
PROVO 2- CON OJ 
PROVO 3" CON OJ 
PROVO 4" CON OT 
PROVO 6- CON or 
PROVO 8- CON OJ 
PR OVO 10· CON OT 
PROVO 12- CON OT 
Minimum 
charge - quantity 
($) (1000 I) 
3.10 
4.05 
5.95 
11.2u 
17.50 
31.85 
51.85 
101.25 
191.50 
6.20 
8.10 
11.90 
22.40 
35.00 
63.10 
103.70 
202.50 
395.00 
3.50 
4.50 
1e.oo 
15.00 
30.00 
50.00 
10C.OO 
150.00 
200.00 
25C.00 
10.50 
13.50 
30.00 
4S.00 
90.00 
l5 O. 00 
300.00 
~50.00 
60Q.OO 
750.00 
28.8 
42.8 
71.2 
142.3 
227.5 
431.5 
7~ 6.9 
1&91.3 
4051.1 
28.8 
42.8 
11.2 
142.3 
221.5 
431.5 
746.9 
1691.3 
"051.1 
28.3 
28.3 
28.3 
28.3 
28.3 
28.3 
28.3 
28.3 
28.3 
2e.3 
28.3 
Z 8. 3 
28.3 
26.3 
28.3 
28.3 
28.3 
28.3 
28.3 
28.3 
30,000 I 
7,926 gal 
1,060 cu ft 
($) 
3.18 
4.05 
5.95 
11.20 
17.50 
31.85 
51.85 
101.25 
191.50 
6.36 
8.10 
11.90 
22.40 
35.00 
63.70 
103.70 
202.50 
395.00 
3.60 
4.60 
10.10 
15.10 
30.10 
50.10 
100.10 
150.10 
200.10 
250.10 
10.19 
13.19 
30.29 
45.29 
90.29 
150.29 
300.29 
450.29 
600.29 
150.29 
60,000 I 
15,852 gal 
2,120 cu ft 
.($) 
5.16 
5.19 
5.95 
11.20 
17.50 
31.85 
51.85 
101.25 
197.50 
10.33 
10.38 
11.90 
22.40 
35.00 
63.10 
105.70 
202.50 
39~.OO 
5.29 
6.29 
11.79 
16.79 
31.19 
51.79 
101 • .19 
151.19 
201.11 
251.79 
15.87 
18.81 
35.37 
50.37 
95.37 
155.37 
305.37 
455.37 
605.31 
155.31 
120,000 I 
31.704 gal 
4,240 cu ft 
($) 
9.13 
9.15 
9.18 
11.20 
11.50 
31.85 
51.85 
101.25 
191.50 
18.25 
18.30 
18.35 
22.40 
35.00 
63.10 
103.70 
202.50 
395.00 
8.68 
9.68 
15.18 
20.18 
35.18 
55.18 
105.18 
IS5.18 
205.18 
255.18 
26.04 
29.04 
45.54 
60.54 
105.54 
165.54 
315.54 
465.54 
&15.54 
765.54 
250,000 I 
66.043 gal 
8,829 cu ft 
($) 
17.71 
17.74 
11.76 
18.31 
1-8. 99 
31.85 
51.85 
101.25 
191.50 
35.42 
35.47 
35.52 
36.62 
37.97 
63.10 
103.10 
202.50 
395.00 
16.03 
11.03 
22.53 
27.53 
42.53 
62.53 
112.53 
162.53 
212.53 
262.53 
48.08 
51.08 
67.58 
62.58 
127.58 
187.58 
331.58 
481.58 
631.58 
167.58 
500,000 I 1,000.000 I 
132.0R6 gal 264.173 gal 
17,658 cu ft 35,317 cu ft 
(S) ($) 
---- - ---- - ---- --- -------
33.42 
33.44 
33.47 
34.02 
34.69 
35.92 
51.85 
101.25 
197. SO 
66.84 
66.89 
66.94 
68.04 
69.39 
11.84 
103.70 
202.50 
395.00 
30.15 
31.15 
36.65 
41.65 
56.65 
16.65 
126.65 
176.65 
226.65 
216.65 
90.46 
93.46 
109.96 
12 ... 9& 
169.96 
229.96 
319.96 
529.96 
679.96 
829.96 
60.76 
60.19 
60.81 
61.36 
62.\)4 
63.26 
64.52 
101.25 
191.50 
121.46 
121.51 
121.56 
122.&6 
124.01 
126.46 
128.98 
202.50 
395.00 
58.41 
59.41 
64.91 
69.91 
84.91 
104.91 
154.91 
204.91 
254.91 
304.91 
l75.22 
178.22 
194.72 
209.72 
25,..12 
314.72 
464.12 
614.72 
7&4.12 
914.72 
2.000.000 I 
528.346 gal 
70,634 cu ft 
($) 
109.35 
109.38 
109.1tO 
109.95 
110.63 
111.85 
113.11 
115.50 
197.50 
216.40 
218.45 
21B.50 
219.60 
220.95 
223.40 
225.92 
230.95 
395.00 
114.92 
115.92 
121.42 
126.42 
141.1t2 
161.42 
211.42 
261.42 
311.42 
361.42 
344.15 
341.75 
364.25 
31~.25 
424.25 
484.25 
634.25 
184.25 
934.25 
1084.25 
20,000.000 I 
5,283.457 gal 
706,345 cu ft 
($) 
715.53 
715.56 
715.58 
7:16.13 
71&.81 
118.03 
71·9.29 
121.68 
724.1& 
1430.76 
1430.81 
1430.86 
1431.96 
1433.31 
1435.16 
1438.28 
1443.31 
1448.31 
1132.05 
1133.05 
1138.55 
1143.55 
1158.55 
1178.55 
ll28.55 
1218.55 
1328.55 
1378.55 
3396.15 
3399.15 
3415.65 
3430.65 
3415.65 
3535.&5 
3&85.65 
3835.65 
3985.65 
4135.65 
01 
CN 
Table B-1. Continued. 
Name of city Minimum 30,0001 60,0001 120,000 I 250,000 I 
charge - quantity 7,926 gal 15,852 gal 31,704 gal 66,043 gal 
($) (1000 I) 1,060 co ft 2,120 co ft 4,240 co ft 8,829 cu ft 
($) ($) (5) (5) 
S l C 3 lit , 1- CON 1.15 31.1 1.15 3.38 6.17 14.12 
SLC 1.5- CON 3.50 62.3 3.50 3.50 6.16 14.11 
SlC 2- CON 5.60 99.1 5.60 5.60 6.18 IIt.13 
SlC 3- CON 11.20 198.Z 11.20 11.20 11.20 14 .13 
SlC ,.- CON 17.50 308.6 11.50 17.50 17.50 17.50 
SlC 6- CON 35.00 620.1 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 
SLC 8- CON 56.00 991.0 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 
SLC 10- CON 80.50 1424.2 80.50 80.50 60.50 80.50 
SLC 3/4,1- CO or 2.50 28.3 2.64 5.19 10.27 21.29 
SLC 1.5- CON OT 5.00 59.5 5.00 5.05 10.13 21.15 
SLC 2- CON OT 8.00 93.4 8.00 6.00 10.25 21.21 
SLC 3- CON OT 16.00 189.7 16.00 16.00 16.00 21.11 
SLC .. " CON aT 25.00 294.5 25.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 
SLC 6- CON aT 5t.OO 588.9 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 
SLC 8" CON OT 80.00 942.9 80.00 80.00 60.00 60.00 
SLC 10- CON OT 115.00 1356.3 115.00 115.00 115.00 115.00 
Table B-2. Comparative culinary water charges-with population between 22,000 and 53,000. 
Name of city 
BOUNTIFUL 15 
MURRAY (5) 2351 
MURRAY HaSP 
MURRAY 2151 OT 
ORE" 27 
OREH (6) 35 
ORE" 27 OT 
ORE" 35 aT 
Minimum 
chargt: - quantity 
($) (1000 I) 
3.00 
3.00 
25.00 
4.00 
4.65 
6.10 
9.30 
11.40 
31.9 
31.1 
3 1.1 
31.1 
45.4 
79.5 
45.4 
19.5 
30,000 I 
7,926 gal 
1,060 cu ft 
($) 
3.00 
3.00 
25.00 
4.00 
4.65 
8.10 
9.30 
11.40 
60,000 I 
15,852 gal 
2,120 cu ft 
($) 
4.17 
4.43 
26.43 
6.04 
5.23 
8.10 
10.46 
11.40 
120,000 I 
31,704 gal 
4,240 cu ft 
($) 
7.34 
7.39 
29.39 
10.26 
7.37 
10.63 
14.14 
21.25 
250.000 I 
66,043 gal 
8,829 cu ft 
($) 
14.21 
13.82 
35.82 
19.46 
10.60 
16.81 
21.61 
.B.62 
' 500,000 I 
132,086 gal 
17,658 cu ft 
(5) 
28.24 
28.23 
28.25 
26.25 
28.31 
35.00 
56.00 
80.50 
42.48 
42.34 
42.46 
42.30 
42.42 
50.00 
80.00 
115.00 
500,000 I 
132,086 gal 
17 .658 cu ft 
($) 
27.42 
26.18 
46.18 
31.12 
11.41 
28.70 
34.82 
57.39 
1,000,000 I 
264,173 gal 
35,317 cu ft 
(5) 
56.50 
56.49 
56e 51 
56.51 
56.51 
56.47 
56.51 
80.50 
84.86 
84.12 
64.a .. 
84.66 
84.80 
64.84 
64.84 
115.00 
1,000.000 I 
264,1 73 gal 
35,317 cu ft 
($) 
53.63 
50.90 
72.90 
72.43 
30.62 
52.47 
61.23 
104.94 
2,000,000 I 
528,346 gal 
70,634 cu ft 
(5) 
113.01 
113.00 
113.02 
113.02 
113.08 
112.96 
113.02 
113.04 
169.b2 
169.48 
169.60 
169.44 
169.56 
169.60 
169.60 
169.56 
2,000,000 I 
528.346 gal 
70,634 cu ft 
($) 
106.61 
96.22 
118.22 
132.75 
51.03 
100.02 
114.07 
200.04 
20,000,000 I 
5,283,457 gal 
706,345 co ft 
($) 
1130.14 
1130.13 
1130.15 
1130.15 
1130.21 
1130.11 
1130.15 
1130.11 
1695.33 
1695.19 
1695.31 
1695.15 
1695.27 
1695.31 
1695.31 
1695.27 
20,000,000 I 
5,283,457 gal 
706,345 cu ft 
($) 
1057.69 
737.80 
759.80 
965.05 
532.55 
955.94 
1065.09 
1911.88 
Table B-S. Comparative culinary water charges-with popuw.tion between 12,000 and 22,000. 
Name of city Minimum 30.000 I 60,0001 120,000 I 250,000 1 500,000 I 1,000,000 I 2,000,000 I 20,000,000 I 
charge - quantity 7,926 gal 15,852 gal 31,704 gal 66,043 gal 132,086 gal 264,173 gal 528,346 gal 5,283,457 gal 
(S) (1000 I) 1,060 cu ft 2,120 cu ft 4,240 cu ft 8,829 co ft 17,658 cu ft 35,317 cu ft 70,634 cu ft 706 ,345 cu ft 
(S) (5) (5) (S) (5) ($) ($) (S) 
Cl£ARf IElD 2351 3.00 37.9 3.00 Ie. 17 7.31 13.49 25.58 49.15 96.70 952.&2 
LAYTON 2 3.00 26.5 3.19 4.77 1.91 14.09 24.41 44.23 83.85 797.12 
LAYlO" 2 OT &.00 26.5 &.37 9.54 15.81 28.18 48.63 86.45 167.70 1594.24 
LAYTO (2) 3 5.30 41.6 5.30 6.27 9.44 15.69 26.16 45.98 85.60 798.87 
LA YTON 5 3.00 26.5 3.19 4.77 7.94 14.81 28.02 54.43 107.27 1058.29 
LA V TO" 1 3.00 26.5 3.19 4.71 7.93 14.11 24.46 44.28 83.90 197.17 
LOGAN 3/4.1-CON 2.50 31.9 2.50 3.67 6.84 13.11 26.92 53.33 106.11 1057.19 
LOGAN 1.5- CON 5.00 83.3 5.00 5.00 6.94 13.81 27.02 53.43 106.27 1057.29 
LOGAN 2- CON 9.00 159.0 9.00 9.00 9.00 13.81 27.02 53.43 106.27 1057.29 
LOGAN 3" CON 17.00 310.4 17.00 17.00 17.00 17.00 27.02 53.43 106.27 1057.29 
LOGAN 4" CON 30.00 575.4 30.00 30.00 3J.00 30.00 30.00 52." :5 105.27 10'56.29 
LOGAN 6" CON 61.50 1332.5 61.50 61.50 61.50 61.50 61.50 61.50 96.11 1047.79 
LOGAN 8" CON 129.50 3338.1 129.50 129.50 129.51l 129.50 129.50 129.50 129.50 1009.79 
0\ ROY 11 2.50 37.9 2.50 3.61 6.62 13.15 25. '0 50.79 100.99 1001t.46 ~ 
ROY 17 OT 6.25 37.9 6.25 8.30 13.85 25.87 48.98 95.21 187.67 1851.96 
SANDY 11 e.oo 15.7 8.01l 8.00 10.93 19.51 36.02 69.04 135.09 1323.86 
TOOELE (9) 2351 2.75 42.5 2.75 3.83 7.54 15.58 31.03 01.93 121.11t 1236. Z3 
Table B-J". Comparative culinary water charges-cities with population between 5,000 and 12,000. 
----- - --_._-
---------- -
---
Name of eity Minimum 30,000 I 60,000 I 120,000 I 250.000 I 500,000 I 1,000.000 I 2,000,000 I 20,000,000 I 
charge - quantity 7,926 gal 15,852 gal 31,704 gal 66.043 gal 132,OR6 gal 264.173 gal 528.346 gal 5,283,457 gal 
($) (1000 I) 1,060 cu ft 2,120euft 4,240 eu ft 8,829 eu ft 17.65R eu ft 35,317 eu ft 70,634 eu ft 706,345 ell ft 
($) ($) ($) ($) (SI ($) ($) ($) 
---- -_._-
--------
KAYS~ILlE 17 2.50 37.9 2.50 3.67 6.81 12.99 23.31 43.13 82.15 796.02 
LEHI 17 3.00 28.4 3.1l 9 4.67 7.84 14.71 27.28 47.48 64.41 750.18 
PAYSON 8 3.00 37.9 3.0U 3.99 6.69 12.53 23.11 41.07 74.09 668.48 
PAY SO ~ 8 01 6.00 37.9 6.0u 7.99 13.38 25.05 46.23 82 • .14 148.19 1336.96 
RIVERDALE 17 3.25 37.9 3.25 4.30 7.16 13.34 25.23 49.()0 96.55 952.47 
Sf.GEORGE 1 3.00 11.4 3.99 5.57 8.74 15.61 2b.62 53.31 96.22 906.59 
51.GEORGE 57 3.00 11.4 4.23 6.21 10.18 18.76 35.27 66.37 123.64 1027.11 
SO UTH OGO£ N 17 2.25 37.9 2.25 3.42 6.59 13.46 26.67 53.08 105.92 1056.94 
S SAL T lAK E 27 2.'50 45.4 2.50 3.35 6.63 14. 39 26.Y2 57. 'Id 116.10 1162.22 
S SAL T (8) 3 4.00 75.7 4.00 4.00 6.57 14. 13 28.66 57.72 115.84 1161.96 
SP Ahl SH fa RK it 3.50 56.8 3.50 3.63 6.01 10.35 16.96 30. 11 56.58 532.10 
SUNSET 3/4" CON 3.65 37.9 3.65 5.00 a.37 14.38 25.00 4b.06 92.97 901.34 
SUNSE T 1" CON 4.50 37.9 4.50 5.85 9.22 15.23 26 .. 45 48. -} 1 93.62 902.19 
c:r'I SUNSET 4" CON 9.15 37.9 9.15 10.50 13.& 7 19.88 31.10 53.56 96.47 906.84 
til SUNSET 6" CON 13.60 31.9 13.60 14.o,l5 18.32 24.33 35.55 5d. 01 102.92 911.29 
WASHING TER 2 3.75 37.9 3.75 4.92 8.09 14.96 28.17 54.5 B 101.42 1056.44 
\ojAS~[NG(10) 2 4.25 41.6 4.25 5.22 8.39 15.26 28.47 54.88 107.72 1058.74 
WASHING TER 3 5.15 71.9 5.75 5.75 8.29 15.16 26.37 54.78 IJ7.62 1058.64 
\oj ASH I N G 31 4" CON 4.25 41.6 4.25 5.22 8.39 15.26 28.47 54.88 101.72 1058.74 
WASHING I" CON 5.75 7 1.9 5.75 5.75 8.29 15.16 28.37 '54.18 107.62 1058.64 
WASHI~G 1.5" CON 9.50 143.6 9.50 9. SO 9.50 15.11 28.32 54.73 IOT.57 1056.59 
IU SHI hG 2- CON I1t.OO 227.1 14.00 14.00 14.00 15.21 28.42 54.83 107.67 10 sa. 6 9 
WAS H IN G 3" CON 24.50 431.5 24.50 24.50 24.50 24.50 28.12 54.53 107.37 1058.39 
wA SHI NG 4" CON 39.50 745.7 39.50 39.50 39.50 39.50 39.50 52.93 105.77 1056.79 
W JOR 0 A( 11) 235 4.00 22.' 4.48 6.46 10.43 19.01 3'5.52 68.54 134.59 1323.36 
Table B-5. Comparative culinary water charges - cities with population between 2,000 and 5,000. 
--- --- -- --_.-- -----
"';tme of city Minimum 30,000 I 60,000 I 1 ~O.OOO I 2"0.000 I 500,000 I 1 JlOO,OOO I 2,000.000 I 20.000.000 I 
chargt: - quantity 7,926 gal 15,852 gal 31.704 gal 66.043 gal 132.0R6 gal 26.t.l73 gal 52R.346 gal 5,283,457 gal ($) (1000 I) 1,060 cu ft 2,120 cu ft 4,240 cu ft 8.829 cu ft 17.658 cu ft 35.317cuft 70.634 cu ft 706,345 cu ft ($) ($) ($) ($) (S) ($) (S) ($) 
--___________ .0 ____ - _ 
CENTERVILLE 1 4.50 37.9 4.50 6.55 12.10 24.12 41.23 93.46 185.~2 1850.21 CENTERViLLE 7 5.00 37.9 5.00 7.05 12.60 24.62 46. 13 82.54 14e.59 1337.36 :E~TE~V[LLE 1 aT E .15 37.9 6.15 9.38 16.52 ,31.97 60.08 109.11 202.17 1856.46 CENTERVILLE 7 aT 7.50 37.9 1.50 10.43 16.35 35.52 66.94 123.17 c:26.t:H 213(J.86 EPHRAIM 6 4.50 2&.5 It.Ed 6.27 9.44 15.73 27.62 51.39 98.94 954 .86 FARMINGTON 21 4.00 37.9 4.00 5.46 9.43 17 .21 29.78 53.55 101.10 957.02 fARMING <1) 3 8.00 75.7 8.00 8.00 10.93 Ib .11 31.2B 55.05 102.60 958.52 HE eER 16 5.00 0.0 5.()O 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 HE 8ER 
" 
4.00 0.0 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 liE aER 7 6.50 64.4 6.50 6.50 9.73 11.29 31.82 bO.S8 119.GO 1165.12 
"U PLE TON 11 3.63 56.8 3.t)] 3.13 S.63 9.29 13.26 21.16 37.03 322.34 
... OAB (,.) 1 2.50 7.6 3.&0 5.55, 9.03 16.59 31.12 60.18 118.30 1164.42 1'10 AS 7 3.50 i 1.4 4.~8 1.36 12.11 21.77 3'.Yd 68.36 12'.99 902.95 
0\ MOAS 1 OT 5.00 7.6 1.&1 11.09 18. 07 33.18 62.24 120.36 236.59 2328.84 0\ MOAB 1 OT 7.00 11. '- 9.96 14.7'1 24.22 43.54 75.96 1 36.72 255.91 1 B 05.91 
PR OVI DENCE 11 3.00 37.9 3.00 3.88 6.26 11.41 21.31 41. 13 80.75 794.02 
RI CHF I ELO 2 3.15 56.8 3.15 3.96 7.93 16.51 33.02 66.04 132.09 1320.86 
RIVER TON 21 4.00 16.9 4.59 6.17 9.34 16.21 29.42 55.&3 108.67 1059.69 
RI VERTON 21 OT s.oo 16.9 5.59 1.17 10.34 17.21 30.42 56.83 109.67 1060.69 
RIYERTON(7) 9 2.00 18.9 2.59 4. 17 1.34 14.21 27.42 53.83 106.67 1057'.69 
ROOSEVELT 11 5.00 31.9 5.0\) 7.05 11.93 20.51 31.02 70.04 136.0} 1324.86 SMITHFIELD 27 3.00 37.9 3.00 3.88 b.26 10.63 16.87 27." 3 48.51 428.98 
SYRACUSE 1 6.15 3 7.9 6.15 1.32 10.49 17.36 30.57 56.98 109.82 1060.84 
SYRACUSE 7 6.15 37.9 6.15 7.03 9.41 14.56 24.46 44.28 83.~0 797.1"7 
YERNAL (10) 2 3.00 37.9 3.00 3.dB 6.93 17.62 40.13 86.96 179.42 1843.71 
VERNAL 357 3.00 31.9 3.VO 3. b8 6.26 11.41 21. 31 41.13 80.15 794. 02 
VERhAl (10) 2 aT 6.00 31.9 6.1l0 7.76 13.18 29.02 62.04 128.09 260.17 2637.73 
YE RNAL 357 OT 6.00 31.9 6.00 7.46 11.43 20.01 36.52 69.54 135.59 1324.36 
0"1 
.....;a 
Table B-6. Comparative cuknary water charges - cities with popu/JI,tion less than 2,000. 
Name of city Minimum 30.000 I 60,0001 120.000 I 250,000 I 500,000 I 1,000,0001 2.000,0001 
charge - quantity 7,926 gal 15,852 gal 31,704 gal 66,043 gal 132,086 gal 264,173 gal 528,346 gal 
($) (1000 I) 1,060 cu ft 2,120 cu ft 4.240 cu ft 8.829 cu ft 17,658 cu ft 35,317 cu ft 70,634 cu ft 
($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
DELTA 21 3.00 30.3 3. tJ 0 3.94 5.84 9.97 17.89 33.74 65.44 
DELTA 27 aT 5.00 30.3 5.00 6.88 10.69 16.93 34.18 66.48 129.88 
E A S TeAR 80 N 11 6.30 0.0 6.30 6.30 6.30 6.30 6.30 6.30 6.30 
FILLMORE 17 5.00 37.9 5.00 5.88 8.26 13.41 22.21 35.42 61.83 
HYDE PARK 2 3.33 15.1 3.33 3.33 4.50 1.93 14.54 21.15 54.16 
I( AN AB 11 4.00 56.8 4.00 4.17 6.26 18.56 38.38 78.00 157.25 
HANILA 15 7.50 37.9 7.50 10.43 18.35 35.52 68.54 134.59 266.67 
MANILA 7 15.00 75.1 15.00 15.00 20.85 38.02 71.04 131.09 269.11 
.. A N IL A (3) 1 11.25 56.8 11.25 11.68 19.60 36.77 69.79 135.84 267.92 
HANTI 8 8.50 31.9 8.50 9.61 12.64 19.21 29.83 48.78 80.83 
MILFORD 17 11.75 0.0 11.r5 11.15 11.75 11.75 11.15 11.75 11.75 
.. T PL E A SAN T 8 3.00 18.9 3.59 5.17 8.34 15.21 26.42 54.83 107.67 
NO RTH LOGA N 21 4.00 3 0.3 4.00 5.96 9.93 18.51 35.02 68.04 134.09 
PANGUiTCH 27 3.00 56.8 3.00 3.13 5.45 9.25 15.86 29.01 55.48 
PARK CIJ'I 1 5.00 0.0 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
PLAIN CITY 2 5.50 0.0 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 
RANDOLPH 11 3.50 56.8 3.50 3.' 1 1.42 10.85 17.46 30.67 57.06 
S~NTAQUIN 11 4.15 31.9 4.15 4.62 5.89 8.&3 13.92 24.48 45.62 
SANTAQUIN 11 aT 6.15 31.9 6.15 9.09 11.62 11.12 27.68 48.82 91.09 
WEllS VILLE 23 5.00 132.5 5.00 5.00 5.00 12.76 29.27 62.29 1Z6.34 
W 80UNflfUL 17 3.00 " 5.4 3.00 3.89 7.26 13.27 24.09 43.91 83.53 
wEST BO(10) Z ~.oo 83.3 5.00 5.00 1.20 13.57 24.65 44.47 84.09 
WEST POINT 11 3.80 45.4 3.80 4.16 8.73 11.31 33.82 6&.84 132.89 
Coding for numbers in parentheses 
1 Farmington: Computed for duplex; for multiple units add $4.00 per month per additional unit and increase the minimum quantity supplied by 10,000 gallons per unit. 
2Layton: Computed for duplex; for multiple units add $2.30 per month per additional unit and increase the minimum quantity supplied by 4.000 gallons per unit. 
3Manila: Multiple rates apply only to duplexes. 
4Moab: For multiple units on the same meter add $2.50 per month per additional unit and increase the nllnimum quantity supplied by 2,000 gallons per unit. 
5Murray: For multiple units add $3.00 per month per additional unit ($4.00 outside city); for mobile homes add $2.25 per month per additional unit ($4.00 outside city). 
60rem : Computed for two units; for three or more units add $4.05 per month per additional unit and increase the minimum quantity supplied by 9,000 gallons per unit. 
7Riverton: Miscellaneous rate is a special "widows" rate. 
8South Salt Lake: Computed for duplex; for third unit add $1.00 and increase the minimum quantity supplied by 5,000 gallons, thereafter ass $.50 per additional unit. 
9Tooele: For multiples add $.50 per month per additional unit; for mobile homes add $.75 per month per additional unit. 
10 Various cities: duplexes are charged the same amount as a single residence. 
II West Jordan: Commercial users are charged $75.00 per acre-foot. 
20,000,000 I 
5,283,457 gal 
706,345 cu ft 
($) 
636.05 
1211.11 
6.30 
537.35 
529.68 
1583.19 
2644.23 
2646.73 
2645.48 
556.35 
11.15 
1058.69 
1322.86 
531.00 
5.00 
5.50 
532.&0 
426.03 
851.90 
1317.11 
796.80 
197.36 
1321.66 
Table B-7. Comparative cultnary water charges- Wasatch Front North Planning District. 
----- ----------
----. -.--------
~ame of city Minimum 30,000 I 60,000 I 120,000 I 250.000 I 500,000 I 1.000.000 I ~.ooo.ooo I ~o,ooo.ooo I 
charge - quantity 7,926 gal 15,852 gal 31.704 gal 66.043 gal \3~.0~6 gal 264.173 gal 52~.346 gal 5.~83.457 gal (S) (1000 I) 1,060 cu ft 2.120 cu ft 4.240 cu ft 8.829 Cll ft 17.658cuft 35.317 ell ft 70.634 ell ft i06.345 cu ft ($) ($) ($) ($, (SI IS) IS) (S) 
- _._---"---90UNTIFUL 15 3.00 37.9 3.00 4.17 7.34 14.21 27.42 53.83 106.61 1051.69 CENTERVILLE 1 4.50 37.9 4.50 6.55 12.10 24. 12 47.23 B.46 185.92 Id50.21 CENTERVILLE 7 5.00 37.9 5.00 1. OS 12.60 24.62 46.13 82.54 148.59 1337.36 CENTERVILLE 1 OT 6.75 37.9 6.15 9.38 i6.52 31 •. 97 60.08 109.11 202.11 1866.46 CENTERVILLE 7 aT 7.50 37.9 1.5\) 10.43 18.35 35.52 66.'14 123.11 228.84 2130.88 CLEARfiELD 2351 3.00 31.9 l.oo 4. 17 7.31 13.49 25.36 49.15 96.70 952.62 FARMINGTON 21 4.00 37. ~ 4.00 5.46 '1.43 17.21 29.18 53.55 101.10 951.02 FARMING (1) 3 8.0'0 15.1 8.00 8.00 10.93 18. 71 31.2ti 55.0S 102.6u 958.52 KAYSVILLE 11 2.50 3'.9 2.50 3.61 6.81 12.99 23. 31 43. 13 82.15 796.02 LAY TO N 2 3.00 26.5 3.19 4.77 7.91 14.09 21t.41 44.23 63.85 791.12 L ~ Y TO N 2 OT 6.00 26.5 6.31 9.54 15.81 28.16 46.63 86.4'5 167.70 1594.24 
L A '(TO (2) 3 5.30 41.6 5.30 6.27 9.4" 1 '5.69 26.16 45.96 85.60 796.67 
LAYTON 5 3.00 26.5 3.19 4.77 7.94 14 .. 8 1 28 .. 02 54.43 101.27 1056.29 
LA Y TOH 7 3.00 26.5 3.19 4.77 r.93 14 • 11 21t. 4 b 44.28 83.I}C 797.11 
OGDEN 1/2·5/8" 3.10 28.6 3.18 5. 16 9.13 17.71 33.42 60.76 109.35 715.53 
~ OGDEN 3/4"CON 4.05 42.8 4.05 5. 19. 9.15 17.74 33.44 60.79 109.36 715.56 OGDEN 1" CON 5.95 71.2 5.95 5.'15 9.18 11.76 33. It 7 60.81 109.40 715.56 
OGOEN 1.5" CON 11.20 142.3 11.20 11.20 ll.2u 18 •. H 34.02 &1.36 109.95 716.13 
OG DEN 2" CON 11.50 227.5 17.50 17.50 17.5.0 18.99 34.b9 bl.OIt 110.63 116.81 
OGDEN 3" CON 31.85 431.5 31.& 5 31.85 31.85 31.65 35. ~2 63.26 111.85 716.03 
OGDEN 4" CON 51.65 746.9 51.65 51.65 51.85 51.8'5 51.65 64.'52 113011 719.29 
OG DEN f>" CON 101.25 1691.3 101.25 101.25 101.25 101.25 101.25 101.25 115.50 721.68 
OGDEN 6" CON 191.50 4051.1 191.50 191 .. 50 197.50 191 • ') 0 197.~0 1 n. 50 197.50 724.16 
OGDEN 1/2·5/8-0T 6.20 26.6 6.36 10.33 18.25 35.42 66.64 121.46 218.40 1430.76 
OGDEN 3/4"CON or 8.10 4 2.8 6.10 1 0.38 16.30 35.41 66.69 121.51 216.45 1430. e 1 
OGDEN I" CON OT 11.90 7 1.2 11.90 11.90 18.35 35.52 66.94 121.56 218.50 1430.86 
OGOEN 1.5"CON OT 22.40 142.3 22.40 22.40 22.40 36.62 66.04 122.66 219.60 1431.96 
OGDEN 2" CON OT 35.00 221.5 35.0u 35.00 35.0u 37.91 69.39 124.01 220.95 1433.31 
OGO£N 3- CON aT 63.70 431.5 63.70 63.70 b 3.1 0 63.70 11.64 126.46 223.40 1435.76 
OG DEN 4- CON OT 103.70 746.9 103.70 103.70 103.70 103.70 103.10 128.96 225.92 1436.28 
OGDEN 6- CON or Z02.50 1691.3 202.50 202.50 202.50 202.50 202.50 202.50 230.95 1443.31 
OGDEN 8- CON OT 395.00 4051.1 395.00 395.00 395.00 395.00 395.00 395'. 00 395.00 1446.31 
PL_IN CITY 2 5.50 0.0 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 
RIVERO ALE 17 3.25 37.9 3.25 4.30 7.16 13.34 25.23 49.00 96.55 952.47 
ROY II 2.50 37.9 2.50 3.61 6.62 13 .15 25.70 50.19 100.99 1004.46 
ROY 11 OT 6.25 37.9 6.l5 8.30 13.65 25.81 48.98 95.21 181.61 1851".96 
SOUTH OGOE N 11 2.25 31.9 2.25 3.42 6.59 13 .46 26.&1 53.08 105.92 1056.94 
SUNSET 3/4" CON 3.65 31.9 3.65 5.00 8.31 14.38 25.60 48.06 92.91 901.34 
0'1 
IC 
Table B-7. Continued. 
Name of city Minimum 30,0001 60,0001 120,000 1 250,000 I 500,000 I 1,000,000 I 2,000,0001 20,000,000 I 
charge - quantity 7,926 gal 15,852 gal 31,704~1 66,043 gal 132,086 ~l 264,173 ~l 528,346 gal 5,283,457 gal 
($) (1000 I) 1,060 co ft 2,120 co ft 4,240 co ft 8,829 cu ft 17,658cuft 35,317 cu ft 70,634 cu ft 706,345 CO ft 
(S) (S) ($) (S) (5) (S) (5) (5) 
SUNSET 1- CON "-'4.50 37.9 4.50 5.65 9.22 15.23 26.45 48.91 93.b2 902.19 
SUNSE T 4- CON 9.15 37.9 9.15 10.50 13.81 19.68 31.10 53.56 ~6.4 7 906.84 
SUNSET 6- CON 13.60 37.9 13.60 14.95 18.32 24.33 35.55 58.01 102.92 911.29 
SYRACUSE 1 6.15 37.9 6.15 1.32 10.49 17.36 30.57 56.98 109.82 1060.84 
S YRAC USE 1 6.15 37.9 6.15 7.03 9.41 14.56 24.46 44.28 63.90 797.11 
WASHI~G TER 2 3.75 37.9 3.75 4.92 8.09 14.96 26.17 54.58 107.42 1058.44 
WASHIHG(10) 2 4.25 41.6 4.25 5.22 8.39 15.26 28.47 54.86 107.12 1058.74 
WASHING TER 3 5.75 7 1. ~ 5.15 5.75 8.29 15.16 28.37 54.lel 107.62 1058.64 
WASHI .. G 3/4- CON 4.25 41.6 4.25 5.22 8.39 15.26 28.41 54.88 107.12 1058.74 
WAS H I N G 1 - CON 5.75 11.9 5.15 5.75 8.29 15.16 28.31 54.76 101.62 1056.64 
WASHING 1.5- CON 9.50 143.8 9.50 9.50 9.50 15.11 28.32 54.13 107.57 1056.59 
WA SHI HG 2- CON 14.00 221.1 14.00 14.00 14.00 15.21 28.42 54.83 101.67 1058.69 
WASHING 3- CON 24.50 431.5 24.50 24.50 21t.50 24.50 28.12 54.53 107.31 1058.39 
WASHING 4- CON 39.50 745.7 39.50 39.50 39.50 39.50 39.50 52.93 105.77 1056.79 
W BOUNTIfUL 11 3.00 45.4 3.00 3. ~9 7.26 13.27 24.09 1t3. 'J 1 83.53 196.aO 
WEST BO(10) Z 5.00 83.3 S.OO 5.00 7.20 13.57 24.&5 44.41 84.09 191.36 
WEST POINT 17 3.80 45.4 3.60 4.76 8.73 17.31 33.62 66.d4 132.61 1321.66 
Table B-8. Comparative culinary water charges - Southeastern PULnning District. 
---- ---------- --=========== =..0========== ::= _=-==--===--=-
'\arne of city 
lAST CARBO~ 17 
MOAB (4) 1 
HOAB 7 
HOAB 1 aT 
HOAS 7 OT 
Minimum 
charge - quantity 
($) (1000 I) 
6.30 
2.50 
3.50 
5.00 
7.00 
0.0 
7.6 
11.4 
7.6 
11.4 
30,000 I 
7,926 gal 
1,060 cu ft 
($) 
6.30 
3.80 
4.98 
7.61 
9.96 
60,000 I 
15,852 gal 
2,120 cu ft 
($) 
6.]0 
5.55 
7.36 
11.09 
14.71 
120,000 I 
31,704 gal 
4,240 cu ft 
($) 
6.30 
9.03 
12.11 
16.07 
24.22 
250.000 I 500,000 I 1.000,000 I 2,000.000 I 20.000,000 I 
66.043 gal J32.086 gal 264.173 gal 528,346 gal 5,283,457gaJ 
8,829 cu ft 17.658 cu ft 35.317 cu ft 70.634 cu ft 706,345 cu ft 
($) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
--------- ~ -- -- -----_._----
6.30 
16.59 
21.77 
33.18 
43.54 
6.30 
31.1~ 
37.98 
62.24 
75.96 
6.30 
60.18 
68.36 
120.36 
136.72 
6.30 
118.10 
121.99 
236.59 
255.97 
6.30 
1164.42 
902.95 
2328.84 
1805.91 
-...J 
= 
Table B-9. Comparative culinary water charges-Southwestern Planning District. 
Name of city Minimum 30,0001 60,000 1 120,000 I 2S0,OOO I 500,000 I 1,000,000 I 
charge - quantity 7,926 gal 15,852 gal 31.704 gal 66,043 gal 132,086 gal 264.173 gal 
($) (1000 1) 1,060 cu ft 2,120 cu ft 4,240 cu ft 8,829 cu ft 17,658 cu ft 35,317 ('u ft 
($) (S) ($) ($) ($) ($) 
-- --- -- --- --
KANAB 17 4.00 56.8 4.00 4.17 ij.20 18.50 38.38 18.00 
MILF'ORO 17 11.75 0.0 11.15 11.75 11.15 11.15 11.75 11.75 
PANGUITCH 27 3.00 56.8 3.00 3.13 ~.45 9.25 15.86 29.01 
ST.GEORGE 1 3.00 11.4 3.99 5.57 6.14 15.61 26.62 53.31 
ST.GEORGE 57 3.00 11.4 4.23 6.21 10.16 16.76 35.27 66.31 
- -- -- - -_ .. _---
Table B-l0. Comparative culinary water charges- Uintah Basin Planning District. 
Name of city 
MANILA 
MANILA 
MANILA (3) 
HOOSEVELT 
VERNAL (10) 
15 
7 
3 
17 
2 
357 vERNAL 
yERNAL. 
yERNAL. 
(10) 2 OT 
lS7 aT 
Minimum 
charge - quantity 
($) (1000 1) 
7.50 
15.00 
11.25 
5.00 
3.00 
3.00 
6.00 
6.00 
37.9 
75.7 
56.8 
37.9 
37.9 
37.9 
37.9 
37.9 
30,000 1 60,000 I 120,000 I lSO,OOO I 500,000 I 
7,926 gal 15,852 gal 31,704gal 66.043 gal 132.086 gal 
1,060 cu ft 2,120 cu ft 4,240 cu ft 8,829 cu ft 17,658 ('u ft 
($) ($) ($) -- ----(~----- ($) --------
1.50 10.43 16.35 
15.00 15.00 20.85 
11.25 11.68 19.60 
5.00 7.05 11.93 
3.00 3.88 6.93 
3.00 3.88 6.20 
6.00 7.76 13.16 
6.00 7.46 11.43 
35.52 
36.02 
36.77 
20.51 
17.62 
11.41 
29.02 
20.01 
68.54 
71.04 
69.79 
37.02 
40.73 
21.31 
62.04 
36.52 
1.000,000 I 
264.173 gal 
35,317 ('u ft 
($) 
134.59 
137.09 
135.64 
70.04 
86.96 
41,13 
126.09 
69.54 
2,000,000 I 
528,346 gal 
70,634 cu ft 
($) 
----
151.25 
11,75 
55.48 
98.22 
123.64 
2,000,000 I 
528.346 gal 
70,634 cu ft 
($) 
----
266.67 
269,17 
267.92 
13tH 09 
179.42 
60.15 
200.17 
13'5.59 
20,000,000 I 
5,283,457 gal 
706,345 cu ft 
($) 
1583.1,9 
11.15 
531.00 
906.59 
1021.11 
20,000,000 I 
5,283,457 gal 
706,345 cu ft 
($) 
2644.23 
2646.73 
2645.48 
1324.66 
1643.71 
794.02 
2637.73 
1324.36 
'I 
Jo-l 
Table B-ll. Comparative culinary water charges-Bear River Pwnning District. 
Name of city 
~HD[ PARK 2 
LOGAN 31 1., l"CON 
LOGAN 1.5" CON 
LOGAN 2- CON 
LOGAN 3- CON 
LOGAN 4- CON 
LOGAN 6" CON 
LOGAN 8- CON 
NORTH LOGAN 21 
PR OY 10 [NCE 11 
RAt~DOLPH 11 
SMITHFIELD 21 
WELLS~lll£ 23 
Minimum 
charge - quantity 
($) (1000 I) 
3.33 
2.50 
5.00 
9.00 
17.00 
J(l.OO 
61.50 
129.50 
4.00 
3.00 
3.50 
3.00 
5.00 
15.7 
31.9 
63.3 
IS 9.0 
51 0.4 
515.4 
1332.5 
3338.7 
3 0.3 
37. ~ 
56.8 
37.9 
132.5 
-"------- ---=:':---=-- ------
30,000 I 
7,926 gal 
1,060 cu ft 
($) 
3.33 
2.50 
5.00 
9.00 
17.00 
30.00 
61.50 
129.50 
4.00 
3.00 
3.50 
3.00 
5.00 
60,000 I 
15,852 gal 
2,120 cu ft 
($) 
3. 33 
3. b 1 
5. ~v 
9.00 
17.00 
30.00 
61.50 
129.50 
5. '16 
3.68 
3. , 1 
3. aa 
5.00 
120.000 I 
31,704 gal 
4.240 cu ft 
($) 
4.50 
6.84 
6.94 
9.00 
17.00 
30.00 
£)1.50 
129.50 
9.93 
6.26 
1.42 
6.26 
5.00 
---_ .... 
250.000 I 
66.043 gal 
X.R29 cu ft 
($) 
, • 9 3 
13.71 
15.81 
13.81 
17.00 
30.00 
&1.50 
129.50 
18.51 
11.41 
10.85 
10.63 
12.76 
500.000 I 
132.0H6 gal 
17.65Xcuft 
(~) 
14.54 
26.92 
27.02 
27.02 
27.02 
30.0u 
61.50 
129.50 
35.02 
21.31 
11. ,+6 
16.87 
29.27 
1.000.000 I 
264.173 gal 
35.317 cu ft 
IS) 
27.15 
53 .. 33 
53.43 
5.5.4.5 
53.43 
52.43 
61.50 
129.50 
68.04 
41. 13 
3v.67 
27.43 
62.29 
2.000.000 I 
52H,346 gal 
70.634 cu ft 
(S) 
-----
54.16 
106.17 
106.27 
106.21 
106.27 
105.27 
96.77 
129.50 
134.09 
3 o. 75 
57.08 
1t8.57 
128.34 
20,000.000 I 
5.2k3,457 gal 
706.345 cu ft 
($) 
------.--
52~.68 
1057.19 
1057.29 
1057.29 
1057.29 
1056.29 
1041.19 
1009.79 
1322.86 
791t.02 
532.60 
426.98 
1311.11 
'I 
~ 
Table B-12. Comparative culinary water charges- Wasatch Front South Planning District. 
Name of city 
MURRAY (5) 2351 
MURRAY HaSP 
~URRAY 2351 OT 
RIVERTON 21 
RIVERTON 21 or 
R I V ER T OtH 7) 9 
SLC 3/4.1" CON 
SLC 1.5" CON 
SLC 2" CON 
SL C 3" CON 
SLC 4" CON 
SLC 6" CON 
SLC 8" CON 
SLC 10" CON 
SLC 1/4,1" CO OT 
SLC 1.5" CON or 
5LC 2 It CON 0 r 
SLC 3" CON or 
5LC 4" CON aT 
5LC 6" CON 0 T 
CSlC 8- CON aT 
SLC 10" CON or 
SANDY 17 
5 SAL T LAKE 27 
S SAL T (8) 1 
TOOELE (9) 2351 
w J OR 0 A< 11) 235 
Minimum 
charge - quantity 
($) (1000 I) 
3.00 
25.00 
4.00 
4.00 
5.00 
2.00 
1.75 
3.50 
5.60 
11.20 
17.50 
35.00 
56.00 
8e.50 
2.50 
5.00 
8.00 
16.00 
25.00 
50.00 
80.00 
115.00 
8.00 
2.50 
4.00 
2.15 
... 00 
3 1.1 
31.1 
31.1 
18.9 
18.9 
16.9 
31.1 
62.3 
99.1 
198.2 
108.6 
620.1 
991.0 
142 1t.2 
26.3 
59.5 
93.4 
189.1 
294.5 
588.9 
942.9 
1356.3 
75.7 
45.4 
75.1 
42.5 
22.7 
30,0001 
7,926 gal 
] ,060 cu ft 
($) 
3.00 
25.00 
4.00 
4.59 
5.59 
2.59 
1.15 
3.50 
5.60 
11.20 
11.50 
35.00 
56.00 
80.50 
2.64 
5.00 
8.00 
16.00 
25.00 
50.00 
80.00 
115.00 
8.00 
2.50 
4.00 
2.75 
4.48 
60,000 I 
15,852 gal 
2,]20 cu ft 
($) 
---
Jt. 4 3 
26.43 
6.04 
6. 17 
7. 17 
4.17 
3.38 
3.50 
5.60 
11.20 
17.50 
35.00 
56.00 
80.50 
5.19 
5.05 
c3.00 
16." 0 
25.00 
50.00 
80.00 
115.00 
8.00 
3.35 
4.00 
3.83 
6.46 
120,000 I 
31,704 gal 
4,240 cu ft 
($) 
7.39 
29.39 
10.28 
9.34 
10.34 
7.34 
6.77 
6.76 
6.78 
11.20 
17.50 
35.00 
56.00 
80.50 
10.27 
10.13 
10.25 
16.00 
25.00 
50.00 
80.00 
l15.0u 
10.93 
6.63 
6.57 
7.54 
10.43 
250,000 I 
66.043 gal 
S.S29 cu ft 
($) 
13.62 
35.82 
19.46 
16.21 
11.21 
14.21 
14.12 
14. 11 
14.13 
14.13 
17.50 
35.00 
56.00 
80.50 
21.29 
21.15 
21.27 
21.11 
2S.00 
50.00 
80.00 
115.00 
19.51 
1".39 
14. 13 
15.58 
19.01 
500,000 I 
132.0X6 gal 
17.65S cu ft 
(S) 
26.18 
48.18 
31.12 
29.42 
30.42 
27.42 
28.24 
28.23 
28.25 
28.25 
28.31 
35.00 
56.VO 
80.50 
42.48 
42.34 
42.4& 
42.30 
42.42 
50.00 
80.00 
11S.0U 
36.02 
2e.92 
28.66 
31.03 
35.52 
1.000.000 I 
26 .. U73 gal 
35.317cuft 
(S) 
50. '10 
72.90 
72.43 
55.83 
56.83 
53.63 
56.50 
56. It 9 
56.51 
56.51 
56.51 
56 •• 7 
56.51 
80.50 
84.&6 
84.12 
84.84 
84.68 
64.60 
84.84 
84.84 
115.00 
69.04 
57.98 
57.12 
&1.<13 
68.54 
2,000,000 I 
52R.346 gal 
70,634 cu ft 
(S) 
96.22 
116.22 
132.75 
108.67 
109.&7 
106.67 
113.01 
113.00 
113.02 
113.02 
113.08 
112.98 
113.u2 
113.04 
169.62 
169.48 
16~.60 
169.44 
169.56 
169.60 
169.60 
169.56 
135.09 
It6.10 
115. e 4 
123.14 
134.59 
20,000,000 I 
5,283,457 gal 
706,345 cu ft 
($) 
737.80 
759.80 
965.05 
1059.69 
1060.69 
1057.69 
1130.14 
1130.13 
1130.15 
1130.15 
1130.21 
1130.11 
1130.15 
1130.17 
1695.33 
1 b 95 .19 
1695.31 
1695.15 
1695.21 
1695.31 
1695.31 
16~5.27 
1323.86 
1162.22 
1161.96 
1236.23 
1323.36 
.....:I 
~ 
\.. 
Table B-13. Comparative culinary water charges-Central PkLnning District. 
:\ame of city 
DE L fA 
DELI. 
~PHRArM 
fILLMORE 
21 
27 or 
8 
11 
M~NTI 8 
MT PLEASANT 6 
Q[CHFI£LD 2 
Minimum 
charge - quantity 
(S) (10001) 
3.00 30.3 
5.00 30.3 
4.50 26.5 
5.00 37.9 
B.50 37.9 
3.00 18.9 
3.15 56.B 
30,000 I 
7,926 gal 
1,060 cu ft 
($) 
3.00 
5.00 
4.69 
5.()O 
6.50 
3.59 
3.15 
60,000 I 
15,852 gal 
2,120 cu ft 
($) 
3.94 
6.88 
6.27 
5.88 
~. 67 
5.17 
3.96 
120.000 I 
31,704 gal 
4,240 cu ft 
(S) 
5.84 
10.69 
9.44 
8.26 
12.84 
8.34 
1.93 
250.000 I 
66.043 gal 
8.829 cu ft 
(S) 
~.j7 
1'3.93 
15.73 
13.41 
19.27 
15.21 
16.51 
500.000 I 
13l.0R6 gal 
17.658 cu fl 
(S) 
17.69 
34. '8 
27.62 
22.21 
29.83 
26.42 
33.02 
1.000.000 I 
264.173 gal 
3:;,317 cu fI 
(S) 
33.74 
66.48 
51.39 
35.42 
48.78 
54.83 
66.04 
2.000.000 I 20.000.000 I 
52k.346 gal 5.283,457 gal 
70.634 cu ft 706,345 cu ft 
_ .. __ . _.l~L ______ . <.~._ 
65.44 
12Y.86 
98.94 
61.B3 
80.83 
107.67 
132.09 
636.05 
1211.11 
954.86 
537.35 
556.35 
1058.69 
1320.86 
Table B-1". Comparative culinary water ckarges-Mountainlands Planning District. 
._- ---- _.- -----.-
------- . 
Name of city Minimum 30,000 I 60,000 I 120,000 I 250,000 I 500,000 I 1,000,000 I 2,000,000 I 20,000,000 I 
charge - quantity 7,926 gal 15,852 gal 31.704 gal 6h,043 gal 132,OR6 gal 264.173 gal 528.346 gal 5,283,457 gal 
($) (1000 I) 1,060 cu ft 2.120 eu ft 4,HO eu ft X,X29 l'll ft 17,65X l'U ft 35,~17 eu ft 70,634 eu ft 706,345 eu ft 
($) ($) lSI lSI IS) IS) (~L ___________ {_$) 
fi E 8[R 16 5.00 0.0 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.uO 5.00 5.00 5.00 ~[8ER - .. 4.00 0.0 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.UO 4.00 4.vO 4.00 HE8ER 7 6.50 64.4 6.50 6.50 9. { 3 17.29 31. d 2 60.88 11~.OO 1165.12 LEHI 11 3.00 28.4 3.09 4.61 l.b4 14.71 27.2'8 4{ .4 B B4.47 750.18 MAPLETON 17 3.63 56.8 3.63 3.13 5. b 3 9.29 1.3. Zb 21.18 31.(13 322.34 
OREN Z7 4.65 It 5.4 4.65 5.23 7.37 10.80 11.41 .30.62 5T.e3 532.55 OREt4 (6) 35 6.70 79.5 6.10 8.70 10.63 16 _ e 1 2~.70 52.47 100.02 955.94 
ORE" Z1 or 9.30 45.4 9.30 1 J. 46 14.14 21.61 34.0 Z 61.23 114.01 1065.09 
OR EM 35 OT 11.40 79.5 17.40 17.40 21. 25 33.62 'jl.j~ 104. 94 200.04 1911.88 
PARK CITY 1 5.00> 0.0 5.00 5. 00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
PAYSON 8 3.00 37.9 3.1)0 3.99 6.69 12.53 23. 11 41.07 74.01 668.48 
PA Y SON 8 OT 6.00 37.9 6.00 7.99 13.38 25.05 46.23 82.14 148.19 1336.96 
PROVO 3/4" CON 3.50 Z 8. 3 5.bO 5.29 8.b 8 16.03 30.15 5il. It 1 114.92 t132.05 
PROVO 1- CON 4.50 Z8.3 4.60 6.29 9.68 1f.03 H.! 5 59. 41 115.92 1133.05 
PROVO I-liZ" CON 10.00 Z 8 • .3 10.10 11.19 15.18 22.53 56.65 64.91 121.42 1138.55 
"'-I PROVO Z" CON 15.00 26.3 15.10 16.79 20.18 27.53 41.65 69.91 126.42 1143.55 0l:Io PROVO 3" CON 30.00 Z 8. 3 30.10 31. 79 35.18 42.53 56.65 84.91 141.42 1158.55 
PROVO 4" CON 50.00 28.3 50.10 51.1 ~ 55.18 62.53 16.65 104.91 161.42 1178.55 
PROVO 6" CON 10C.OO 26.3 100.10 101.79 105.18 112.53 126.65 154.91 211.42 1228.55 
PROVO 8- CON 150.00 26.3 150.10 151.19 155.18 162.53 176.65 2.)4.91 261.42 1276.55 
PR OVO 10" CON 200.00 28.3 200.10 201.79 205.18 212.53 226.65 254.91 311.42 1328.55 
PROVO 12- CON 25C.00 z-a • .3 250.10 251.79 255.18 262.53 276.65 304.91 361.42 1578.55 
PROVO 3/4 CON or 10.50 Z 8. 3 10.19 15.87 26.04 48. O~ 90. __ 6 175.22 344.15 3396.15 
PROVO I" CON or 13.50 28.3 13.19 16.87 29.04 51.08 93.46 178.22 347.75 3399.15 
PROVO 1-1/Z C or 30.00 2 e. 3 30.Z9 35.37 45.54 67.56 109.96 194.72 364.25 5415.65 
PR ova 2- CON OT 45.00 Z 8.3 45.Z9 50.37 60.54 82.58 124.96 209.72 379.25 3450.65 
PROVO 3" CON or 90.00 Z 8.3 90.29 95. 57 105.54 127.58 169.96 254.72 424.25 3475.65 
PROVO 4· CON or 150.00 28.3 150.Z9 155.37 165.54 187.5 d 229.96 314.72 484.25 3535.65 
PROVO 6" CON OT 300.00 26.3 300.29 305.37 315.54 357.58 319.96 464.72 634.25 3685.65 
PROVO 6" CON OT 45 O. OJ 28.3 450.29 455.37 465.54 461.58 529.96 614./2 78lt.25 3835.65 
PROVO 10" CON OT 60().OO 28.3 600.Z9 605.37 615.54 637.56 619.96 764.72 934.25 3985.65 
PR OVO 1Z" CON OT 15C.00 28.3 150.29 755.37 765.54 ldr.58 8 2~. 96 914.12 1064.25 4135.65 
SANTAQUIN 17 4.15 37.9 4.15 4.6Z 5.89 8.63 13.92 24.48 45.62 426.03 
SANTAQUIN 11 or 8.15 31.9 8.1, 9.09 11.62 17.12 27.68 46.82 91.09 851.90 
S? AfliI SH rORK d 3.50 56.a 3.50 3.63 6.01 10.35 16.96 30.17 56.58 532.10 
APPENDIXC 
SAMPLE ESTIMATE OF REVENUE POTENTIAL 
7S 
I. MAXIMIZING FEE = K 
e 
a) • PUBLIC SUPPLY FEE = f .30 = $ .40 PER 1,000 GAL 
.75 
b). IRRIGATION FEE = f = % = $2.50 PER AC FT 
II. TOTAL REVENUE f. q - f. dq 
f.q - f.ei!·g 
1 2 f.q - 2P e.f. q 
1 2 
= q (f - 2P e.f ) 
EXAMPLE: FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
a) • PUBLIC SUPPLY 
q = (280) (1,000) (365) 
f = .40 
P = .30 
e = .75 
TR = (280) (1,000) (365) 
(208) ( ,000) (365) 
15,184,000 
b). IRRIGATION 
q = (4,100) (1,000) 
f = 2.50 
P = 5.00 
e = 2.00 
TR = (4,100) (1,000) [2.50 -
(4,100) (1,000) (1.25) 
5,125,000 
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1 
2(5.00) 
1,000 GAL/YEAR 
$ /1,000 GAL 
$ /1,000 GAL 
AC FT/YEAR 
$ /AC FT 
(2) ( .50) 2J 
APPENDIXD 
A REVIEW OF ALPINE IRRIGATION COMPANY 
WATER RIGHTS RECORDS 
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Alpine Irrigation Company is medium sized 
(irrigating some 1,750 acres) located near American 
Fork, Utah County (Haws, 1973). Early settlers in this 
area used water from Dry Creek and Fort Canyon for 
irrigation, watering livestock, and domestic purposes. 
Prior to 1877, Lehi City and the town of Alpine built 
systems of ditches and diversion works in order to use 
water from Dry Creek. The community organized and 
incorporated the Alpine Irrigation Company in 1880 
(Company records-State Engineers Office). 
At first water was divided on the basis of primary 
and secondary rights between four major ditches; 
Fort Ditch, North Ditch, West Field Ditch, and East 
Field Ditch. These shares were distributed as follows: 
Primary shares 
Fort Ditch 
North Field 
East Field 
West Field 
Alpine City, 
Fort Ditch 
Secondary shares 
North Field 
East Field 
Field Ditch 
West Field 
Highland Bench 
318 shares 
137 shares 
479 shares 
420 shares 
50 shares 
42 shares 
151 shares 
10 shares 
1101/z shares 
212 shares 
Primary rights were established when a person 
(a) diverted and used unappropriated water of any 
stream, watercourse, lake spring, or other natural 
source of supply, or (b) had "the open, peaceable, 
uninterrupted and continuous use of water for a period 
of seven years." Secondary rights were established, 
"subject to the perfect and complete use of the 
primary right," (a) when all water from any natural 
source had been appropriated and used by prior 
appropriators for parts of a year only, and subsequent 
appropriations had been made of all or part of the 
water during any other part of the year; (b) when the 
average seven years flow of water had been 
appropriated, and other persons thereafter appropri-
ated an increase over the average flow. 
On December 5, 1889, Lehi Irrigation Company 
entered into an agreement with the Alpine Irrigation 
Company under which Alpine received one half of all 
the water of Dry Creek during April, May, June, and 
July up to and including the 10th of July each year. 
During the remainder of the year, Alpine Irrigation 
Company was entitled to all of the waters of Dry 
Creek. Alpine also enjoyed the total flow of Grove 
Creek throughout the whole year. 
A court decree of July 14, 1893, gave the North 
Bench Irrigation Company two thirteenths of the 
rights of Alpine Irrigation Company during the 
months of April, May, and June. North Bench was 
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given no right during July, August, and September. 
Then, during October, November, December, Janu-
ary, February, and March of each year North Bench 
Irrigation Company was given one fourth of the right 
of Alpine Irrigation Company. This division of the 
total flow continues to be the basis of distribution 
among the three companies. 
All ditches in the system are filled to capacity 
during spring runoff. As flow diminishes, distribution 
is made on the basis of total shares (both primary and 
secondary). At the point when total flow diminishes to 
14 cfs all secondary shares are eliminated. During the 
hot summer months when Fort Creek carries only a 
minimal stream, the supply is supplemented by a flow 
from Dry Creek, which holds up fairly well until late 
July or early August. 
The following diligence claims have been filed on 
water rights which were in use before 1903. 
Claim 797 
Dry Creek: North Field Ditch and Fort Ditch 
Use 
Irrigation 27 sec. ft. from 1 April to 31 Oct. 
Stock 3 sec. ft. from 1 Nov. to 31 March 
Construction began: 1852 Water first used: 1852 
Claim 798 
Dry Creek: West Field Ditch 
Use 
Irrigation 30 sec. ft. from 1 April to 31 Oct. 
Stock 2 sec. ft. from 1 Nov. to 31 March 
Claim 799 
Dry Creek: East Field Ditch 
Use 
Irrigation 40 sec. ft. from 1 April to 31 Oct. 
Stock 2 sec. ft. from 1 Nov. to 31 March 
Claim 800 
Dry Creek: High Bench Ditch 
Use 
Irrigation 25 sec. ft. from 1 April to 31 Oct. 
Stock 2 sec. ft. from 1 Nov. to 31 March 
Claim 801 
Grove Spring Stream (tributary to Dry 
Creek) 
Use 
Irrigation 6.99 sec. ft. from 1 April to 31 Oct. 
Stock 2 sec. ft. from 1 Nov. to 31 March 
Claim 802 
Fort Canyon Creek: Carlisle Ditch 
Use 
Irrigation 6 sec. ft. from 1 April to 31 Oct. 
Stock 1 sec. ft. from 1 Nov. to 31 March 
Carlisle Ditch is classified as a "high water" ditch, 
that is, when Fort Creek flows in excess of 16 cfs, 
users of Carlisle Ditch may divert the excess to a total 
of 3 ds. There are two exceptions to the rule. First, 
"the 3 cfs rule is exceeded when the water flowing in 
Fort Creek belonging to the Alpine Irrigation is in 
excess of the need of West Field Ditch u~ers. Carlisle 
Ditch users have been permitted to exceed the 3 cfs to 
a ditch capacity of 6 cfs." Second, "users of West Field 
Ditch may transfer shares from West Field Ditch to 
Carlisle Ditch to protect Carlisle Ditch crops or 
whenever water is not needed in the West Field 
Farms." 
In 1963 the Alpine Irrigation Company made two 
applications to appropriate water from wells. Both 
were for 6 sec. ft. for irrigation from April 1 to 
October 30. 
On behalf of the Alpine Irrigation Company, the 
Utah State Board of Water Resources applied to 
change the point of diversion for the Alpine right as 
evidenced by diligence claims on water used prior to 
1903. As required, the application was advertised 
publicly from May 7 to May 21, 1970. It was protested 
by a number of shareholders of the company on the 
grounds that secondary holders would benefit at the 
cost of the primary holders; however, the method of 
allocation is clearly established by the bylawys of the 
company. The State Engineer approved the applica-
tion, reiterating that it is not the province of the State 
Engineer to interfere with the internal organizations 
of bylaws of individual irrigation companies nor to 
regulate the distribution of water once it has been 
diverted from the natural channel or source to the 
company. (Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953) 
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Testimonies of witnesses involved with the 
Alpine Irrigation Company add interesting insights 
into the development of the company. In a sworn 
affidavit of April 21, 1960, Albert J. Adams who was 
born in Alpine, Utah, July 7, 1868, recalls: "at first 
there were no turns, each user would take a stream as 
needed and keep it as long as wanted or until some one 
else took it, but in later years it was necessary to take 
turns." He added that, as time went on, people began 
quarreling over the water. 
Another witness, Evan Shepherd, who moved to 
Alpine in 1932 stated on April 21, 1960, that a board of 
directors was chosen by voting according to shares. 
The board then chose a watermaster. He noted that it 
was the practice to divide water betweeen the North 
Bench, Lehi Irrigation, and Alpine Irrigation compa-
nies to the letter. Any trading was done only through 
mutual agreement, and there was no share trading 
between ditches, although trading was permitted 
within the limits of a ditch. 
The records of the Alpine Irrigation Company 
were relatively brief and simple as compared with 
those of other companies. In some areas, legal 
disputes resulted in decreased rights. Furthermore, 
due to the size of operations of the various companies 
changes in diversions, appropriations, or arrange-
ments for waters of additional streams, add com-
plexity to the task of sorting out the water rights held 
by each company. Finally, applications for changes 
may still be pending. 
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LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF IMPOSING 
WATER-USE FEES 
I. Preface 
This short paper examines the legal implications 
which necessarily would be encountered if a State 
were to implement a program of charging fees for the 
use 01 unappropriated water. The term "unappropria-
ted" is used to distinguish such a program from those 
where fees are charged for water-use after the 
wholesaler or retailer of water has acquired appro-
priation rights under state law. The latter situation 
has been common for many years, by subdivisions of 
state government and by federal agencies. 
It should be noted that this paper does not 
purport to be an exhaustive analysis of the legal 
problems identified, but is, rather, intended merely to 
characterize the nature and substance of the basic 
legal problems identified. Moreover, problems which 
are peculiar to States having riparian water right 
systems are not within the purview of this paper, and 
any discussion of riparian right concepts of doctrines 
will be limited to their applicability to the legal 
concepts applicable to appropriation jurisdictions. 
Most of the discussion which follows will be 
applicable to appropriation States in general, but 
where specific focus must be drawn on a particular 
State for emphasis or illustration, Utah is the State 
most often selected. 
II. Ownership of Water 
Before anyone is legally entitled to "sell" 
anything, or to charge fees for its use, he must have 
owr."'rship or a degree of legal control which justifies 
the sale or charging fees for use. Thus, an initial 
question which must be addressed is the extent to 
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which an appropriation State has legal ownership or 
control of water sufficient to allow it to impose 
water-use fees. There are a number of doctrines and 
concepts which must be noted. 
A. Source of State Ownership 
1. Navigable Waters 
One aspect of state ownership is directly related 
to the concept of navigability. Ownership of navigable 
waters developed in large part from the law in 
England, as it pertained to the rights of the public, the 
Parliament, and the King in such waters (Shively v. 
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894». The ownership rights of 
the Crown and Parliament were both in a proprietary 
and a governmental capacity, but they were subject to 
certain public uses for public purposes. The king 
could, at earlier times, make grants of the shores to 
private parties and extinguish public rights of use 
therein, but there is no authority indicating that he 
could sell, grant or otherwise dispose of the waters 
themselves. (R. Hall, Essay on the Rights of the 
Crown and the Privileges of the Subject in the Sea 
Shores of the Realm, 106-08 (2nd ed. 1875).) 
As a result of the American revolution, the 
thirteen colonies superceded the Crown and Parlia-
ment in all proprietary rights and regulatory powers 
over navigable waters; and, when these colonies 
formed the Federal Union, and thus became the 
original thirteen States, they did not surrender any 
ownership rights in waters, but they did grant certain 
regu/4tory power to the Federal Government over 
interstate and foreign commerce. (U.S. Const., art. I, 
s 8, Para. 3). 
This constitutional power has been held to include 
regulatory authority over navigable waters (Gibbons 
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824», but only over those 
waters that are directly navigable in interstate or 
foreign commerce (The Montello, 11 Wall. 411 (1870». 
Waters that are navigable only in intrastate 
commerce, or from one point to another point within 
the same State, are not within the regulatory 
authority of the United States, but are subject to the 
regulatory authority of the States (The Daniel Ball, 10 
Wall. 557 (1870)). These regulatory powers must, of 
course, be distinguished from ownership rights. This 
distinction was made clear by the United States 
Supreme Court in Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 229 
(1845), wherein the Court said: 
To Alabama belong the navigable waters and the 
soils under them, in controversy in this case, 
subject to the rights surrendered by the Constitu-
tion to the United States; and no compact that 
might be made between her and the United States 
could diminish or enlarge these rights. (See Also, 
Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367 (1842)). 
The concept of "ownership" of navigable waters 
has never been defined or clarified with any degree of 
precision. The Supreme Court of the United States 
has observed that the state ownership of the water 
and the underlying soil is closely related to a 
regulatory power and duty to protect public uses of 
navigable waters, their beds and shorelands: 
The State holds the propriety of this soil for the 
conservation of the p-ublic rights of fishing 
thereon, and may regulate the modes of that 
enjoyment so as to prevent the destruction of the 
fishery ... This power results from the ownership of 
the soil, from the legislative jurisdiction of the 
State over it, and from its duty to preserve those 
public uses for which the soil is held. (Smith v. 
Maryland, 18 How. 71, 75 (1855)). 
2. Non-navigable Waters 
Waters that are non-navigable come within 
different legal rules. In England, there were no public 
rights in non-navigable waters, and they were 
considered to be private waters owned by those who 
owned the adjacent (riparian) uplands (Johnson v. 
O'Neill, 105 Law Times Rep. 587, 597 (House of 
Lords, 1911)). 
The doctrine of riparian rights, as it developed in 
England and as it has been adopted by most of the 
Eastern States in this country, entitles each riparian 
owner to make a reasonable use of the water so long as 
the flow of the stream is not materially diminished in 
volume or unreasonably deteriorated in quality 
(Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18-25 (1894)). 
In appropriation States, no material distinction is 
drawn between ownership of navigable and non-
navigable waters, since all waters are deemed to be 
owned by the "public" in general and not susceptible 
to private ownership wh~e flowing in natural 
channels; and in some instances public rights of use for 
recreational purposes have been recognized in 
non-navigable waters even though the beds are 
privately owned (see, e.g., Day v. Armstrong, 362 P. 
2d 137, 145 (Wyo. 1961). 
The question then arises as to the relationship of 
state doctrines with respect to the ownership of water 
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to federal ownership interests. These relationships 
are summarized below. 
B. Federal Ownership Interests 
When the United States acquired territory by 
p~rchase and cession, it acquired all proprietary 
rIghts and regulatory authority over the territory 
acquired. As a landowner, the United States thus 
acquired riparian rights along watercourses, because 
the riparian rights regime of water law was the only 
one in existence at the time these areas were 
acquired. When the United States subsequently sold 
~ands along watercourses to private persons, and 
Issued patents thereto, the private patentees natu-
rally claimed riparian water rights. 
In the West, however, the States had begun to 
develop appropriation concepts, the basis of which 
was that the first person to use water for a beneficial 
use had the prior right to water from the watercourse 
without regard to whether he owned any land riparia~ 
to the stream. It was natural that conflicts arose 
between patentees of the Government who claimed 
r~parian rights and those who claimed appropriation 
rIghts under state law (see, e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 
Cal. 140 (1855); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 
443 (1882)). 
Congress enacted mining and homestead legisla-
tion in 1866, 1870, and 1877, with an apparent 
authorization for water use under appropriation 
principles of the various States. In 1935, the United 
States Supreme Court held that these statutes 
evidenced a congressional intent that water-use in 
appropriation States be pursuant to water rights 
acquired in accordance with state law (California 
Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 
295 U.S. 142 (1935)). 
This apparently was not a renunciation or 
disclaimer by the United States of all riparian water 
rights which it owned, but merely a declaration that 
patentees who received conveyances of land from the 
United States received no riparian water rights as 
part of the conveyance; and that if they desired water 
rights, they would have to proceed in accordance with 
the requirements of the State wherein the land was 
located. Thus, if the State recognized riparian rights, 
the patentee would enjoy such rights as measured by 
state law; and if the State recognized only appropria-
tion water rights, then the patentee would have to 
make an appropriation in the manner required by the 
law of the State. 
But, with respect to lands that remained in 
federal ownership, some species of riparian rights 
apparently continued in existence. As noted earlier, 
the doctrine of riparian rights allows the owner of land 
adjacent to a natural watercourse to make a 
reasonable use of the water within the watercourse. 
The first clear evidence of the continued existence of 
federal riparian rights surfaced in Winters v. United 
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), where the Court held that 
the creation of an Indian reservation by the United 
States impliedly reserved sufficient water from the 
Milk River in Montana to satisfy the agricultural 
needs of reservation lands. This case gave rise to what 
commonly is referred to as the "Winters Doctrine." 
Since the United States has no source of power or 
control over water other than (1) ownership rights and 
(2) regulatory authority, it is clear that the 
Government must have relied on one of these sources 
of power in withdrawing and reserving water for use 
on the reservation. And, since a regulatory power 
does not create ownership rights, it necessarily 
follows that the Government must have held 
ownership rights in the Milk River sufficient to allow 
the withdrawal of water for use on the reservation. 
The only source of ownership rights which the 
Government could have had was through riparian 
rights, since it owned land adjacent to the Milk River 
but had not made any appropriation under the laws of 
Montana. 
This conclusion seems to have been borne out in 
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-601 (1963), 
which is the Court's most definitive statement of the 
"reserved" water rights of the United States. There, 
the Court held that the creation of federal reserva-
tions impliedly reserves sufficient water from streams 
arising on or flowing across the reservations to satisfy 
the purpose or purposes for which the reservations 
were created. 
The obvious question, then, is how these 
continuing riparian rights of the United States are to 
be correlated with state ownership and control of 
water. The essential answer lies in the "priority date" 
of rights created by federal reservations, whether for 
Indian use or for federal purposes. The priority date is 
the date when the reservation was officially estab-
lished. This means that water rights held by private 
persons and initiated prior to the creation of a federal 
reservation, will be superior to and have a priority 
over water rights reserved by the creation of the 
reservation. Conversely, state-created water rights 
that were initiated after the reservation was created 
are inferior and junior to the rights reserved by the 
creation of the reservation, and as the reserved rights 
are developed and the water put to use, the junior 
private rights may be impaired or destroyed without 
compensation. 
Thus, the priority of date of federal reserved 
rights makes the reservation doctrine consistent with 
the congressional acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877, and 
with the Supreme Court's opinion in the California 
Oregon Power case, supra. In other words, federal 
riparian rights were not extinguished in appropriation 
States, but were simply made subordinate to water 
rights created under state law. This gives appropria-
tors valid water rights with complete security of title. 
However, if and when the Government decides to 
exercise any of its riparian rights, it does so by 
expressly creating a federal reservation, and this 
serves as the "appropriation" or "notice" to everyone 
within the State where the reservation is created that 
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the Government's riparian rights have been exercised 
to the extent necessary to satisfy the water needs of 
the reservation. 
Sometimes this proprietary arrangement has 
been characterized as an "offer" by the Government to 
prospective private water users to acquire rights 
under state law, and to the extent that the offer is 
"accepted" through the acquisition of such state-
created rights, they cannot be divested; but, to the 
extent unappropriated water remains in the water-
course, then to that extent the federal offer has not 
been accepted, and in law an offer may always be 
withdrawn until it has been accepted. In this 
characterization, creation of a federal reservation 
withdraws the outstanding federal offer as to those 
waters reserved by the reservation, and as to all other 
waters the federal offer to private appropriators 
remains open and in effect. 
The most difficult aspect of federal and Indian 
reserved rights is that they are not quantified by the 
statutory reservation. They are merely implied 
reservations of water, with no mention of water-use 
and no indication of the volume or amount of use 
intended by the reservation. Since circumstances 
change, the extent of possible future development and 
use of water under reserved rights cannot be 
predicted. Oil shale and other mineral development, 
for example, could require water use on Indian lands 
for purposes not foreseen when the reservations were 
created. 
It seems logical that water use under reserved 
rights should not exceed a "reasonable use" as 
measured by state law, because reserved rights are 
bottomed on riparian rights, and "reasonable use" is 
always a limitation on the exercise of riparian rights. 
But no case has yet addressed this questions. 
III. Prospects for Sale of Water 
As indicated above, uncertainties exist as to the 
ext.ent that water is "owned" by the States, or by the 
Umted States, or by anyone else, while it remains in 
natural watercourses; and further uncertainties exist 
with respect to the unquantified nature of federal and 
Indian reserved rights, as well as to the nature of 
subordinated but continuing riparian rights of the 
Government in appropriation States. 
Despite these uncertainties, a number of propo-
sals have been made by legal scholars concerning sales 
of unappropriated water by States. Some of those are 
noted below, along with further comments about the 
prospects of water sales or the imposition of water-use 
fees. 
A. Interstate and Interbasin Sales 
The question of major interbasin transfers from 
one region of the Nation to another region has been 
hotly debated for years, and was one of the reasons for 
creation of the National Water Commission. One of the 
most prominently discussed potential transfers was 
from the Columbia River Basin to the southwest 
region of the United States. 
Professors Charles Meyers and Richard Posner 
have made the following suggestions: 
Because unappropriated waters are technically not 
owned, there is a conceptual difficulty in suggest-
ing that the state may sell them. However, since 
the state has the power to create property rights 
in the waters by establishing procedures for their 
appropriation and since the state could itself 
appropriate the waters, we conclude that the state 
can establish a procedure by which it sells 
unappropriated water to a purchaser in another 
state. 
Another seriQus problem with any major iIlter-
regionsJ transfer arises from the fact that the 
waters to be exported may be shared among 
several states. The Columbia River Basin, for 
example, includes portions of Washington, Ore-
gon, Idaho, Montana and Wyoming, as well as 
Canada. In such cases of multistate basins, the 
states cannot know in advance of an apportion-
ment how much water they have power to create 
appropriation rights in-that is, how much they 
can sell. To resolve this problem, there must be an 
apportionment-by congressional action, Supreme 
Court decree, or interstate compact-or a regional 
entity must be created that would hold title to the 
waters, effect the sale, and divide the proceeds 
among the states represented in the entity. The 
second alternative is probably no simpler than the 
first because the entity must still conduct an 
apportionment of sorts when it comes to divide the 
proceeds of the sale among the participating 
states. (C. J _ Myers and R. A. Posner, Market 
Transfers of Water Rights, pp. 44-46 (National 
Water Commission Publication, NTIS ACC. NO. 
PB-202-620,1971». 
Interregional transfers and sales of water are not 
within the scope of this paper, but the fact that 
proposals have been made for such sales by States 
within the area of origin are of present interest 
because of the conceptual similarity to the imposition 
of water-use fees by a State. In other words, if a State 
is legally empowered to sell its unappropriated water 
to another State, then, a fortiori, it would be 
empowered to impose water-use fees on users within 
the State. 
B. Sales Within the State: Public Auction 
Legal writers have also suggested that it would 
be legal for an appropriation State to "auction" 
unappropriated water to the highest bidder. This 
proposal would be compared to the procedures used 
by most States for leasing state lands for oil and gas, 
oil shale, and other minerals. When the lands are 
known to contain valuable minerals, then leasing 
procedures require that public notice be given by 
publication of the details of the lands to be offered for 
lease, including the time within which sealed offers 
will be accepted. At the appointed time and place for 
opening the competitive bids, the bids are opened and 
evaluated, and the lease is awarded to the highest 
qualified bidder. 
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By analogy, since the State knows that its 
unappropriated water is a valuable resource, it would 
be sold to the highest bidder pursuant to competitive 
bidding procedures similar to those employed for 
mineral leasing. When the State determined that 
there was an active interest or market demand for 
water in a particular river basin, it would determine 
how much of its unappropriated water should be 
offered for sale, and proceed to hold the sale. (See 
e.g., Meyers and Posner, Ope cit., supra 39-43.) 
C. Sales Within the State: Some Illustrations 
1. The Orange County Experience 
The water-use fees imposed on groundwater use 
in Orange County, California, are often cited as an 
illustration of the economic and practical efficiency 
with which such a system can work. In barest form, 
the essence of the system is that any potential water 
user is entitled to pump water from the underground 
basin in accordance with the schedule of fees 
established by the management district for water use; 
and the district imports water to recharge the basin 
sufficient to sustain the demands on the basin. The fee 
schedule for the various users is rather complicated, 
and to some extent is intended to allow credit to the 
earlier water users for the seniority of their rights. 
From a legal standpoint, the interesting features 
relate to the manner in which such a system came into 
being. 
California originally adopted the absolute owner-
ship doctrine of groundwater, which allowed overlying 
landowners to make full use of percolating ground-
water without regard to other landowners. Then, in 
Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 Pac. 766 (1903), 
the court adopted the rule of correlative use, which 
gives all overlying owners common rights to 
percolating waters beneath their lands. When the 
supply is sufficient, each owner withdraws water to 
meet his needs, but in time of shortage each owner is 
limited to the reasonable quantity of water needed to 
meet his beneficial needs, subject to similar and equal 
rights of all other overlying owners. 
In water-short Southern California, many under-
ground basins provided a relatively inexpensive 
supply of water. As the groundwater supply was 
developed, and more and more uses initiated, the 
basins were threatened with irreparable damage from 
salt water intrusion and exhaustion of the basin 
supply. Underground water basin management pro-
grams were initiated, but these were of limited 
effectiveness until Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 
908, 207 P. 2d 17 (1949). In that case, the court noted 
that the landowners overlying the basin originally had 
various kinds of rights to withdraw water from the 
basin, and also underscored the fact that "as between 
appropriators, the one first in time is the first in right, 
and a prior appropriator is entitled to all the water he 
needs, up to the amount that he has taken in the past, 
before a subsequent appropriator may take any." 
However, the court apparently was concerned 
with the disorganized, happenstance manner in which 
the basin had been developed and overdrawn, and 
noted that many of the uses were illegal in that they 
impaired prior rights. The court compared appropria-
tion and prescription rights in the following language: 
An appropriative taking of water which is not 
surplus is wrongful and may ripen into a 
prescriptive right where the use is actual, open 
and notorious, hostile and adverse to the original 
owner, continuous and uninterrupted for the 
statutory period of five years ... 
To perfect a claim based upon prescription there 
must, of course, be conduct which constitutes an 
actual invasion of the former owner's rights so as 
to entitle him to bring an action ... 
Appropriative and pre~criptive rights to ground 
water, as well as the rights of an overlying owner, 
are subject to loss by adverse user. This is in 
accord with the rule announced in cases dealing 
with water in. a surface stream. (207 Pac. 2d. 17 et 
seq.). 
In a rather complicated maneuver, the court then 
adopted a theory of "mutual prescription" which 
effectively destroyed priorities between users, and 
put everyone on a rather equal basis. VVhile that 
characterization is an over-simplification, it accounts 
for the fact that the court's decision marked the way 
for eHective and efficient management of groundwater 
basins in California. 
The California Supreme Court reached similar 
decisions in other cases, and the legislature took cue 
by enacting various statutes to facilitate groundwater 
management. In 1951 the legislature provided tbat use 
of water to replenish or recharge a groundwater basin 
was a beneficial (and therefore legal) use of water 
(Cal. VVater Code, sec. 1005.2), further provided that 
existing rights could be satisfied with imported water 
(Cal. VVater Code, sec. 1005.1), and also conferred 
authority on the VV ater Resources Control Board to 
enjoin harmful pumping which would allow salt water 
intrusion into basins which were subject to water 
rights adjudication (Cal. Water Code, sec. 2020). 
Thus, it may be said that general management 
and administration of groundwater basins in California 
are perhaps further advanced than in any other State 
in the Union-and water-use fees are undeniably a key 
feature in the success of the system. But it also must 
be said that the system was made possible, at least in 
major part, by the doctrine of mutual prescription as 
adopted by the state supreme court. 
No other state supreme court has applied that 
doctrine so eHectively to groundwater basins, and 
there is no way that legislation could accomplish the 
same result. This is so because the adjudication of 
existing rights in groundwater basins is exclusively 
within the province of the judiciary, and the 
legislature cannot constitutionally adjudicate or define 
the limit of existing property rights. 
In short, the success of the California. system 
cannot be exported to other States unless their 
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supreme courts adjudicate a result similar to that 
reached in the Pasadena case, supra. It must be 
emphasized, however, that these observations relate 
to developed (or over-developed) groundwater basins, 
and not to basins which have unappropriated water. In 
the latter event, imposition of water-use fees would 
present fewer problems, but, as will be noted below, 
might not be as simple as with surface watercourses 
because of the hydrostatic pressure problem. 
2. Present "Retail" VVater-Use Fees 
Purely by way of comparison and illustration, it is 
to be noted that there are no legal impediments to the 
imposition of water-use fees by those who have 
acquired appropriation water rights. VVhile water 
rights cannot be acquired for speculation or monopoly, 
public and quasi-public entities are allowed to acquire 
appropriation water rights and then sell the water in 
various ways to the users. These entities include 
towns, cities, water improvement districts, water 
conservancy districts, metropolitan water districts, 
federal agencies (notably the Bureau of Reclamation, 
but also the Corps of Army Engineers), and even 
private companies operating for profit who have 
obtained certificates of convenience and necessity 
from the State (see, generally, E. VV. Clyde and D. VV. 
Jensen, Administrative Allocation of Water, p. 77 et 
seq. (National Water Commission, NTIS PB-205-249, 
1971). 
The entities mentioned above sometimes enter 
into long-term water delivery contracts for specific 
annual charges, sometimes charge monthly or periodic 
rates for household and culinary use, and sometimes 
"wholesale" the water to other entities for subsequent 
retail sales to users (most typically the case with the 
Bureau of Reclamation on large projects). VVhile most 
of these charges are designed to recoup the cost of 
construction of facilities and operation and mainte-
nance costs, in some instances the fees are designed to 
produce a profit (as is the case with private companies 
operating as public utilities with certificates of 
convenience and necessity). The only difference 
between the fees charged by these entities, and 
potential fees to be charged directly by the State for 
use of previously unappropriated water, is that the 
agencies and entities mentioned above have gone 
through the procedure of acquiring appropriation 
water rights (without cost, other than payment of a 
modest filing fee), and have thus acquired a "right" to 
the use of the water that they sell. The related 
question is whether the State, which created the 
water rights in favor of these agencies, has an initial 
right to sell the water or impose fees for its use-as 
distinguished from the present practice of simply 
creating rights of use in applicants. 
3. Analytical Position of Utah Division 
of VV ater Resources 
The Utah Division of Water Resources, as 
governed by the Board of VV ater Resources, is 
authorized to acquire water rights through filings 
made with the Utah State Engineer (see section 
73-10-19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). Acting in 
accordance with this authorization, the Board has 
obtained a number of approved applications, notably 
on the Fremont, White and Escalante Rivers. Other 
applications of the Board are pending action by the 
State Engineer. 
At the present time there is an active interest, 
and, to some degree, a competition among prospective 
water users to acquire water-use rights under these 
approved applications. The most significant aspect is 
that the Board of Water Resources is not obligated by 
law to assign these applications, or rights of water use 
under them, to water users free of water-use charges. 
In contrast, the State Engineer is obligated by statute 
to process and act on applications to appropriate 
water, but he may charge no fees other than the 
prescribed filing fee. Thus, the Board of Water 
Resources has no such statutory limitations on fees to 
be charged, and appears to stand in a position similar 
to that of the Bureau of Reclamation or a conservancy 
district that has acquired an approved application 
under state law. 
The interesting feature, of course, is that if the 
Board of Water Resources were to decide, as a matter 
of administrative policy, to develop water under its 
approved applications and to deliver such water under 
a system of water-use fees, then the State would in 
fact be imposing fees for the use of water. This would 
be a different institutional arrangement from a 
hypothetical case in which the State Engineer would 
be authorized to impose fees on all unappropriated 
water, because the Board of Water Resources has 
made the initial step in the appropriation process by 
acquiring approved applications. 
This merely suggests that, among the potential 
alternatives for imposition of water-use fees, are (1) 
selective imposition by authorizing a state agency to 
obtain from the State Engineer approved applications 
in areas where the public interest is most pronounced, 
or (2) authorizing or requiring the State Engineer to 
impose a statutory schedule of fees on all new water 
applications (and thus eliminating the traditional 
appropriation system of acquiring water rights). 
IV. Summary: Constitutional Considerations 
The foregoing discussion has explained in 
summary manner some of the legal implications of 
imposing water-use fees directly by the State. A 
considerable number of minor or tangential problems 
could be itemized, but problems of such a nature can 
be resolved when a program of water-use fees is 
defined with specificity and proposed for implementa-
tion. Of present interest are those problems of a major 
and substantive nature that cast serious clouds on the 
basic legality of any program to charge water-use 
fees. And they are the problems that are listed below. 
As a preliminary matter, it must be observed that 
no appropriation State has present legislative autho-
rity to impose water-use fees. Therefore, legislation 
would have to be enacted before such a system could 
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be implemented. Thus, there is little point in itemizing 
the numerous ways in which such a system would 
conflict with present statutory law. The salient 
question, then, has to do with the legal problems that 
relate to the constitutionality of any proposed 
legislation to authorize water-use fees by the State. 
The three most importnat constitutional problems are 
discussed below. 
A. Guaranteed Right of Appropriation 
Some appropriation States have constitutional 
provisions which declare, in substance, that the right 
to appropriate the waters of the State for beneficial 
use shall never be denied (see, e.g., Idaho Const., art. 
XV, sec. 3; Colo. Const., art. XVI, sec. 6). Since the 
appropriation process traditionally has been one of 
diverting unappropriated water from watercourses 
for beneficial use, without payment of water-use fee, 
the question arises as to whether the imposition 
water-use fees is so fundamentally in opposition to the 
concept of appropriation so as to be unconstitutional. 
If so, then, of course, the state legislature would be 
without power to authorize water-use fees. 
Two observations are in order: (1) this constraint 
applies only to those States that have such 
constitutional limitations; and (2) the legal meaning 
and effect of such limitations, with respect to 
water-use fees, are open questions, and will remain so 
until definitively decided by the supreme courts of the 
States having such provisions. There is no federal 
question involved, and so the final answer for any 
particular State must come from the supreme court of 
that State. 
B. Public Nature of Water 
It is rather common for the constitutions of 
appropriation States to provide, in substance, that 
unappropriated water is the property of the public 
(see e.g., New Mexico Const., art. XVI; Wyo. Const., 
art. VIII, sec. 1). The basic concept here is that the 
State does not "own" water in the sense that it owns 
land, buildings, or automobiles, but that it merely 
administers and regulates use of the water resource 
for the benefit of the public. 
A comparable example might be wild game, 
which is said to be owned by the public and is to be 
regulated and managed by the State for public use. 
Thus, the State does not "own" a deer in the forest, 
but it has the sole and exclusive authority to prescribe 
regulations for the management and hunting of deer. 
Of course, statutes require payment of a sort of "use 
fee" by the hunter who purchases the license. But 
these fees, in the main, are designed to cover the cost 
of managing, conserving, and administering the 
resource and the public use of it-much the same as 
the water application fees charged by the State 
Engineer are designed to cover his administrative 
costs in processing the application. 
However, non-resident hunting and fishing 
license fees are higher than those paid by residents; 
and it probably is true that big game license fees 
underwrite part of the cost of managing the fishery 
resource. By analogy, it might be said that water-use 
fees could be implemented at rates that would provide 
a surplus to underwrite other functions of state 
government. 
In short, the question is an open question that 
would, again, have to be answered by the supreme 
court for each State having a constitutional provision 
declaring that unappropriated water is owned by the 
public. 
C. Hydrostatic Pressure 
Groundwater basins pose a separate problem 
with respect to hydrostatic pressure. As a general 
rule, an appropriation water right includes a right to 
the established means of diversion as well as to the 
amount of water actually diverted for beneficial use. 
With underground water rights, the pertinent 
question is whether the hydrostatic pressure in 
existence at the time that a particular right was 
acquired becomes a part of that right in that it is an 
essential feature of the means of diversion employed 
to obtain the water. 
In other words, in some underground basins the 
early appropriators received sufficient water by 
artesian pressure, or were required to pump from 
very shallow depths. As more appropriators withdraw 
water from the basin, the hydrostatic pressure 
lowered, and greater pump lifts were required. This 
has created serious problems in determining whether 
the early appropriators can enjoin the later appropria-
tors from any further withdrawal of the water from 
the basin, or whether they are entitled to compensa-
tion in an amount that will cover their increased cost 
of pumping from the greater depths. 
The problem is aggravated, from a standpoint of 
efficiency of use, by higher-valued uses that can afford 
to pay higher pumping costs. Thus, if irrigation users 
acquired the early rights in an underground basin, but 
had not fully appropriated the water within the basin, 
it would be possible for industrial or municipal users to 
establish later rights because they would be able to 
sustain the cost of pumping from greater depths. If 
87 
there is no protection with respect to the means of 
diversion (hydrostatic pressure), municipal and indus-
trial users could thus drill new wells and pump water 
from a depth of, say, 1,000 feet, whereas irrigators 
could not afford such pumping costs. The water might 
still be in the basin for the irrigators, but at a depth 
which, to them, is too costly to obtain. Do they have a 
legal remedy? 
This question is still an open question in most 
States. In Utah, for example, the Supreme Court has 
held, with respect to changes in existing underground 
water rights, that a user does not have an absolute 
guarantee to hydrostatic pressure, but must suffer 
some reasonable reduction in that pressure in order to 
assure maximum beneficial development of the 
underground basin; and indicated that each user must 
comply with this standard as a means of employing a 
reasonably efficient means of diversion (Wayman v. 
Murray City, 23 U.2d 97, 458, P.2d 861 (1969)). 
With respect to a state system of charging 
water-use fees, it will be necessary to determine 
whether such fees for water withdrawn will have to be 
scaled to amounts sufficient to compensate prior users 
for increased pumping costs made necessary by 
reduced hydrostatic pressure, resulting from addi-
tional water withdrawn by the State for delivery 
under the water-use fee program. Again, this answer 
must come from the supreme court of each State that 
considers implementing a system of water-use fees. 
V. Conclusion 
Since this paper is designed as a general overview 
of the major legal implications that will arise from any 
system to impose water-use fees in appropriation 
States, the conclusions are tentative. While further 
legal research could refine the nature of the problems, 
and forecast with greater accuracy the probable 
resolution of the constitutional questions, it is likely 
that definitive answers to the problems set forth 
above can only be supplied by the supreme court of the 
particular State that desires to draft legislation to 
implement a program to charge water-use fees. When 
that time arises, then careful legal research would be 
necessary to assess the problems in light of the 
statutes and decisional law of the particular State. 

APPENDIXF 
GEOMETRIC AND ALGEBRAIC PROOFS OF 
EXCISE TAXES 
INTRODUCTION 
"Excise taxes" can be classified as two types. One 
type is the "unit tax" or the "straight levy." Under 
this type, each unit of a taxed commodity or base is 
taxed a specific amount. A second type, the "ad 
valorem tax" is calculated as a percentage of the 
selling price of the taxed item. 
Most excise tax theory concerns itseU with the 
effects of excise taxes upon monopolies, oligopolies, 
monopolistic competitors, and pure competition. 
Unless otherwise stated, all discussion of theory 
presented herein is in terms of partial-equilibrium 
analysis, since very little has or can be said about 
effects of excise taxes under dynamic-equilibrium. 
Three publications (Bishop, 1968; Musgrave,1959; 
Taubman, 1965) develop the theory of excise taxes in 
various industries and discuss special cases found in 
the theory. The discussion which follows is based 
largely on these works. The economic analysis 
presented utilizes simplifying functions for ease of 
understanding. The use of linear functions facilitates 
not only the mathematical presentation of the theory 
but also an accompanying graphic analysis. A more 
rigorous analysis is presented in the articles just cited 
and can be referred to if the linear assumption is 
inappropriate. 
Given a linear demand function of the form p = 
a + bx and a supply function of the form s = c+dx and 
the market equilibrium clearing condition s = p, it can 
be shown that if a unit tax of t is levied, the 
corresp<.mding change in price (IJ. p) is given by the 
expression: 
_ b ~p - b - (d)t 
If d > 0 and b < 0 as is the case in Figure F -1, price 
will go up less than the tax levied (P1-Po< t). This is 
accounted for by the upward sloping supply curve. As 
price rises, the quantity taken goes down and part of 
the tax increase is absorbed in lower production costs. 
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At this stage it is important to note several things: 1) 
if the industry is one of constant costs (d = 0) then 
price goes up by the amount of the tax no matter what 
the demand conditions; 2) change in price is dependent 
only upon the slopes of the demand and supply 
functions and not their intercepts; and 3) the ratio of 
the price increase to the unit tax is equal to the ratio of 
the elasticity of demand over the sum of the elasticity 
'of demand and supply. In mathematical notation: 
=_€-
€+ 17 
In the diagrammatic analysis, Figure F-1, initial 
equilibrium is at Mo with output of Qo and price of Po. 
A unit tax of BD is imposed and the new intersection 
of price net-of-tax and supply is at MI. Q1 units are 
produced and sold at a price of Pl. 
$ 
Figure F-l. Competitive Industry. 
$ 
As shown in Figure F -3, an ad valorem tax can be 
represented by a downward rotation of the demand D 
curve. If the industry is one of constant costs over the 
relevant range (d = 0) it can be shown that the change 
in price is as follows: 
cr 
dp =G 
and thus varies directly with the intercept of the 
supply function. It is useful to note that in general the 
price increase is dependent upon both the intercepts 
and the slopes of the supply and demand equations. 
Units 
Figure F-2. Monopoly. 
MONOPOLY 
In the case of the monopoly, if we begin with the 
demand function p = a + bx and the cost function C 
= c + dx, and a unit tax of t is introduced, the change 
in price is as follows: 
b 
dp = 2(b-d)t 
which is one-half the change under the competitive 
case (this is always true with linear functions since the 
marginal revenue curve has twice the slope of the 
average revenue curve). Again for the case of constant 
cost (d=O) we find that ~p=l/Zt. 
In Figure F -2 the monopoly case is shown with 
initial demand curve AB, marginal revenue curve BK 
and cost curve of EF. Initial equilibrium is at N with 
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Figure F-3. Competitive Industry. 
QQ being produced and sold at a price Po. A unit tax of 
Bu is now levied. The new demand curve becomes CD 
with marginal revenue curve DH. The new equilib-
rium is at R with Ql units produced and sold at a price 
Pl· 
The ad valorem tax under monopoly is illustrated 
in Figure F-4. With linear cost and demand curves and 
an ad valorem tax I'ate r, and with constant cost (d = 
p) the price change will be: 
dp 1/2 (IC\) 
It will be noted that this again represents exactly 
half the price change noted under the unit tax. Figure 
F -4 is labeled as the other diagrams and its analysis is 
similar. 
Figure F-~. Monopoly. 
The case of monopolistic competition is much 
more difficult to analyze since the "industry" is 
comprised of many producers each faced with a highly 
elastic, yet downward sloping demand curve for their 
product. With free-entry and no externalities, the 
equilibrium position exists where the average revenue 
(of the group-demand schedule) equals the average 
unit cost of the individual firm. Musgrave (1959) 
points out that if a unit tax is now imposed, we will 
witness a contracting of output and perhaps even a 
slight exodus from the industry. Eventually prices will 
rise enough to allow those left to recover part of the 
previous decline. Prices will rise but in the case of 
monopolistic competition with its limited production 
differentiation, price rises will fluctuate from firm to 
firm. A more complete analysis of many of the issues 
involved with monopolistic competition is discussed in 
the classic work of Due (1942). 
With oligopoly many alternative results are 
possible depending upon number of firms, shape of 
cost and revenue curves, and at what point on the 
curves equilibrium occurs. No attempt will be made to 
discuss the various alternatives here since they are 
discussed in some detail in Due (1942) and Sweezy 
(1939). However, one interesting phenomenon may 
occur under oligopoly which does not occur under any 
other market structure. This is illustrated in Figure 
F-5. 
$ 
B 
p 
o 
E 
Figure F-S. Kinked demand. 
A units 
The demand curve is the kinked line AB and the 
corresponding marginal revenue is represented by the 
broken line BCDE. The line FG is the oligopolist's 
marginal cost schedule. A unit tax is now imposed and 
is represented by an upward shift of the cost schedule 
to LM. A downward shift of demand curve AB would 
yield the same result. In this case, however, price 
remains constant at Po' and there is no reduction of 
output. The entire tax is paid for out of the profit of 
the oligopolist. 
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Unit tax and ad valorem tax compared 
Again using linear schedules it would be useful to 
compare the effect of a unit tax as compared to an ad 
valorem tax. How they are to be compared depends 
upon the purpose of the agent imposing the tax. If the 
purpose is to raise a certain amount of funds or 
restrict output to a given level we can compare them 
using Figure F -6 in the case of a competitive market. 
$ 
c 
Q 
1 
G A 
1 
s 
Figure F-6. Perfect competition equal yield. 
units 
Initial equilibrium without tax is at K. A unit tax 
is now levied if BH and new eqUilibrium is established 
at E with price PJ. Total tax yield is represented by 
DEFP1. For an a valorem tax to provide equal yield, 
the new after-tax demand curve must pass through E 
and is represented by the line CA. In either case price, 
quantity, and yield are the same; however, as we look 
at the initial position we see that the initial burden 
was not the same. At the initial price Po' the unit tax 
equals MK but the ad valorem tax equals only LK. 
Since LK < MK the initial burden is greater under the 
unit tax and an ad valorem tax would be better. If it is 
necessary or desirable to formulate a tax with equal 
initial burden, the opposite question may be asked: 
What is the result when an ad valorem and a unit tax 
of equal initial burden are levied? As is illustrated in 
Figure F -7, the ad valorem tax results in a higher 
price and a lower output. The total yield depends on 
the elasticities of demand and supply at the various 
quantities. IT the goal of the controlling agency were 
to curtail consumption of the taxed product; however, 
the obvious choice would be the ad valorem tax. 
In Figure F -8 we can compare the effect of an ad 
valorem and a unit tax which tax a monopoly in such a 
way as to generate the same final quantity and price. 
In eqUilibrium after the imposition of the tax, the price 
is PI and the quantity if Ql. One important difference 
exists however, the total tax yield with the ad valorem 
B 
H 
P2 
P 
1 
$ 
units 
Figure F-7. Perfect competition equal initial burden. 
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Figure F-8. Monopoly - equal ftngl output and price. 
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tax is HRMP1' while the unit tax yields only KLMP10 
From a revenue generating viewpoint. the ad valorem 
tax appears the more efficient. All of the above 
comments in some way depend upon the underlying 
shapes of the demand and cost (or supply) schedules. 
TAX BASE 
Several major problems arise with respect to the 
tax base. By base, in this instance, we mean the group 
of commodities to which the tax applies. Hatch (1964) 
indicates that many problems incurred in current 
excise tax structures could be corrected if administra-
tors would see a broader base. That is, if a tax is to be 
imposed on recreational equipment as luxury items it 
would be better to levy the tax on all recreational 
equipment rather than a more narrow base, say boats 
only. Shoup (1964) further justifies this policy, 
arguing that supply of a narrowly defined commodity 
will be relatively inelastic while close substitutes will 
cause a relatively more elastic demand schedule. If the 
factors of production of the specific commodity are 
specialized, a narrow based tax can be shifted back 
almost entirely on the factors of production when the 
purpose is usually to tax the user (consumer) of the 
taxed item. A broader base alleviates, or at least 
reduces, the problem. The other problem related to 
base, relates to base defined not as the commodity to 
be taxed, but rather the group upon which the tax will 
fall. The problems are referred to by Due (1971) as the 
"border city" and "border state" problems. The 
essence of the problem in either case is that when a 
tax is levied in any particular state (city), the 
surrounding states (cities) may not follow suit. If the 
tax increase is substantial and the transportation costs 
are minimal or at least less in comparison, then we will 
see a substantial shift of purchases to the states 
(cities) taxing at a lower rate. Hamovitch (1966) found 
that when New York City raised its sales tax, the loss 
in sales was significantly more than the expected loss 
due to the substitution or income effects. However, in 
Alabama where there was little opportunity to 
substitute for untaxed items, there was no significant 
loss in sales beyond the income and substitution 
effects. These results would indicate that a federal 
excise tax would probably result in better tax control. 
Another problem closely related to base is the 
definitions to be employed. For example. how much 
fur must a coat have before it is fur coat? In 
formulating a tax policy there is a tradeoff between 
the relative ease of defining under a narrow base, and 
the definitional difficulties of a broad base (but with its 
other tax advantages). 
APPENDIXG 
HOUSE BILL NO. 458 
State of Washington 
44th Regular Session 
by Representatives Valle, Pardini and 
Thompson (by Executive request) 
Read first time February 3, 1975, and referred to 
Committee on Ecology. 
An Act Relating to fees for water permits; and 
adding new sections to chapter 90.03 RCW. 
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE 
STATE OF WASHINGTON: 
NEW SECTION. Section 1. There is added to 
chapter 90.03 RCW a new section to read as follows: 
The department of ecology may include, as a 
condition of approval of an application for a permit 
now or hereafter fIled with department pursuant to 
RCW 90.03.250 or 90.44.060, any or all ofthe following 
in a permit issued pursuant to RCS 90.03.290 and 
90.44.060: 
1. A condition establishing a reasonable fee to 
be paid to the state for the use of public waters. In 
relation thereto: 
(a) The fee, which may be graduated based 
on increasing volumes of use, shall be set in 
accordance with general schedules of fees 
contained in rules adopted by the department; 
(b) No fee may be included as a permit 
condition prior to the adoption of rules as 
described in subsection (1) (a) of this section; 
and 
(c) The fee shall relate only to rights to 
divert or withdraw and make use of significant 
amounts of public waters for industrial, 
commercial, and agricultural irrigation pur-
poses. 
2. A condition establishing a date of termina-
tion of the permit and the authority embodied therein 
to divert or withdraw and make use of public waters. 
In relation therefore: 
(a) The date of termination shall be set in 
accordance with formulas contained in rules 
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adopted by the department; 
(b) No date of termination of a permit may 
included prior to the adoption of rules as 
described in subseciton (2) (a) of this section; 
(c) In the development of rules and the 
determination of a term of a permit, considera-
tion shall be given, among other factors, to the 
adequacy of the time period necessary for full 
development of the use related to the permit 
taking into account economic factors; 
(d) No permit shall have a term of less than 
ten years or more than fifty years from the date 
of issuance; and 
(e) The term shall relate only to rights to 
divert or withdraw and make use of significant 
amounts of public water for industrial, com-
mercial, and agricultural irrigation uses. 
3. A condition providing that the holder of a 
permit to withdraw or divert and make use of public 
waters for beneficial uses shall manage, formally 
dedicate, or otherwise provide, as the department 
shall determine in accordance with general rules 
adopted by the department, portions of the lands or 
improvements to which the right to use water 
generally relates so as to promote public interest and 
values. Public interest and values as used herein shall 
include, but not be limited to, recreational, scenic, 
aesthetic, wildlife, and fisheries interests and values. 
Whenever a condition of management or dedication of 
lands or improvements or other requirement as 
provided in this subsection is included in a permit, any 
fee included under authority of subsection (1) of this 
section shall be reduced in proportion to the value of 
the requirement or the former condition. 
4. A condition limiting the size of lands to 
which a permit to withdraw or divert and make use of 
significant amounts of public waters for agricultural 
irrigation and other beneficial uses may apply. In 
relation thereto: . 
(a) The limitation shall be set in accordance 
with formulas and criteria contained in rules 
adopted by the department; and 
(b) No limitation may be included as a 
permit condition prior to the adoption of such 
rules. 
New Section. Sec. 2. There is added to chapter 
90.03 ReWa new seetion to read as follows: 
The fees paid to the state as provided in section 
1 (1) of this 1975 act shall be divided and placed as 
follows: 
1. Eighty percent in the water protection 
account of the general fund; aild 
2. Twenty percent in the water resources 
enforcement account of the general fund. 
New Section. Sec. 3. There is added to chapter 
90.03 ReWa new section to read as follows: 
In relation to the conditioning of permits by terms 
as authorized under section 1 (2) of this 1975 act, the 
department shall, at the request of a permit holder, 
extend the permit as conditioned originally or with 
new conditions if the department determines that an 
extension is consistent with the public interest as 
94 
determined through the application of criteria 
contained in rules established by the department. 
New Section. Sec. 4. There is added to chapter 
90.03 ReWa new ~'ection to read as follows: 
There is established in the general fund the 
following revolving accounts: 
1. The water protection account; the moneys 
of said accounts to be used by the department either 
by direct expenditures or through grant or loan or 
other arrangements to public entities, for the planning 
for, and acquisition, construction, and improvement of 
public waste disposal and water supply facilities, 
including agricultural, irrigation, and water distribu-
tion facilities, and land development facilities associ-
ated therewith. 
,2. The water law enforcement account; the 
moneys of said account to be used by the department 
to perform administrative and enforcement responsi-
bilities arising under chapters fO.03, 90.14, 90.44, 
90.48, and 90.54 ReW. 
